Reduce the Omoiyari Yosan Benefits to the US Military!
Budget reduction is one of the biggest threats to the U.S. military.
The U.S. Department of Defense has revealed a reorganization plan to either close or merge 15 military bases and establishments in Europe, along with a general reduction in garrison numbers. The plan has been devised in order to deal with recent drastic cuts in the national defense budget.
This is a reduction that was announced in spite of rising fears among European countries regarding national security in light of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces. What could be the reason for withdrawing troops from Europe before Okinawa, a place that analysts from the U.S. and Japan alike agree doesn’t need a military presence?
Chances are, the existence of “omoiyari yosan”*— the military benefits expenses Japan itself furnishes — was not irrelevant to this decision. It’s simply cheaper to keep troops in Japan than in Europe. In order to progress with the dissolution of military bases in Okinawa, it is imperative to hurry to reduce the needlessly ambiguous omoiyari yosan payments at the root of the problem.
In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the U.S. Department of Defense released last year, there was a recommendation to pursue relocation of Marine Corps forces — including those forces stationed in Okinawa — to Guam. Even from the perspective of countering China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy (A2/AD) strategy of keeping U.S. forces from entering nearby waters, it’s unnecessary to keep a huge reserve of troops on Okinawa, which is within missile strike distance of the mainland.
There are two possible reasons for maintaining a militarily unnecessary reserve of marines in Okinawa. One reason is omoiyari yosan. As it happens, there is no stipulation that ever obligated Japan to pay omoiyari yosan in the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement at all. On the contrary, the first item of article 24 of the agreement stipulates, “the United States will bear for the duration of this agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan,” with the exception of granting land and facilities for U.S. military use. Compensation for employees hired directly by the U.S. military is included in “all expenditures.” From the beginning, it’s an expense Japan has never needed to pay.
The other possible reason are the circumstances from the Japanese side. Based on the testimony of Ambassador Mondale, who was serving in Japan at the time of the 1995 rape scandal, it was hypothesized that “the U.S. military in Okinawa will be driven out, or at the least forced to make a considerable reduction.”* However, the Japanese government stifled those sentiments by claiming that it would actually be problematic for U.S. troops to leave Okinawa. The concentration of bases in Okinawa, as opposed to elsewhere in Japan, is due to political pressures stemming from domestic opposition to their establishment.
The recent estimate of national debt, breaking past 1 quadrillion yen at 1,039,413,200,000,000 yen (as of June 2014), shows we are in no place to be helping out the U.S. with its expenses. The Japanese government ought to reduce omoiyari yosan, which is the root cause preventing the dissolution of U.S. bases.
* "Sympathy budget,” i.e., payments made as a gesture of thanks/goodwill.
** Editor's note: The original quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
The U.S. Department of Defense has revealed a reorganization plan to either close or merge 15 military bases and establishments in Europe, along with a general reduction in garrison numbers. The plan has been devised in order to deal with recent drastic cuts in the national defense budget.
This is a reduction that was announced in spite of rising fears among European countries regarding national security in light of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces. What could be the reason for withdrawing troops from Europe before Okinawa, a place that analysts from the U.S. and Japan alike agree doesn’t need a military presence?
Chances are, the existence of “omoiyari yosan”*— the military benefits expenses Japan itself furnishes — was not irrelevant to this decision. It’s simply cheaper to keep troops in Japan than in Europe. In order to progress with the dissolution of military bases in Okinawa, it is imperative to hurry to reduce the needlessly ambiguous omoiyari yosan payments at the root of the problem.
In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that the U.S. Department of Defense released last year, there was a recommendation to pursue relocation of Marine Corps forces — including those forces stationed in Okinawa — to Guam. Even from the perspective of countering China’s anti-access/area-denial strategy (A2/AD) strategy of keeping U.S. forces from entering nearby waters, it’s unnecessary to keep a huge reserve of troops on Okinawa, which is within missile strike distance of the mainland.
There are two possible reasons for maintaining a militarily unnecessary reserve of marines in Okinawa. One reason is omoiyari yosan. As it happens, there is no stipulation that ever obligated Japan to pay omoiyari yosan in the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement at all. On the contrary, the first item of article 24 of the agreement stipulates, “the United States will bear for the duration of this agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States armed forces in Japan,” with the exception of granting land and facilities for U.S. military use. Compensation for employees hired directly by the U.S. military is included in “all expenditures.” From the beginning, it’s an expense Japan has never needed to pay.
The other possible reason are the circumstances from the Japanese side. Based on the testimony of Ambassador Mondale, who was serving in Japan at the time of the 1995 rape scandal, it was hypothesized that “the U.S. military in Okinawa will be driven out, or at the least forced to make a considerable reduction.”* However, the Japanese government stifled those sentiments by claiming that it would actually be problematic for U.S. troops to leave Okinawa. The concentration of bases in Okinawa, as opposed to elsewhere in Japan, is due to political pressures stemming from domestic opposition to their establishment.
The recent estimate of national debt, breaking past 1 quadrillion yen at 1,039,413,200,000,000 yen (as of June 2014), shows we are in no place to be helping out the U.S. with its expenses. The Japanese government ought to reduce omoiyari yosan, which is the root cause preventing the dissolution of U.S. bases.
* "Sympathy budget,” i.e., payments made as a gesture of thanks/goodwill.
** Editor's note: The original quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.
The people of the U.S. like and admire the Japanese and we feel obligated to protect Japan. Other than the U.S., Japan has few, if any, friends in the region. China’s rise in power and its aggressive territorial claims are a threat to Japan. It is therefore in Japan’s own self interest that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is undertaking to strengthen Japan’s armed forces and to deepen the alliance with the U.S. Trying to poison relations with the benevolent great power that protects Japan is not a wise course.