America Lands Itself in East Asia 'Alliance Dilemma'
America is once again destined to fight for the stability of its hegemony.
Last month, Eastern European and Western countries suffered Russia’s powerful sortie into Ukraine, leading to a significant alteration of Europe’s national borders, while America took no initiative to deal with the situation. Despite justifications that America needn’t stick out its neck for Ukraine, which is not its ally, this event will certainly produce negative effects for the United States. Very soon, this will come to East Asia.
East Asia’s circumstances are obviously different than Eastern Europe’s. U.S. allies in East Asia — the Philippines and Japan — have always stood at the front line of provocation with China. The Philippines clearly came prepared for the activities at Ayungin Shoal in late March, from allowing journalists on a fishing boat carrying soldiers to photograph official Chinese boating operations, to filing a lawsuit against China in the International Court of Arbitration — it’s just like a combination punch.
Additionally, Japan is determined to oppose China on historical issues until the very end. When Chinese President Xi Jinping brought up the Nanjing Massacre during a visit abroad, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga openly quibbled over the number of massacre victims; he also stated that since the war Japan has consistently made contributions to “world peace,” ignoring the uninterrupted infractions against its pacifist constitution.
China has responded with severe criticism of various recent provocations from the Philippines and Japan. And the U.S. has expressed its fervent desire to support the Philippines from the very beginning. The U.S. State Department has even taken the charge of “provoker” and placed it upon China’s head, making it so the Philippines need not fear any form of reprisal. As for the World War II historical issue with Japan, the U.S. is unable to publicly offer support. However, America is using the late-April International Naval Review, to be held in Qingdao, as a chance to make its position known. China did not invite Japan to participate in this naval review, so the U.S. decided to decline its invitation; this is tantamount to taking Japan’s side.
In a system of alliances, world powers must provide security safeguards for lesser nations, and lesser nations also have a duty to provide a screen of security for dominant countries. Currently, Japan and the Philippines are both entangled in territorial disputes with China; originally, this had no connection to the United States. But due to the existence of alliances, objectively there can be no doubt that Japan and the Philippines will uphold the real presence of their American ally in the East Asia region. America is very clear about what kind of position Japan and the Philippines would have in the structure of East Asia if they were to lose America’s favor. This not only implies that the U.S. is thoroughly overturning the structure of East Asia established through many years of operations in the Western Pacific — it further implies that the U.S. reputation and trust among its alliances in the Far East will utterly collapse. This will undoubtedly be catastrophic to the maintenance of U.S. hegemony.
However, there is still another side to this matter. Japan and the Philippines would never be so delightedly willing to serve as America’s pawns. For this reason, the U.S. must pay tremendous costs to maintain social stability. For the Philippines, America will have no choice but to supply a huge amount of military and economic assistance, to support the Philippines’ every unfolding provocation against China. And Japan, despite being temporarily unable to cast off its subordinate position in its alliance with the U.S., has appeared in recent years to deviate increasingly to the right politically and has actively sought dominance with its every political and military action, none of which are at all positive for America.
America undoubtedly has landed itself in an “alliance dilemma” in East Asia. On one hand it needs to protect its interests in East Asia; on the other hand it cannot satisfy every supposed “reasonable demand” of its allies. As America’s relative strength begins to decline, its alliance dilemma will become more obvious.
Actually, this is the result of America’s thinking, which has not jumped out of the vicious cycle of the Cold War. If America wants to walk away from this dilemma, it must revise its perception of China. Since long ago China has clearly expressed that its development would not obstruct America’s interests in the Asia-Pacific. If the U.S. insists on believing that China’s efforts to defend sovereignty jeopardize U.S. interests, then it will fall deeper and deeper into the alliance dilemma.
Last month, Eastern European and Western countries suffered Russia’s powerful sortie into Ukraine, leading to a significant alteration of Europe’s national borders, while America took no initiative to deal with the situation. Despite justifications that America needn’t stick out its neck for Ukraine, which is not its ally, this event will certainly produce negative effects for the United States. Very soon, this will come to East Asia.
East Asia’s circumstances are obviously different than Eastern Europe’s. U.S. allies in East Asia — the Philippines and Japan — have always stood at the front line of provocation with China. The Philippines clearly came prepared for the activities at Ayungin Shoal in late March, from allowing journalists on a fishing boat carrying soldiers to photograph official Chinese boating operations, to filing a lawsuit against China in the International Court of Arbitration — it’s just like a combination punch.
Additionally, Japan is determined to oppose China on historical issues until the very end. When Chinese President Xi Jinping brought up the Nanjing Massacre during a visit abroad, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga openly quibbled over the number of massacre victims; he also stated that since the war Japan has consistently made contributions to “world peace,” ignoring the uninterrupted infractions against its pacifist constitution.
China has responded with severe criticism of various recent provocations from the Philippines and Japan. And the U.S. has expressed its fervent desire to support the Philippines from the very beginning. The U.S. State Department has even taken the charge of “provoker” and placed it upon China’s head, making it so the Philippines need not fear any form of reprisal. As for the World War II historical issue with Japan, the U.S. is unable to publicly offer support. However, America is using the late-April International Naval Review, to be held in Qingdao, as a chance to make its position known. China did not invite Japan to participate in this naval review, so the U.S. decided to decline its invitation; this is tantamount to taking Japan’s side.
In a system of alliances, world powers must provide security safeguards for lesser nations, and lesser nations also have a duty to provide a screen of security for dominant countries. Currently, Japan and the Philippines are both entangled in territorial disputes with China; originally, this had no connection to the United States. But due to the existence of alliances, objectively there can be no doubt that Japan and the Philippines will uphold the real presence of their American ally in the East Asia region. America is very clear about what kind of position Japan and the Philippines would have in the structure of East Asia if they were to lose America’s favor. This not only implies that the U.S. is thoroughly overturning the structure of East Asia established through many years of operations in the Western Pacific — it further implies that the U.S. reputation and trust among its alliances in the Far East will utterly collapse. This will undoubtedly be catastrophic to the maintenance of U.S. hegemony.
However, there is still another side to this matter. Japan and the Philippines would never be so delightedly willing to serve as America’s pawns. For this reason, the U.S. must pay tremendous costs to maintain social stability. For the Philippines, America will have no choice but to supply a huge amount of military and economic assistance, to support the Philippines’ every unfolding provocation against China. And Japan, despite being temporarily unable to cast off its subordinate position in its alliance with the U.S., has appeared in recent years to deviate increasingly to the right politically and has actively sought dominance with its every political and military action, none of which are at all positive for America.
America undoubtedly has landed itself in an “alliance dilemma” in East Asia. On one hand it needs to protect its interests in East Asia; on the other hand it cannot satisfy every supposed “reasonable demand” of its allies. As America’s relative strength begins to decline, its alliance dilemma will become more obvious.
Actually, this is the result of America’s thinking, which has not jumped out of the vicious cycle of the Cold War. If America wants to walk away from this dilemma, it must revise its perception of China. Since long ago China has clearly expressed that its development would not obstruct America’s interests in the Asia-Pacific. If the U.S. insists on believing that China’s efforts to defend sovereignty jeopardize U.S. interests, then it will fall deeper and deeper into the alliance dilemma.