An Agreement with Tehran Is Not Enough; We Need a Regional One
Published in Le Monde
(France) on 7 April 2015
by Jean-Marie Collin et Luc Mampaey (link to original)
(France) on 7 April 2015
by Jean-Marie Collin et Luc Mampaey (link to original)
Translated from
by Tony Arseneault.
Edited by Danielle Tezcan.
The Iran talks have ended with a “historic agreement,” according to President Obama, that permits the drafting of a definitive agreement before June 30, 2015. As for France, it stays guarded. Yet behind this diplomatic power play, a problem remains: how to prevent nuclear proliferation in the Middle East?
Since the beginning of the 90s, Iran has been looking to assert its power. To re-launch its electronuclear program, started with the help of France, Germany and the United States under the Shah, was a part of a strategy to acquire energy independence.
Sadly, thanks to revelations first brought to light in 2002, everything suggests that Iran has launched a clandestine, military nuclear program. Questions about the nuclear infrastructure, the number of centrifuges (nearly 19,000) or the close links with a ballistic program are the principal leads. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has never been able to confirm these suspicions, despite numerous investigations.
However, for 14 years, through this game of nuclear hide-and-seek, two questions remain unanswered and unasked by the group of P5 (the United States, France, Russia, China and the United Kingdom) + 1 (Germany): the double usage of civilian nuclear installations and Israel's nuclear arsenal.
HEU, Also Known As “Military Quality”
Iran has the right to possess nuclear installations according to section IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Obviously, when this treaty was written in 1970, nobody thought that ultra-centrifugation technology (used in Iran) would be so readily available. Indeed, this technology is a problem. These “uranium wringers” may produce fuel for the civilian nuclear reactors, but if they spin for too long and exceed 20 percent, then the uranium becomes highly enriched (HEU).
This HEU, also known as “military quality,” can then allow the construction of nuclear weapons. This civilian technology, available through the 6,000 authorized centrifuges, and these “inalienable” right are a real problem, since they give this state and other regional powers (Saudi Arabia or Turkey, if they wanted to equip themselves with it) the capacity to enrich uranium for military purposes.
The Iranian wish — true or not — to arm itself with a nuclear arsenal should have forced the nuclear powers to orient the debate toward Israel's possession of a nuclear arsenal of its own. The P5 has been facing pressure since 1995 within review conferences for the NPT.
Worse, in May 2010, the P5 reiterated its “commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East,” that provides for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) also affecting other weapons of mass destruction, and the introduction in December 2012 of the first conference with the creation of this zone as its main goal. This conference has been postponed at the request of the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom.
Camp David in Spring
Israel is right to fear the presence of a regional nuclear power, but are these fears based in its own security or its reluctance to unveil its nuclear identity? Indeed, this may be the reason why Prime Minister Netanyahu has been intervening so often. Is he scared that Iran — whose principal adversary has always been Iraq — will one day use its nuclear weapons against Israel, which is home to a Palestinian population and the third holy site of Islam (al-Aqsa), at the risk of nuclear intervention by the United States? Or is he rather scared of justifying to the international community his possession of a hundred atomic bombs?
The result achieved in Lausanne should be applauded. However, the solution, at the risk of elevating another nuclear power in this area, must be a regional one. In 2012, the P5 swept aside the conference on the creation of this NWFZ. Then, in 2013, it was not able to seize the opportunity offered by the dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons to launch this process.
On April 27, the NPT conference will open. Aside from the nuclear disarmament issue, on which the P5, states officially armed with nuclear weapons, has made little effort, non-proliferation will be an important subject. The implementation of this zone, with the objective of stopping proliferation and reinforcing our own security, must be achieved.
As soon as this year, the P5 powers must commit to opening talks with every concerned country. A crushing majority of states were ready in 2012. The summit with the Gulf countries proposed by Obama at Camp David this spring absolutely must be the location of these talks. France has its role to play. Paris must use its influence to convince P5 partners and key states of this region to be there. Without the affirmation on the implementation of this will, the way toward nuclear proliferation will stay open indefinitely!
Since the beginning of the 90s, Iran has been looking to assert its power. To re-launch its electronuclear program, started with the help of France, Germany and the United States under the Shah, was a part of a strategy to acquire energy independence.
Sadly, thanks to revelations first brought to light in 2002, everything suggests that Iran has launched a clandestine, military nuclear program. Questions about the nuclear infrastructure, the number of centrifuges (nearly 19,000) or the close links with a ballistic program are the principal leads. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has never been able to confirm these suspicions, despite numerous investigations.
However, for 14 years, through this game of nuclear hide-and-seek, two questions remain unanswered and unasked by the group of P5 (the United States, France, Russia, China and the United Kingdom) + 1 (Germany): the double usage of civilian nuclear installations and Israel's nuclear arsenal.
HEU, Also Known As “Military Quality”
Iran has the right to possess nuclear installations according to section IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Obviously, when this treaty was written in 1970, nobody thought that ultra-centrifugation technology (used in Iran) would be so readily available. Indeed, this technology is a problem. These “uranium wringers” may produce fuel for the civilian nuclear reactors, but if they spin for too long and exceed 20 percent, then the uranium becomes highly enriched (HEU).
This HEU, also known as “military quality,” can then allow the construction of nuclear weapons. This civilian technology, available through the 6,000 authorized centrifuges, and these “inalienable” right are a real problem, since they give this state and other regional powers (Saudi Arabia or Turkey, if they wanted to equip themselves with it) the capacity to enrich uranium for military purposes.
The Iranian wish — true or not — to arm itself with a nuclear arsenal should have forced the nuclear powers to orient the debate toward Israel's possession of a nuclear arsenal of its own. The P5 has been facing pressure since 1995 within review conferences for the NPT.
Worse, in May 2010, the P5 reiterated its “commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East,” that provides for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) also affecting other weapons of mass destruction, and the introduction in December 2012 of the first conference with the creation of this zone as its main goal. This conference has been postponed at the request of the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom.
Camp David in Spring
Israel is right to fear the presence of a regional nuclear power, but are these fears based in its own security or its reluctance to unveil its nuclear identity? Indeed, this may be the reason why Prime Minister Netanyahu has been intervening so often. Is he scared that Iran — whose principal adversary has always been Iraq — will one day use its nuclear weapons against Israel, which is home to a Palestinian population and the third holy site of Islam (al-Aqsa), at the risk of nuclear intervention by the United States? Or is he rather scared of justifying to the international community his possession of a hundred atomic bombs?
The result achieved in Lausanne should be applauded. However, the solution, at the risk of elevating another nuclear power in this area, must be a regional one. In 2012, the P5 swept aside the conference on the creation of this NWFZ. Then, in 2013, it was not able to seize the opportunity offered by the dismantling of the Syrian chemical weapons to launch this process.
On April 27, the NPT conference will open. Aside from the nuclear disarmament issue, on which the P5, states officially armed with nuclear weapons, has made little effort, non-proliferation will be an important subject. The implementation of this zone, with the objective of stopping proliferation and reinforcing our own security, must be achieved.
As soon as this year, the P5 powers must commit to opening talks with every concerned country. A crushing majority of states were ready in 2012. The summit with the Gulf countries proposed by Obama at Camp David this spring absolutely must be the location of these talks. France has its role to play. Paris must use its influence to convince P5 partners and key states of this region to be there. Without the affirmation on the implementation of this will, the way toward nuclear proliferation will stay open indefinitely!