The CIA, Torture and Revenge
Published in Il Giornale
(Italy) on 10 December 2014
by Orlando Sacchelli (link to original)
(Italy) on 10 December 2014
by Orlando Sacchelli (link to original)
Translated from
by Bora Mici.
Edited by Emily Chick.
There are 20 charges that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight Subcommittee has put forth, in black and white, against the CIA regarding the abuses carried out within the scope of the Detention and Interrogation Program from 2001 (after Sept. 11) to 2006.
Let's see what we are dealing with: first of all, there was the technical employment of strengthened interrogation techniques (through real and true torture). However, despite these techniques, the prisoners did not supply useful information. This lack of success is a secondary detail, seeing that the CIA has always justified its harsh means by talking about effectiveness and necessity.
Evidently, however, they were not so effective. The techniques used to conduct the interrogations – like, for example, waterboarding (simulated drowning) – would have been far worse than what was reported to political forces. And the same goes for the conditions of detention (much harsher than members of Congress were aware of).
The CIA failed to supply the details to the Department of Justice, thereby denying the government the opportunity to conduct a serious analysis of the legal legitimacy of the detention program. In other words, the CIA prevented (deliberately, according to the accusation) and did everything to avoid the supervision of the program by Congress and the White House. And it eluded the oversight of the Inspector General of the agency.
If this is really true, to whom was the CIA answering, if it was not providing the details of such an important operation to Congress and the president, and was not reporting to the very organism of internal self-oversight? Another very grave accusation that emerges is that, with its behavior, Langley has hindered, if not directly prevented, the missions of other security agencies.
In its communications with the media, the CIA has been very careful to diffuse inaccurate news regarding the efficacy of the methods that were used. It passed them off as "decisive" and "fundamental," even if they were rarely so at all.
The agency, according to the report of the Commission on Oversight, managed the detention program in an incomplete and deficient manner, especially between 2002 and the beginning of 2003. In other words, six months after the approval of the program, it still was not underway.
Points of interest also include the operation costs: in 2006, they amounted to around $180 million, with ample recourse and external resources already acquired from 2005.
Coming up with the particular interrogation techniques were two contracted psychologists, who would later also play a fundamental role in the evaluation and management of the entire program. In fact, there were reserved "special treatments" for detainees approved neither by the Department of Justice nor authorized by those in charge at the CIA.
The legality would have waned even from another point of view: in fact, there was never a detailed account of the number and identity of those detained, and the legal standards for detention were not respected. Even when news leaked out about the abuses carried out in the detention camps (such as Guantanamo), the CIA almost never intervened to sanction the very men who, in fact, have always benefited from a certain type of special immunity. Eventual critiques or internal resistances, on the part of those who condemned these practices, were silenced or marginalized.
The Detention and Interrogation Program went on until 2006. What finally put an end to it was the news, leaked by the press, of the abuses that were carried out, together with the possible legal consequences. According to the Commission on Oversight, the program caused serious damage to the image, in the entire world, not only of the CIA, but of the entire U.S., with heavy economic repercussions.
Five years of work, thousands of pages and documents and $40 million spent. These are the numbers of the report that has shaken America.
In substance, the accusation raised against the CIA is that of having caused suffering and pain to the prisoners with methods that go “well beyond legal limits,"* using methods that were even more brutal "than was expected by the public over these years."*
All of this was done with very few results and, above all, without any political authority being duly informed. At least this is what seems to emerge from the report. "It led to the capture of senior al-Qaida operatives, thereby removing them from the battlefield," said George Tenet, CIA director when America came under terrorist attack, "saving American and Allied lives.” The commission verified as much; however, things went differently.
In essence, after all these accusations, what happens? Practically nothing. Obama has solemnly promised that, as long as he is president, he will do everything to "ensure that we will no longer rely on these methods."*
Putting aside for a moment the good intentions, always full of interesting proposals, it seems almost certain that there will not be any legal proceedings. The confirmation comes from the Department of Justice: no one will be prosecuted, except for in sensational news. This was likely the consequence of the tug-of-war between Democrats and Republicans before the way was free for the publication of the dossier.
But then, what did all this noise do? Did it make us see how great and humane the Democrats are and how bad the Republicans are in contrast? There are few doubts about the timing of the publication. In a few weeks, with the Senate under Republican control, the dossier would have ended up at the bottom of a drawer. Therefore, the only moment for making it stand out was this.
In the end, we can hazard a few hypotheses: was it a settlement of accounts between the powers of government? Was it a backlash on the part of the ultra liberal among Democrats, before the course of the primaries brings order and discipline and imposes more moderate positions in aiming for the White House?
Or maybe it was Obama's revenge, who – far from electoral competitions and now no longer able to leave his mark like he may have wanted – thought to once again emphasize his "moral superiority" compared to George W. Bush, who keeps saying he is proud of the work carried out by the men of the CIA?
And yet another question: why pull out this story now, after Obama, when he had just been elected, said publicly "never again torture,"* but in fact did nothing to prosecute those who were involved in such behavior? Then, maybe, the president was looking to find a bipartisan spirit. Now, it does not matter anymore, and any strategy is good for beating the adversary over the head with a stick.
And to whoever accuses Obama of weakness in foreign policy and of having used drones too lightly, he can respond by showing, documents in hand, that the special methods of the CIA served for little or nothing. One thing is certain: America cannot go forward in this dangerous game of The Wounded King** in the name of national security. The risks are too high. And not just for the U.S.
