Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy: Disregard for European Interests
The U.S. president reproaches Europeans for poorly welcoming migrants, but he himself holds some responsibility for the current migratory crisis. His country’s hasty disengagement in Afghanistan provoked significant destabilization, and he still refuses a no-fly zone in northern Syria.
In recent statements, President Obama incites Europeans to better welcome refugees, even though, for its own part, the United States accepts very few of them. With America beset by the same identity obsession Europe is facing, how would the country react to the arrival of one or two million refugees, primarily Muslims? In fact, the United States absolves itself of all responsibility in the creation, and thus the regulation, of the migratory crisis. The reality is entirely different: by action or omission, American policy has been a fundamental cause of the European refugee crisis. The cases of Syria and Afghanistan, where the majority of the asylum seekers originate, will more precisely illustrate this perspective.
Since the almost complete withdrawal of Western forces at the end of 2014, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated to such an extent that the motto of Western governments is silence: not a word in the American electoral campaign and not a single significant initiative in Europe, a diplomatic task at a standstill. Let’s remember that, under pressure from American soldiers, Obama’s first mandate was marked by a massive investment in both men and funds (the Surge). Owing to the lack of an appropriate strategy, and to having left the matter of Pakistan to the Taliban, failure was irrevocable. His second mandate was marked by symmetric error: a hasty disengagement that left the Afghani government incapable of handling the transition. The Taliban controls between a third and the majority of the land, and constitutes – proof as it were of Western collapse – the only effective shield against the local branch of the Islamic State. Moreover, al-Qaida (but who remembers that its elimination was the objective of the 2001 intervention?) prospers today under the protection of the sanctuary that is Afghanistan. In this context, hundreds of thousands of Afghanis leave for Europe and substantial self-deception is needed to, as Great Britain does, consider Afghanistan to be a secure country that one can so matter-of-factly take back.
Syrian policy has been marked by the same incoherence and the same refusal to consider the predictable consequences of the implemented policy. The first problem was the disconnect between diplomatic statements on the illegitimacy of the Syrian regime and the quasi-absence of aid to the most reduced component of the insurrection. And so, when this practically eliminated the Islamic State group in Syria in January 2014, no aid allowed the insurrection to consolidate its positions. Furthermore, it’s well known that civilians first fled the bombings from Bashar Assad’s regime, which were supported by Russian air reinforcement, when the regime tried clearing urban zones held by the insurrection by repeatedly bombing civilian targets (hospitals, schools and houses). The departure of five million Syrians first affected neighboring countries (three million went to Turkey, and one million to Lebanon), but also Europe. Yet, the only means of stabilizing the Syrian population is technically easy to achieve, and it worked in Iraq: the implementation of a no-fly zone over northern Syria that would allow civilians to regroup and to receive humanitarian aid, which currently is systematically blocked or redirected by Damascus. President Obama has persistently opposed this solution for fear of a downward spiral (the mechanism for which remains a bit mysterious) that would lead to an intervention requiring ground troops. A no-fly zone is sometimes an appropriate response, like the show of protection for the Kurds in Iraq, put in place in 1991, which was precisely meant to allow their return to Turkey and Iran. Refusal to protect Syrian civilians would mechanically result in an influx of refugees toward Europe, a negligible consideration for Washington insofar as the United States isn’t affected.
Never, even during the Bush administration, has an American government gone so far in its disregard for European interests. This attitude, besides being annoying in its hypocrisy, is testament to a worrisome blindness.
On one hand, whatever may have been understood at the time of Obama’s visit, the United States is not a reliable partner for Europe. Except for the case of Israel, the American idea of national interest is narrow and, as all Europeans who’ve passed through Washington are aware, the condescension toward Europe is well anchored in political environments. Europeans haven’t been included in strategic decisions regarding any of the issues that primarily affect them (terrorism or refugees): their interests are only marginally taken into account (at best). More recently, the German proposal of a protection zone for civilians to negotiate Damascus’ support – which indicates, albeit in passing, a worrisome level of incomprehension of Russian policy – has been dismissed without discussion by the American presidency. Moreover, this disregard for European interests is counter-productive for the United States itself. The profound destabilization of Europe, its only nearly-unconditional ally, already hinders American foreign policy. What would happen if, tomorrow, European institutions were to concede to pressures from the extreme right? How would the United States be able to manage the regional effects of an authoritarian Turkish drift when Europe is ready to concede everything in order to obtain Ankara’s cooperation on the matter of refugees? President Obama has tragically underestimated the fragility of his allies with respect to Middle-Eastern crises. These crises reinforce the fears surrounding their identity, which then bring about authoritarian movements and establish a biased perception of events. Even if Syrian and Afghan refugees are very often the victims of sexual assault (notably the prostitution of minors), the image of the “Muslim sexual predator” is evidently irresistible. In the end, more important than moral lessons is a recognition of the disastrous effects of American policy and a recognition of Europe’s legitimate interests. Europeans have a right to expect these from President Obama.
In recent statements, President Obama incites Europeans to better welcome refugees, even though, for its own part, the United States accepts very few of them. With America beset by the same identity obsession Europe is facing, how would the country react to the arrival of one or two million refugees, primarily Muslims? In fact, the United States absolves itself of all responsibility in the creation, and thus the regulation, of the migratory crisis. The reality is entirely different: by action or omission, American policy has been a fundamental cause of the European refugee crisis. The cases of Syria and Afghanistan, where the majority of the asylum seekers originate, will more precisely illustrate this perspective.
Since the almost complete withdrawal of Western forces at the end of 2014, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated to such an extent that the motto of Western governments is silence: not a word in the American electoral campaign and not a single significant initiative in Europe, a diplomatic task at a standstill. Let’s remember that, under pressure from American soldiers, Obama’s first mandate was marked by a massive investment in both men and funds (the Surge). Owing to the lack of an appropriate strategy, and to having left the matter of Pakistan to the Taliban, failure was irrevocable. His second mandate was marked by symmetric error: a hasty disengagement that left the Afghani government incapable of handling the transition. The Taliban controls between a third and the majority of the land, and constitutes – proof as it were of Western collapse – the only effective shield against the local branch of the Islamic State. Moreover, al-Qaida (but who remembers that its elimination was the objective of the 2001 intervention?) prospers today under the protection of the sanctuary that is Afghanistan. In this context, hundreds of thousands of Afghanis leave for Europe and substantial self-deception is needed to, as Great Britain does, consider Afghanistan to be a secure country that one can so matter-of-factly take back.
Syrian policy has been marked by the same incoherence and the same refusal to consider the predictable consequences of the implemented policy. The first problem was the disconnect between diplomatic statements on the illegitimacy of the Syrian regime and the quasi-absence of aid to the most reduced component of the insurrection. And so, when this practically eliminated the Islamic State group in Syria in January 2014, no aid allowed the insurrection to consolidate its positions. Furthermore, it’s well known that civilians first fled the bombings from Bashar Assad’s regime, which were supported by Russian air reinforcement, when the regime tried clearing urban zones held by the insurrection by repeatedly bombing civilian targets (hospitals, schools and houses). The departure of five million Syrians first affected neighboring countries (three million went to Turkey, and one million to Lebanon), but also Europe. Yet, the only means of stabilizing the Syrian population is technically easy to achieve, and it worked in Iraq: the implementation of a no-fly zone over northern Syria that would allow civilians to regroup and to receive humanitarian aid, which currently is systematically blocked or redirected by Damascus. President Obama has persistently opposed this solution for fear of a downward spiral (the mechanism for which remains a bit mysterious) that would lead to an intervention requiring ground troops. A no-fly zone is sometimes an appropriate response, like the show of protection for the Kurds in Iraq, put in place in 1991, which was precisely meant to allow their return to Turkey and Iran. Refusal to protect Syrian civilians would mechanically result in an influx of refugees toward Europe, a negligible consideration for Washington insofar as the United States isn’t affected.
Never, even during the Bush administration, has an American government gone so far in its disregard for European interests. This attitude, besides being annoying in its hypocrisy, is testament to a worrisome blindness.
On one hand, whatever may have been understood at the time of Obama’s visit, the United States is not a reliable partner for Europe. Except for the case of Israel, the American idea of national interest is narrow and, as all Europeans who’ve passed through Washington are aware, the condescension toward Europe is well anchored in political environments. Europeans haven’t been included in strategic decisions regarding any of the issues that primarily affect them (terrorism or refugees): their interests are only marginally taken into account (at best). More recently, the German proposal of a protection zone for civilians to negotiate Damascus’ support – which indicates, albeit in passing, a worrisome level of incomprehension of Russian policy – has been dismissed without discussion by the American presidency. Moreover, this disregard for European interests is counter-productive for the United States itself. The profound destabilization of Europe, its only nearly-unconditional ally, already hinders American foreign policy. What would happen if, tomorrow, European institutions were to concede to pressures from the extreme right? How would the United States be able to manage the regional effects of an authoritarian Turkish drift when Europe is ready to concede everything in order to obtain Ankara’s cooperation on the matter of refugees? President Obama has tragically underestimated the fragility of his allies with respect to Middle-Eastern crises. These crises reinforce the fears surrounding their identity, which then bring about authoritarian movements and establish a biased perception of events. Even if Syrian and Afghan refugees are very often the victims of sexual assault (notably the prostitution of minors), the image of the “Muslim sexual predator” is evidently irresistible. In the end, more important than moral lessons is a recognition of the disastrous effects of American policy and a recognition of Europe’s legitimate interests. Europeans have a right to expect these from President Obama.
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