It has been over two months since U.S. airstrikes against the Islamic State forces began on Iraq, and almost a month since they expanded to Syria with the support of Arab and Western governments. The objective set by Barack Obama was to weaken and destroy the ruthless fanatic militia that has proclaimed a caliphate in the more than 27,000 square miles, and which has control over both countries.
The results do not back up Obama's purpose. The elapsed time is insufficient to certify the failure of his strategy, but enough to confirm that the allies have not inflicted any serious defeat on fundamentalist forces. On the contrary, General John Allen, who leads the international coalition, stated last week before Congress that the Islamic State group has made substantial progress in Iraq, where the Pentagon has been forced to deploy Apache helicopters to protect the airport in the capital of the jihadi, owners of the neighboring Anbar province.
The debate that started in August in the U.S. regarding the effectiveness of an exclusively air campaign has given way to voices that consider it an inevitable fiasco without ground troops. In Syria, the bombings have been unable to break the jihadi siege in Kobane, on the border with Turkey. The situation is so critical and the town so symbolic that Washington is already supplying weapons by air to the Kurdish defenders and President Erdogan has backtracked on his decision to abandon them to their fate.
The value of these measures remains to be seen. Erdogan will only allow his Iraqi Kurdish allies to help Kobane, not the ones from Turkey itself or the ones from Syria. The in extremis easing of Ankara aims not to undermine the stagnant peace dialogue with the powerful Kurdish party PKK in Turkey, with which the besieged align themselves. Meanwhile, the U.S. Hercules only launch a small armament over Kobane, and with remarkable inaccuracy.
The military reality on the ground, the regional political complexities and the shifting loyalties at stake highlight how insufficient and fragile Obama's plan is and the urgency of its reconsideration. The Islamic State group represents a grave threat not only to the Middle East. For the West, and nearby Europe in particular, it is imperative to prevent the creation of a gigantic territorial sanctuary by a dark enemy of civilization, bent on maintaining and globalizing its fight.
Los resultados no avalan el propósito de Obama. El tiempo transcurrido es escaso para certificar el fracaso de su estrategia, pero no para constatar que los aliados no han infligido ninguna derrota seria a las fuerzas fundamentalistas. Por el contrario, el general John Allen, que dirige la coalición internacional, declaraba la semana pasada ante el Congreso que el EI ha hecho avances sustanciales en Irak, donde el Pentágono se ha visto obligado a desplegar helicópteros Apache para proteger el aeropuerto de la capital de los yihadistas, dueños de la vecina provincia de Anbar.
La realidad militar sobre el terreno, las complejidades polÃticas regionales y las movedizas lealtades en juego ponen de relieve lo insuficiente y frágil del plan de Obama y la urgencia de su reconsideración. El EI representa una gravÃsima amenaza no solo en Oriente Próximo. Para Occidente, y la cercana Europa en particular, resulta imperativo prevenir la creación de un gigantesco santuario territorial por parte de un oscuro enemigo de la civilización, decidido a mantener y globalizar su lucha.
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Washington is no longer content with slow exhaustion; it has adopted a strategy of swift, symbolic strikes designed to recalibrate the international landscape.