US Interference in the South China Sea Will Only Complicate Matters
According to social commentaries, these recent weeks have seen the Philippines and Vietnamese authorities adopt provocative tactics in response to the territorial disputes occurring within the South China Sea. Along with the recent rhetoric coming out of Japan and the U.S., these acts are causing the South China Sea situation to deteriorate rapidly. The U.S. and Japan have even announced that they want to “unite to curb China,” stating clearly that China must stop obstructing foreign vessels in its waters. This kind of attitude is only going to increase tensions within the South China Sea, as the Philippines and Vietnam become emboldened by the backing of the United States and Japan.
Why is the territorial dispute in the South Sea so tense now? In this author’s reckoning, it is due to causes both recent and long-standing. Four years ago, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sought the signatures of authorities from various countries regarding a previous convention held in 1999. That convention sought to clarify the boundaries of territorial waters, and the U.N. needed the statements on this convention to be submitted before May 13, 2009. This issue directly aggravated the bifurcation between China and various ASEAN nations over the South East China Sea islets. It was precisely from this point that Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and other countries began to unceasingly adopt ambitious strategies in their vying for the islets within the South China Sea area. In May 6 of the same year, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint claim for a 200 nautical mile boundary to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The following day, Vietnam again submitted another claim to the same commission.
In reality, this dispute between China and other southeast Asian nations over this boundary dispute within the South China Sea affects not only these countries, but it also implicates the U.S. and Japan in a conundrum over China’s development and core interests. In recent years, we have seen the U.S. spy ship “Flawless” incident, the Philippines’ forceful occupation of the Scarborough Shoal, and Malaysia’s claim over the Pellet Reef. All of these issues point, coincidentally, to a United States that is meddling within the region from behind the curtains; its aim being to provoke and expand these southeastern islet disputes both in complexity and scale on the international scene. The actions of the “Flawless,” for example, are an excuse for meddling in the South China Sea issue. In spite of the Chinese government’s stern resistance to American surveillance activities, the U.S. excuses itself by claiming that it has the right to operate freely within “international waters.” But in truth, the U.S. is conducting investigative operations within China’s economic zone; this is something which no sovereign country would accept.
In response to both the growing complexity of the situation in the South China Sea and the clandestine operations of the United States in the region, China ought to do more than just proclaim its strong resistance. It ought to adopt more effective methods to defend China’s territory and rights. Firstly, China needs to strengthen the effectiveness of its internal legislation over both domestic and international laws. Specifically, it needs to align its operations in accordance with UNCLOS provisions, thereby ensuring it has the legal backing to defend its rights in these boundary disputes. Taiwan and China must also unite and cooperate on the use of escort ships and trawlers in the region. Doing this will ensure China can lay down the law and exercise its policy that states: “These are ours, so let’s not contend and instead embrace the path of mutual development.”
Since 2009, when the Obama administration began loudly proclaiming its “pivot to Asia” strategy, the South China Sea islets issue has grown in prominence daily. For China to find answers to the issues of territorial rights within the region, it needs to indulge in some deep, probing research. The South China Sea islets, the Diaoyu Islands issue and even the Taiwan issue are all related; they are all historical problems that were left unresolved following the end of World War II. In researching these issues, it is important to make clear their overall historical context and then bring out the major sticking points within that history. According to both the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, Japan was ordered to return to China any Chinese territory that it had forcefully occupied. Consequently, on April 28, 1952, Japan and the Republic of China (at which time was the government that represented China) signed a mutual treaty returning the ownership and naming rights of Taiwan, the Pescadores islands and the South China Sea islets to China. Therefore, April 28, 1952 is an important date, because it records that China owns all these islands without question. After this date, Vietnam and other southeast Asian nations have attempted forced occupation of some of the South China Sea islets. This behavior is incontrovertibly a violation of both the spirit of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. It is also not in accordance with the resolutions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It does not constitute ownership or occupational rights in any way. Their occupation cannot pass these historical tests, and therefore their occupation is clearly in violation of international law.
Also, research into the South China Sea issue requires consideration from an overarching strategic viewpoint. Why has the South China Sea issue been gaining prominence as the days pass? This is because it is connected with the United States’ “pivot to Asia” strategy. The U.S. aims to blatantly intervene in the South China Sea by reshuffling the existing order in the region and establishing a new kind of San Francisco Treaty — one in which the ASEAN nations work together to veto China’s proposition for a “nine parts line,” while simultaneously opposing attempts by China to negotiate with these nations over these contentious issues.
