Obama’s Leadership and the Korean Peninsula
United States President Barack Obama recently seems to have become a punching bag of sorts. Not only have Republicans criticized him, but close Cabinet members from his first term in office have also joined in on the “Obama abuse.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner have all criticized President Obama in their autobiographies. Recently, former CIA Director and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also chimed in with his opinions.
If it were only one or two people, the criticism could be interpreted as treacherous grumblings by former officials, but for four senior level officials to be critical of Obama raises serious concerns.
Particularly, Panetta brought Obama’s policies and leadership style into question. Panetta praised Obama’s ability to intellectually engage and consolidate information in a logical and coherent way and present it to others. However, due to his overdependence on logic, Panetta asserts that Obama acts more like a law school professor than a passionate leader. This means that instead of being a leader with the conviction and courage to push through issues, Obama seems more like a nervous brother who is picky, inquisitive and always concerned about problems that may arise. This criticism of Obama’s wavering commitment is illustrated by the 2011 troop withdrawals from Iraq, the 2012-13 support for the rebels in Syria and the reneging of airstrikes in response to the Bashar al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons.
Panetta’s assessment of Obama’s leadership style can also be seen via America’s policy regarding North Korea. The U.S. has evaded the issue of North Korea’s nuclear programs and seems to refuse to address them directly, reflecting Obama’s weak leadership style. The negotiations for the 2-29 Agreement from Obama’s first term were incomplete due the transition of power in North Korea.* For Obama’s second term, Secretary of State John Kerry tried to field the possibly of renewed dialogue, only to have the White House refuse to budge. At the center of this stance was Obama. Secretary Kerry is constantly hovering in the Middle East because that is where Obama’s interests lie.
Not heeding the criticism inside and outside of the Oval Office, Obama is using the Islamic State group and the situation in Ukraine to return to a stronger foreign policy of engagement. However, it is difficult to expect that proactive foreign policy will address North Korea’s nuclear program. No matter how much the United States tries to direct international engagement, it is unrealistic to expect the U.S. to bring forth the North Korean nuclear issue while in the midst of starting a new war in the Middle East, as well as during tough nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Of course, there is a silver lining. Given that the U.S. may fall into a quagmire with the Islamic State group, the White House may turn to North Korea to look for a foreign policy victory. The problem is that the situation on the Korean Peninsula cannot afford to wait for its time in the U.S. spotlight.
In the end, the solution for peace on the Korean Peninsula can only be led by North and South Korea. To see progress from the recent high-level meetings, the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region must be re-opened, and the 5.24 Measures must be lifted.** The South Korean government needlessly looks to the U.S. for guidelines regarding these policies. The U.S., which dictates issues on the Korean Peninsula, sees the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region as a violation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea, particularly the “bulk cash” provision.
I cannot acknowledge this criticism. Rather, I countered that the Kaesung Industrial Region also infuses cash into the North Korean economy. This leads me to consider that the South Korean government is afraid of U.S. opposition to re-opening the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region —which seems unlikely since the U.S. is not overly concerned with Korea at this time — or that the government is just using the U.S. to avoid action. I await a joint decision by North and South Korea regarding this matter.
*Translator’s note: The 2-29 agreement is a food aid program from the U.S. to North Korea predicated on North Korea’s denuclearization.
**Translator’s note: The 5.24 Measures are sanctions against North Korea levied by South Korea in response to the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan.
If it were only one or two people, the criticism could be interpreted as treacherous grumblings by former officials, but for four senior level officials to be critical of Obama raises serious concerns.
Particularly, Panetta brought Obama’s policies and leadership style into question. Panetta praised Obama’s ability to intellectually engage and consolidate information in a logical and coherent way and present it to others. However, due to his overdependence on logic, Panetta asserts that Obama acts more like a law school professor than a passionate leader. This means that instead of being a leader with the conviction and courage to push through issues, Obama seems more like a nervous brother who is picky, inquisitive and always concerned about problems that may arise. This criticism of Obama’s wavering commitment is illustrated by the 2011 troop withdrawals from Iraq, the 2012-13 support for the rebels in Syria and the reneging of airstrikes in response to the Bashar al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons.
Panetta’s assessment of Obama’s leadership style can also be seen via America’s policy regarding North Korea. The U.S. has evaded the issue of North Korea’s nuclear programs and seems to refuse to address them directly, reflecting Obama’s weak leadership style. The negotiations for the 2-29 Agreement from Obama’s first term were incomplete due the transition of power in North Korea.* For Obama’s second term, Secretary of State John Kerry tried to field the possibly of renewed dialogue, only to have the White House refuse to budge. At the center of this stance was Obama. Secretary Kerry is constantly hovering in the Middle East because that is where Obama’s interests lie.
Not heeding the criticism inside and outside of the Oval Office, Obama is using the Islamic State group and the situation in Ukraine to return to a stronger foreign policy of engagement. However, it is difficult to expect that proactive foreign policy will address North Korea’s nuclear program. No matter how much the United States tries to direct international engagement, it is unrealistic to expect the U.S. to bring forth the North Korean nuclear issue while in the midst of starting a new war in the Middle East, as well as during tough nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Of course, there is a silver lining. Given that the U.S. may fall into a quagmire with the Islamic State group, the White House may turn to North Korea to look for a foreign policy victory. The problem is that the situation on the Korean Peninsula cannot afford to wait for its time in the U.S. spotlight.
In the end, the solution for peace on the Korean Peninsula can only be led by North and South Korea. To see progress from the recent high-level meetings, the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region must be re-opened, and the 5.24 Measures must be lifted.** The South Korean government needlessly looks to the U.S. for guidelines regarding these policies. The U.S., which dictates issues on the Korean Peninsula, sees the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region as a violation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea, particularly the “bulk cash” provision.
I cannot acknowledge this criticism. Rather, I countered that the Kaesung Industrial Region also infuses cash into the North Korean economy. This leads me to consider that the South Korean government is afraid of U.S. opposition to re-opening the Mount Kumgang Tourist Region —which seems unlikely since the U.S. is not overly concerned with Korea at this time — or that the government is just using the U.S. to avoid action. I await a joint decision by North and South Korea regarding this matter.
*Translator’s note: The 2-29 agreement is a food aid program from the U.S. to North Korea predicated on North Korea’s denuclearization.
**Translator’s note: The 5.24 Measures are sanctions against North Korea levied by South Korea in response to the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan.