America: The Stick in Place of the Carrot!
When the Obama administration fails in its “stick” policy with Iran, it will return and confirm its failure with a “carrot” policy. That was shown in the strange decision in style and timing when the Obama administration decided to suspend aid to Egypt. It was the decision that will not only leave an impact on Egypt, but on all the moderate countries in the region which count among the most important and principal allies of the United States.
The Obama administration’s decision returns us to the middle of the last century, when the American administration tried to pressure Egypt and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to finance the Aswan Dam project. The result was disastrous; that refusal turned to volcanic anger in the Egyptian streets, which weakened the United States’ image in the region.
Confronted by the Aswan Dam in the ‘60s, what came from the Egyptian people, supported by its army, on July 30 was the rebuilding of the national, political dam by a new and powerful lever.
It was a failure in the politics of the stick. It turned a state the size of America to begging with Iran regarding its nuclear issue, which has existed for more than 10 years without anything new, only the extension of the scope of Iranian political geography and Iran’s increasing influence. This begging was not even conditional on regional issues and cases. Iran must discuss its intransigent position. All the data from this failure make the decision on the policy of the carrot regarding the Egyptian situation surprising — it punishes an ally at a time when its stability is among the most important factors for stability and balancing political situations in the region.
On the other hand, the timing of the decision will give negative signs regarding support for the Egyptian army and security forces in the war on terrorism in the Sinai and the surrounding regions, in which armed, violent groups have run rampant after rebounding from the period of the [Muslim] Brotherhood government. It takes form in the failure to eliminate the real threat to the security of Israel. The important key is in reading the United States’ relationship with the region.
The excess of the reaction to the United States’ decision is not as important now as stemming the tide and restoring the healthy relationship with America. That is the most important aid. That is through the cancellation of the decision to implement the new political roadmap realizing the highest standards of pluralism, constituent rights and non-intervention in the political process.
The Obama administration should negotiate flexibly with Iran, despite the increase of its political influence in neighboring states and regions burning with conflict, in return for the firmness with which the Egyptian government is treated, although it is a rebuilding state. This turns us to the true crisis in assessing the position in the region where the “unresolved” situation on the Syrian scene that has contributed to the heated political situation and the laxity of support for stability in Egypt have caused the United States to miss the opportunity to reinstate its presence in the region as a strong and large ally of Egypt.
The question is: How much remains of the United States’ stock in the countries of the region to ensure the functioning of its strategic interests, despite all this confusion about its stances?
The position depends on the United States’ behavior throughout the remaining period of the current administration; the extent of its impact depends on the outstanding crises, especially the Syrian crisis, and in general. The general context suggests the survival of the state of confusion in the absence of any profound imbalances in the scales of power in the region.
The Obama administration’s decision returns us to the middle of the last century, when the American administration tried to pressure Egypt and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to finance the Aswan Dam project. The result was disastrous; that refusal turned to volcanic anger in the Egyptian streets, which weakened the United States’ image in the region.
Confronted by the Aswan Dam in the ‘60s, what came from the Egyptian people, supported by its army, on July 30 was the rebuilding of the national, political dam by a new and powerful lever.
It was a failure in the politics of the stick. It turned a state the size of America to begging with Iran regarding its nuclear issue, which has existed for more than 10 years without anything new, only the extension of the scope of Iranian political geography and Iran’s increasing influence. This begging was not even conditional on regional issues and cases. Iran must discuss its intransigent position. All the data from this failure make the decision on the policy of the carrot regarding the Egyptian situation surprising — it punishes an ally at a time when its stability is among the most important factors for stability and balancing political situations in the region.
On the other hand, the timing of the decision will give negative signs regarding support for the Egyptian army and security forces in the war on terrorism in the Sinai and the surrounding regions, in which armed, violent groups have run rampant after rebounding from the period of the [Muslim] Brotherhood government. It takes form in the failure to eliminate the real threat to the security of Israel. The important key is in reading the United States’ relationship with the region.
The excess of the reaction to the United States’ decision is not as important now as stemming the tide and restoring the healthy relationship with America. That is the most important aid. That is through the cancellation of the decision to implement the new political roadmap realizing the highest standards of pluralism, constituent rights and non-intervention in the political process.
The Obama administration should negotiate flexibly with Iran, despite the increase of its political influence in neighboring states and regions burning with conflict, in return for the firmness with which the Egyptian government is treated, although it is a rebuilding state. This turns us to the true crisis in assessing the position in the region where the “unresolved” situation on the Syrian scene that has contributed to the heated political situation and the laxity of support for stability in Egypt have caused the United States to miss the opportunity to reinstate its presence in the region as a strong and large ally of Egypt.
The question is: How much remains of the United States’ stock in the countries of the region to ensure the functioning of its strategic interests, despite all this confusion about its stances?
The position depends on the United States’ behavior throughout the remaining period of the current administration; the extent of its impact depends on the outstanding crises, especially the Syrian crisis, and in general. The general context suggests the survival of the state of confusion in the absence of any profound imbalances in the scales of power in the region.