*Editor’s note: The original quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
** Translator's note: Seems to be a reference to the movie Gioco al Massacro by Damiano Damiani.
Let's see what we are dealing with: first of all, there was the technical employment of strengthened interrogation techniques (through real and true torture). However, despite these techniques, the prisoners did not supply useful information. This lack of success is a secondary detail, seeing that the CIA has always justified its harsh means by talking about effectiveness and necessity.
Evidently, however, they were not so effective. The techniques used to conduct the interrogations – like, for example, waterboarding (simulated drowning) – would have been far worse than what was reported to political forces. And the same goes for the conditions of detention (much harsher than members of Congress were aware of).
The CIA failed to supply the details to the Department of Justice, thereby denying the government the opportunity to conduct a serious analysis of the legal legitimacy of the detention program. In other words, the CIA prevented (deliberately, according to the accusation) and did everything to avoid the supervision of the program by Congress and the White House. And it eluded the oversight of the Inspector General of the agency.
If this is really true, to whom was the CIA answering, if it was not providing the details of such an important operation to Congress and the president, and was not reporting to the very organism of internal self-oversight? Another very grave accusation that emerges is that, with its behavior, Langley has hindered, if not directly prevented, the missions of other security agencies.
In its communications with the media, the CIA has been very careful to diffuse inaccurate news regarding the efficacy of the methods that were used. It passed them off as "decisive" and "fundamental," even if they were rarely so at all.
The agency, according to the report of the Commission on Oversight, managed the detention program in an incomplete and deficient manner, especially between 2002 and the beginning of 2003. In other words, six months after the approval of the program, it still was not underway.
Points of interest also include the operation costs: in 2006, they amounted to around $180 million, with ample recourse and external resources already acquired from 2005.
Coming up with the particular interrogation techniques were two contracted psychologists, who would later also play a fundamental role in the evaluation and management of the entire program. In fact, there were reserved "special treatments" for detainees approved neither by the Department of Justice nor authorized by those in charge at the CIA.
The legality would have waned even from another point of view: in fact, there was never a detailed account of the number and identity of those detained, and the legal standards for detention were not respected. Even when news leaked out about the abuses carried out in the detention camps (such as Guantanamo), the CIA almost never intervened to sanction the very men who, in fact, have always benefited from a certain type of special immunity. Eventual critiques or internal resistances, on the part of those who condemned these practices, were silenced or marginalized.
The Detention and Interrogation Program went on until 2006. What finally put an end to it was the news, leaked by the press, of the abuses that were carried out, together with the possible legal consequences. According to the Commission on Oversight, the program caused serious damage to the image, in the entire world, not only of the CIA, but of the entire U.S., with heavy economic repercussions.
Five years of work, thousands of pages and documents and $40 million spent. These are the numbers of the report that has shaken America.
In substance, the accusation raised against the CIA is that of having caused suffering and pain to the prisoners with methods that go “well beyond legal limits,"* using methods that were even more brutal "than was expected by the public over these years."*
All of this was done with very few results and, above all, without any political authority being duly informed. At least this is what seems to emerge from the report. "It led to the capture of senior al-Qaida operatives, thereby removing them from the battlefield," said George Tenet, CIA director when America came under terrorist attack, "saving American and Allied lives.” The commission verified as much; however, things went differently.
In essence, after all these accusations, what happens? Practically nothing. Obama has solemnly promised that, as long as he is president, he will do everything to "ensure that we will no longer rely on these methods."*
Putting aside for a moment the good intentions, always full of interesting proposals, it seems almost certain that there will not be any legal proceedings. The confirmation comes from the Department of Justice: no one will be prosecuted, except for in sensational news. This was likely the consequence of the tug-of-war between Democrats and Republicans before the way was free for the publication of the dossier.
But then, what did all this noise do? Did it make us see how great and humane the Democrats are and how bad the Republicans are in contrast? There are few doubts about the timing of the publication. In a few weeks, with the Senate under Republican control, the dossier would have ended up at the bottom of a drawer. Therefore, the only moment for making it stand out was this.
In the end, we can hazard a few hypotheses: was it a settlement of accounts between the powers of government? Was it a backlash on the part of the ultra liberal among Democrats, before the course of the primaries brings order and discipline and imposes more moderate positions in aiming for the White House?
Or maybe it was Obama's revenge, who – far from electoral competitions and now no longer able to leave his mark like he may have wanted – thought to once again emphasize his "moral superiority" compared to George W. Bush, who keeps saying he is proud of the work carried out by the men of the CIA?
And yet another question: why pull out this story now, after Obama, when he had just been elected, said publicly "never again torture,"* but in fact did nothing to prosecute those who were involved in such behavior? Then, maybe, the president was looking to find a bipartisan spirit. Now, it does not matter anymore, and any strategy is good for beating the adversary over the head with a stick.
And to whoever accuses Obama of weakness in foreign policy and of having used drones too lightly, he can respond by showing, documents in hand, that the special methods of the CIA served for little or nothing. One thing is certain: America cannot go forward in this dangerous game of The Wounded King** in the name of national security. The risks are too high. And not just for the U.S.
*Editor’s note: The original quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
** Translator's note: Seems to be a reference to the movie Gioco al Massacro by Damiano Damiani.