Afghanistan's Future
President Obama's decision to negotiate directly with the Taliban in Qatar, with no other precondition than never to let Afghanistan become a terrorist haven again, has shaken President Karzai's government.
But what led to the predicted scenario that has further shaken [Karzai’s government] is a political office with the practical rank of an embassy that flaunted the Taliban flag in the wind along with a plaque with the inscription, "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," one week before its opening. President Obama has been forced to explain himself and suspend initial talks with the Taliban after an angry Karzai broke off negotiations with the U.S. to keep American troops in Afghanistan after their scheduled departure next year.
For the main players, the countdown that will seal Afghanistan’s future has begun after more than 10 years of war. The peace talks will require all involved to make difficult decisions. For president Obama, it will be no easy task to express his public opinion at the beginning of talks with an opponent that has not been defeated and continues to kill American soldiers. The same can be said about the Taliban, who have scored talks with the West.
Its most radical leaders, who feel invincible due to their ability to keep the war going, will fight until the final farewell of NATO, for [they] understand what is most politically profitable. However, the Taliban's strategy to keep fighting while negotiating might prove difficult to explain to many of their fanatical jihadists.
The peace talks are decisive for Karzai, the weakest link, who, after agreeing to participate in the talks, has changed his mind and affirmed that his government, illegitimate to the Taliban, will not get involved in the talks until they are just between Afghans. It is imperative for Karzai, who has one more year in power, to assert his precarious authority in the face of what the future might hold, despite his dependence on foreign troops and money to maintain power.
Karzai, who seems to be losing footing, refuses to be marginalized by a possible agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban. This is a distant but plausible possibility, since the insurgents have been portrayed in Doha as an alternative government to Kabul's.
But what led to the predicted scenario that has further shaken [Karzai’s government] is a political office with the practical rank of an embassy that flaunted the Taliban flag in the wind along with a plaque with the inscription, "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," one week before its opening. President Obama has been forced to explain himself and suspend initial talks with the Taliban after an angry Karzai broke off negotiations with the U.S. to keep American troops in Afghanistan after their scheduled departure next year.
For the main players, the countdown that will seal Afghanistan’s future has begun after more than 10 years of war. The peace talks will require all involved to make difficult decisions. For president Obama, it will be no easy task to express his public opinion at the beginning of talks with an opponent that has not been defeated and continues to kill American soldiers. The same can be said about the Taliban, who have scored talks with the West.
Its most radical leaders, who feel invincible due to their ability to keep the war going, will fight until the final farewell of NATO, for [they] understand what is most politically profitable. However, the Taliban's strategy to keep fighting while negotiating might prove difficult to explain to many of their fanatical jihadists.
The peace talks are decisive for Karzai, the weakest link, who, after agreeing to participate in the talks, has changed his mind and affirmed that his government, illegitimate to the Taliban, will not get involved in the talks until they are just between Afghans. It is imperative for Karzai, who has one more year in power, to assert his precarious authority in the face of what the future might hold, despite his dependence on foreign troops and money to maintain power.
Karzai, who seems to be losing footing, refuses to be marginalized by a possible agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban. This is a distant but plausible possibility, since the insurgents have been portrayed in Doha as an alternative government to Kabul's.