Concerns over the Lame Duck Rush

With the ruling Democratic Party having suffered a crushing defeat in the midterm elections, President Obama has little choice but to single-mindedly proceed down the lame duck path during the remaining two years of his term of office.

Changing to lame duck status at the end of one’s term is an institutionally inevitable phenomenon that is true not only of Mr. Obama, but of previous presidents as well. For Mr. Obama himself, however, it was the most crushing defeat since Eisenhower’s in 1958, as expected. It is a huge blow that gave the Republican Party control of both the House and Senate.

Before the election, the Republicans controlled only the House, but next year executive-congressional relations will fall from “half twisted” to “completely twisted.” No bills that propose policies that go against Congress will be passed, and a budget will not be obtained. The president is bound hand and foot. He can try to build a legacy through political achievements, but his policies will be impossible to pass and prone to failure.

Past examples have shown that, above all, the risk is highest in the field of diplomacy, which undergoes less scrutiny and opposition from Congress than [matters dealing with] domestic administration. Former President Bush, in a hurry to get a nuclear agreement with North Korea at the end of his term, committed the great mistake of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and loosening sanctions against it. Even Mr. Obama is no exception, as indicated by his Asia tour, which included the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

At the APEC CEO summit (a forum sponsored by the host country’s business community) that opened in Beijing, he twice repeated his agreement to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s statement, “The Pacific Ocean is broad enough to accommodate the development of both China and the United States.” At the U.S.-China summit, he emphasized that close cooperation with China is at the heart of the “return to Asia” strategy of rebalance.

The original rebalancing strategy that then Secretary of State Clinton launched in the first term of 2011 was supposed to restrain China’s forcible Pacific maritime expansion and strengthen alliances with Japan, Australia and others.

The Jinping administration, opposed to this, proposed a “new type of great power relationship.” Mr. Obama is currently on board with this proposal, saying he wants to take the U.S.-China relationship “to a new level.” As if aiming for a “G-2” centered on U.S.-China cooperation, the rebalancing strategy is in the process of alteration.

I recall the “Second-Term Foreign Policy” presentation given by a major U.S. think tank in January last year. The recommendations written by the pro-Obama experts, with the South China Sea and Senkaku Islands issue in mind, advised the U.S. not to “get involved in disputes over small islands and reefs,”* and to prioritize reconciliation with China.

In a foreign policy speech given in Brisbane, Mr. Obama called for a strengthening of the alliance and appealed to China to observe international norms, but hardly mentioned China’s problematic behavior such as its aggressive pursuit of marine hegemony or unilateral establishment of an air defense identification zone. Additionally, I was struck by how he used almost the same wording as the think tank’s statement, arguing that “disputes over territory, remote islands and rocky shoals … threaten to spiral into confrontation.”

Achieving a trilateral Japan-China summit is a diplomatic victory for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. No wonder the United States welcomed this summit. However, rather than wholeheartedly and strongly supporting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its ally Japan, the Obama administration instead holds a strong “don't-get-involved” philosophy of resisting getting needlessly entangled in a quarrel between Japan and China.

The rebalancing strategy Asia expected has been altered from its original version to the revised version formulated by Secretary Kerry and presidential adviser Rice. Restraint and cooperation regarding China are both indispensable components, but whether the emphasis falls on one or the other makes a huge difference.

The think tank's proposal recommends leaving an "admirable legacy"* through U.S. reconciliation with China, along with making the appropriate compromises with Iran for a resolution to the nuclear problem. I do not wish to second-guess Mr. Obama, but if ignoring allies' concerns and giving shape to a U.S.-China cooperation, as well as compromising with Iran, are the diplomatic achievements he's aiming for, his remaining term might be a blank two years that are extremely hazardous to U.S. allies and Japan.

I would like Prime Minister Abe to completely change his staff with the general election and recover his position of protecting the peace and safety of Japan.

*Editor's note: The original quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.