Venezuela in the Security Council, Election Analysis
The inclusion of Venezuela in the United Nations Security Council presents at least three elements worthy of reflection. First of all, notwithstanding the economic and political crisis it is enduring, this South American country has the support of virtually all the states of Latin America and the Caribbean.
Second, the ability of the U.S. and its closest Western allies to build a global political consensus around their strategic interests is increasingly weak. Third, the plural and heterogeneous composition of the current Security Council demonstrates the difficulty in thinking of the global order around an image of stable geopolitical blocs.
The election that favored Venezuela was inevitable despite the opposition its government may cause among several powerful international actors. The Venezuelan candidacy was the only one presented from Latin America and the Caribbean. This contrasts with what occurred in 2006 when, in spite of the intense personal activism of Hugo Chávez, the country was not able to obtain the seat that was finally awarded to Panama after 47 rounds of voting in competition against Guatemala. This time no Latin American or Caribbean country challenged the proposition, while knowing that said option profoundly displeased Washington. In reality, when it comes to events occurring on the international level, Latin American and Caribbean governments are more interested in regional stability than in the nature or type of regime that governs in any one of these countries. It may even seem that maintaining inter-regional ties of trust can take priority over following the 20th century tradition of aligning with the U.S. on international events. For the last several years, Caracas has been persistently supported in its internal political events by practically all multilateral organizations in the region, and the single candidacy, as well as the vote at the United Nations, confirms this trend.
On the other hand, Latin American and Caribbean support for the regional candidacy makes evident to all of the international actors Washington's inability to generate a different alternative in its own neighborhood. The U.S. attitude toward the election was explicit. Its spokespeople made clear the mistrust and discomfort their government felt at the possibility that Venezuela might become part of the Security Council. What happened to the U.S. was not something attributable to its symbolic abstention. It shows its political distance from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and its loss of strategic perspective. Its deliberate indifference has fractured its ties to its former allies so much that it simply did not have the ability to make any of the 32 potential alternative candidacies materialize. If that happened in its closest sphere, what can we think of the American political ability to generate global hegemonic consensus? This is worse in an electoral scenario whose rules include acceptance by two thirds of those voting for candidates to the Security Council, where that pronouncement seems stunning. It was not just the region. The vote in the Assembly clearly illustrates that barely into the second decade of the 21st century, the strategic scenario of global hegemony is very different from that of the recent past. The problem is not only what appears to be a decline in Washington's power, but that this world power, the U.S., does not yet understand nor accept the new scenario. It becomes paralyzed in astonishment when realizing it.
The composition of the Security Council, on the other hand, precludes taking the easy way out by concluding that there are new blocs of global power that inherit the power that Washington is apparently losing. It is very difficult to assert this, even though it is tempting, especially if the concepts are permeated by realist logic associated with the right, or by highly ideological anti-hegemonic images. The vote was diverse. Spain, with a clearly conservative government, was elected in Turkey's place. Malaysia is governed by one of the world's oldest political parties, which is more pragmatic than ideological. New Zealand, which was elected most easily, clearly identifies with the West's interests, while Angola's ruling MPLA party belongs to the international social democrat community. With this composition, every important decision of the Security Council will have its own negotiating scenario and probably changing majorities.
What is certain is that with Venezuela in the seat, it appears that persistence attains what luck cannot. Regardless of the difficulties, with the practically unanimous support of the region, President Maduro's government achieved what the man who inspired the idea, Hugo Chávez, could not. In particular, Latin American countries do not overstate the ideological differences between their governments, nor do they give extraordinary importance in the international arena to the internal contingencies they suffer. The U.S. does not know how to adapt to this new period of its global and regional strategic capacity, and the political world of 2014 resembles more a kaleidoscope of shifting forms and powers than a rigid chess board.
Second, the ability of the U.S. and its closest Western allies to build a global political consensus around their strategic interests is increasingly weak. Third, the plural and heterogeneous composition of the current Security Council demonstrates the difficulty in thinking of the global order around an image of stable geopolitical blocs.
The election that favored Venezuela was inevitable despite the opposition its government may cause among several powerful international actors. The Venezuelan candidacy was the only one presented from Latin America and the Caribbean. This contrasts with what occurred in 2006 when, in spite of the intense personal activism of Hugo Chávez, the country was not able to obtain the seat that was finally awarded to Panama after 47 rounds of voting in competition against Guatemala. This time no Latin American or Caribbean country challenged the proposition, while knowing that said option profoundly displeased Washington. In reality, when it comes to events occurring on the international level, Latin American and Caribbean governments are more interested in regional stability than in the nature or type of regime that governs in any one of these countries. It may even seem that maintaining inter-regional ties of trust can take priority over following the 20th century tradition of aligning with the U.S. on international events. For the last several years, Caracas has been persistently supported in its internal political events by practically all multilateral organizations in the region, and the single candidacy, as well as the vote at the United Nations, confirms this trend.
On the other hand, Latin American and Caribbean support for the regional candidacy makes evident to all of the international actors Washington's inability to generate a different alternative in its own neighborhood. The U.S. attitude toward the election was explicit. Its spokespeople made clear the mistrust and discomfort their government felt at the possibility that Venezuela might become part of the Security Council. What happened to the U.S. was not something attributable to its symbolic abstention. It shows its political distance from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and its loss of strategic perspective. Its deliberate indifference has fractured its ties to its former allies so much that it simply did not have the ability to make any of the 32 potential alternative candidacies materialize. If that happened in its closest sphere, what can we think of the American political ability to generate global hegemonic consensus? This is worse in an electoral scenario whose rules include acceptance by two thirds of those voting for candidates to the Security Council, where that pronouncement seems stunning. It was not just the region. The vote in the Assembly clearly illustrates that barely into the second decade of the 21st century, the strategic scenario of global hegemony is very different from that of the recent past. The problem is not only what appears to be a decline in Washington's power, but that this world power, the U.S., does not yet understand nor accept the new scenario. It becomes paralyzed in astonishment when realizing it.
The composition of the Security Council, on the other hand, precludes taking the easy way out by concluding that there are new blocs of global power that inherit the power that Washington is apparently losing. It is very difficult to assert this, even though it is tempting, especially if the concepts are permeated by realist logic associated with the right, or by highly ideological anti-hegemonic images. The vote was diverse. Spain, with a clearly conservative government, was elected in Turkey's place. Malaysia is governed by one of the world's oldest political parties, which is more pragmatic than ideological. New Zealand, which was elected most easily, clearly identifies with the West's interests, while Angola's ruling MPLA party belongs to the international social democrat community. With this composition, every important decision of the Security Council will have its own negotiating scenario and probably changing majorities.
What is certain is that with Venezuela in the seat, it appears that persistence attains what luck cannot. Regardless of the difficulties, with the practically unanimous support of the region, President Maduro's government achieved what the man who inspired the idea, Hugo Chávez, could not. In particular, Latin American countries do not overstate the ideological differences between their governments, nor do they give extraordinary importance in the international arena to the internal contingencies they suffer. The U.S. does not know how to adapt to this new period of its global and regional strategic capacity, and the political world of 2014 resembles more a kaleidoscope of shifting forms and powers than a rigid chess board.