The U.S. is pushing for the South China Sea issue to become more multilateral and internationalized. Bilateral versus multilateral — this is the fundamental difference between the approaches that the U.S. and China are using here. America wants China to guarantee sailing freedom and safe passage through the South China Sea, yet herein lies a multitude of extremely complex issues. We need to make use of high-level politics and extensive research to find suitable solutions to them.
The author, Hai Lin Zheng, is an authority for the Hong Kong Asia-Pacific Research Center.
Why is the territorial dispute in the South Sea so tense now? In this author’s reckoning, it is due to causes both recent and long-standing. Four years ago, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea sought the signatures of authorities from various countries regarding a previous convention held in 1999. That convention sought to clarify the boundaries of territorial waters, and the U.N. needed the statements on this convention to be submitted before May 13, 2009. This issue directly aggravated the bifurcation between China and various ASEAN nations over the South East China Sea islets. It was precisely from this point that Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and other countries began to unceasingly adopt ambitious strategies in their vying for the islets within the South China Sea area. In May 6 of the same year, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted a joint claim for a 200 nautical mile boundary to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The following day, Vietnam again submitted another claim to the same commission.
In reality, this dispute between China and other southeast Asian nations over this boundary dispute within the South China Sea affects not only these countries, but it also implicates the U.S. and Japan in a conundrum over China’s development and core interests. In recent years, we have seen the U.S. spy ship “Flawless” incident, the Philippines’ forceful occupation of the Scarborough Shoal, and Malaysia’s claim over the Pellet Reef. All of these issues point, coincidentally, to a United States that is meddling within the region from behind the curtains; its aim being to provoke and expand these southeastern islet disputes both in complexity and scale on the international scene. The actions of the “Flawless,” for example, are an excuse for meddling in the South China Sea issue. In spite of the Chinese government’s stern resistance to American surveillance activities, the U.S. excuses itself by claiming that it has the right to operate freely within “international waters.” But in truth, the U.S. is conducting investigative operations within China’s economic zone; this is something which no sovereign country would accept.
In response to both the growing complexity of the situation in the South China Sea and the clandestine operations of the United States in the region, China ought to do more than just proclaim its strong resistance. It ought to adopt more effective methods to defend China’s territory and rights. Firstly, China needs to strengthen the effectiveness of its internal legislation over both domestic and international laws. Specifically, it needs to align its operations in accordance with UNCLOS provisions, thereby ensuring it has the legal backing to defend its rights in these boundary disputes. Taiwan and China must also unite and cooperate on the use of escort ships and trawlers in the region. Doing this will ensure China can lay down the law and exercise its policy that states: “These are ours, so let’s not contend and instead embrace the path of mutual development.”
Since 2009, when the Obama administration began loudly proclaiming its “pivot to Asia” strategy, the South China Sea islets issue has grown in prominence daily. For China to find answers to the issues of territorial rights within the region, it needs to indulge in some deep, probing research. The South China Sea islets, the Diaoyu Islands issue and even the Taiwan issue are all related; they are all historical problems that were left unresolved following the end of World War II. In researching these issues, it is important to make clear their overall historical context and then bring out the major sticking points within that history. According to both the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, Japan was ordered to return to China any Chinese territory that it had forcefully occupied. Consequently, on April 28, 1952, Japan and the Republic of China (at which time was the government that represented China) signed a mutual treaty returning the ownership and naming rights of Taiwan, the Pescadores islands and the South China Sea islets to China. Therefore, April 28, 1952 is an important date, because it records that China owns all these islands without question. After this date, Vietnam and other southeast Asian nations have attempted forced occupation of some of the South China Sea islets. This behavior is incontrovertibly a violation of both the spirit of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. It is also not in accordance with the resolutions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. It does not constitute ownership or occupational rights in any way. Their occupation cannot pass these historical tests, and therefore their occupation is clearly in violation of international law.
Also, research into the South China Sea issue requires consideration from an overarching strategic viewpoint. Why has the South China Sea issue been gaining prominence as the days pass? This is because it is connected with the United States’ “pivot to Asia” strategy. The U.S. aims to blatantly intervene in the South China Sea by reshuffling the existing order in the region and establishing a new kind of San Francisco Treaty — one in which the ASEAN nations work together to veto China’s proposition for a “nine parts line,” while simultaneously opposing attempts by China to negotiate with these nations over these contentious issues.
The U.S. is pushing for the South China Sea issue to become more multilateral and internationalized. Bilateral versus multilateral — this is the fundamental difference between the approaches that the U.S. and China are using here. America wants China to guarantee sailing freedom and safe passage through the South China Sea, yet herein lies a multitude of extremely complex issues. We need to make use of high-level politics and extensive research to find suitable solutions to them.
The author, Hai Lin Zheng, is an authority for the Hong Kong Asia-Pacific Research Center.