Islamic State: Can the United States Remedy the Crisis of Arab-Muslim Leadership?
Published in Le Nouvel Observateur
(France) on 16 September 2014
by Abdelmalek Alaoui (link to
original)
In an interview with the Parisian, Jean-Pierre Chevènement estimated that “France has nothing to turn about in front-row seats” in the fight against the Islamic State. According to him, Muslim countries — which are the most exposed — must assume their responsibilities and “get rid of this leprosy.”
For certain observers of the situation, the adoption of this position by one of the most respected French figures could convey a certain romanticism, even an ignorance of the subtle mechanisms that drive inter-Arabic relations.
The Difficulty of an Inter-Arab Consensus
What is more, contrary to the opinion shown by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Paris is far from being on the front line of this situation, and François Hollande’s recent visit to Baghdad has largely been seen as an attempt to cause people to forget smoldering internal news.
I must point out here that Muslim countries — and more specifically Arab countries — historically have a lot of trouble coming to a consensus, even on issues where consensus could be established fairly easily, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
A Crisis of Leadership
Essentially, the difficulty in putting to music a common policy of Muslim countries against the proliferation of Islamism in Iraq and Syria is, before everything, a crisis of leadership in Muslim countries.
Saudi Arabia, which has played one of the primary roles for a long time, seems to be in a phase of redefinition of its doctrine of foreign policy to a backdrop of struggles for power.
Despite that, King Abdullah remains a much-heard voice by his peers and a strong signal that his part could certainly put a party of protagonists concerned by the Islamic State around the table.
The new sheikh of Qatar is much less inclined to follow the strategy of projection of power — made by a “duty” of systematic interference — adopted by that little state over the course of the past few years. All of that leaves the Gulf country lacking strong leadership able to effectively unite common efforts against the Islamic State.
Does the U.S. Want to Retake Control?
Probably because they know that Riyadh remains their best option, the Americans decided to promote a new initiative against the Islamic State from Jeddah.
In launching a coalition of ten Arab countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon — Washington wants to show that the U.S. can once again play the role of catalyst in Arab countries and has the capacity to support those countries in their fight against Islamist terrorism.
Excepting the official position adopted by Barack Obama, which involves deploying additional military resources — an extension of strikes against the Islamic State and the sending of 475 advisers — appeared to be an attempt to limit American investments in the region, and isn’t likely to reassure the coalition’s members.
Paris’s More Limited Role
In this context of fearing U.S. retaliation, the place that Paris can occupy is very limited.
Already engaged in Mali and Central Africa, France is not operationally capable of deploying a substantial force on the ground, and is plagued by the challenges of important information on its soil in an attempt to thwart the departures of candidates for jihad in Syria and Iraq.
If the recent arrest of Mourad Fares, one of the presumed principal recruiters of young French candidates for jihad, undeniably constitutes a positive signal, it does not mean enough to mask France’s weak position in the situation. Likewise, the behavior in the conference in Paris Monday morning in the Quai d’Orsay must be interpreted as an attempt to put Paris at the center of the issue of the Islamic State, but strictly in diplomatic terms.
For this group of reasons, to think that a common front of Muslim countries against the Islamic State could be quickly established and replace substantial involvement of great Western military power is probably optimistic.
That is, unless Jean-Pierre Chevènement, an unquestionable expert on the mentality of Arab countries, does not appeal to a reaction of “honor” from them, in which case his media appearance would be understandable.
For certain observers of the situation, the adoption of this position by one of the most respected French figures could convey a certain romanticism, even an ignorance of the subtle mechanisms that drive inter-Arabic relations.
The Difficulty of an Inter-Arab Consensus
What is more, contrary to the opinion shown by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Paris is far from being on the front line of this situation, and François Hollande’s recent visit to Baghdad has largely been seen as an attempt to cause people to forget smoldering internal news.
I must point out here that Muslim countries — and more specifically Arab countries — historically have a lot of trouble coming to a consensus, even on issues where consensus could be established fairly easily, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
A Crisis of Leadership
Essentially, the difficulty in putting to music a common policy of Muslim countries against the proliferation of Islamism in Iraq and Syria is, before everything, a crisis of leadership in Muslim countries.
Saudi Arabia, which has played one of the primary roles for a long time, seems to be in a phase of redefinition of its doctrine of foreign policy to a backdrop of struggles for power.
Despite that, King Abdullah remains a much-heard voice by his peers and a strong signal that his part could certainly put a party of protagonists concerned by the Islamic State around the table.
The new sheikh of Qatar is much less inclined to follow the strategy of projection of power — made by a “duty” of systematic interference — adopted by that little state over the course of the past few years. All of that leaves the Gulf country lacking strong leadership able to effectively unite common efforts against the Islamic State.
Does the U.S. Want to Retake Control?
Probably because they know that Riyadh remains their best option, the Americans decided to promote a new initiative against the Islamic State from Jeddah.
In launching a coalition of ten Arab countries — Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon — Washington wants to show that the U.S. can once again play the role of catalyst in Arab countries and has the capacity to support those countries in their fight against Islamist terrorism.
Excepting the official position adopted by Barack Obama, which involves deploying additional military resources — an extension of strikes against the Islamic State and the sending of 475 advisers — appeared to be an attempt to limit American investments in the region, and isn’t likely to reassure the coalition’s members.
Paris’s More Limited Role
In this context of fearing U.S. retaliation, the place that Paris can occupy is very limited.
Already engaged in Mali and Central Africa, France is not operationally capable of deploying a substantial force on the ground, and is plagued by the challenges of important information on its soil in an attempt to thwart the departures of candidates for jihad in Syria and Iraq.
If the recent arrest of Mourad Fares, one of the presumed principal recruiters of young French candidates for jihad, undeniably constitutes a positive signal, it does not mean enough to mask France’s weak position in the situation. Likewise, the behavior in the conference in Paris Monday morning in the Quai d’Orsay must be interpreted as an attempt to put Paris at the center of the issue of the Islamic State, but strictly in diplomatic terms.
For this group of reasons, to think that a common front of Muslim countries against the Islamic State could be quickly established and replace substantial involvement of great Western military power is probably optimistic.
That is, unless Jean-Pierre Chevènement, an unquestionable expert on the mentality of Arab countries, does not appeal to a reaction of “honor” from them, in which case his media appearance would be understandable.