On Objectively Evaluating the US ‘Report Card’ in the Fight against Islamic State

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 24 August 2016
by Yu Xihong (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Nathan Hsu. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
A panicky episode recently unfolded in Kirkuk, north of the Iraqi capital Baghdad, as security personnel discovered a youth wearing a suicide vest. Reports indicate that he was abducted by Islamic State terrorists and forced to serve as a human bomb in the attempted attack on the local populace. The Islamic State group is also suspected of being behind the previous "wedding bomber" attack in Turkey.

On Aug. 10, the commander of U.S. military operations against the Islamic State group, Sean MacFarland, told media that the international coalition has eliminated 45,000 Islamic State group militants to date, greatly reducing the organization's war-fighting capabilities and entirely routing them in some areas. But taken in tandem with the present situation, even some within the U.S. Congress have questioned whether the military's operational efficacy in the fight against the Islamic State group is being overstated.

As the main force leading the charge against the Islamic State group, U.S. military publications have always been heavily cited in assessments of the situation on the ground in Iraq and Syria. Now, these Pentagon evaluations have been openly called into doubt, a fact that has at least tangentially reminded the international community that various factors have very possibly come into play in making these measures of progress in the fight against the Islamic State group deviate from reality.

First, there is the competition between the United States and Russia. Since Russia began participating in military strikes against the Islamic State group last September, the United States has quite obviously and widely relaxed the degrees of classification for much information pertaining to the results of those U.S.-led strikes, highlighting its own strategic capabilities in fighting terrorism. Second, there is the continued jousting between Democrats and Republicans. The sitting Obama administration is hastening to validate its decision made two years ago to take the fight to the Islamic State group by citing more figures, hoping to use the weight of numbers to silence Republicans who oppose U.S. military action in Iraq and Syria. Third, there is the friction between the military and Congress. Ever since the U.S. military began direct action against the Islamic State group, it has had to work through the obstructions and doubts of the legislature both in its efforts to gain operational authority and set operational time frames. As a consequence, the military has actively placed emphasis on the more sanguine aspects of its counterterrorism campaign, with an eye toward increasing its bargaining power on Capitol Hill.

At the same time, the commander of the U.S. mission's military force essentially performing a self-evaluation is also an important factor that will influence the overall measure of efforts against the Islamic State group. The U.S. military commander responsible for directing and coordinating strikes against the Islamic State group is appointed for a limited term and steps down after approximately a year of service. Using the aforementioned MacFarland as an example, the general will see his term come to a close at the end of August. And on the eve of the changing of the guard, MacFarland is not only claiming that the Islamic State group has lost "nearly half of what the enemy once controlled in Iraq and 20 percent of what they once controlled in Syria," but has also cheerily asserted that if Mosul is retaken, the Islamic State group in Iraq will only be able to offer "scattered pockets of resistance."

Such a rosy view of the horizon is not necessarily a falsification, but in being, after all, a self-written portion of his "end of term report card," we must wait to see if the general's objectivity stands the test of time.

For an international community living under constant threat from the Islamic State group, defeating the terrorist organization as soon as possible and seizing a decisive victory on the Middle Eastern battlefield can not come soon enough. But before truly accomplishing this end, assessments of progress and strike results must be made as objective and factual as possible, for invalid evaluations will not only place front-line troops in harm's way, but can also easily encourage blind optimism that will only give way to chaos and confusion as the situation evolves. A classic example came on Nov. 13 of last year, one day prior to the spate of terrorist attacks in Paris, when U.S. President Barack Obama solemnly declared that the Islamic State group had been "contained," only to call an emergency meeting of the National Security Council the following day to direct intelligence bodies to reevaluate the Islamic State group threat.

Consequently, in the battle against the Islamic State group, whether it be the United States, Russia, or others among the international forces arrayed against terrorism, all must seek to uphold a cautious attitude and pragmatic spirit when measuring and assessing results, as well as avoiding the distractions and interference of extrinsic factors or selfish interests to the extent that such is possible. At the same time, all must maintain a high level of vigilance to guard against splinter groups branching out from the Middle East, and treat the presence or absence of these as a hard indicator for the defeat of the Islamic State group.

The author is an instructor at the PLA Nanjing Political College.


  最近伊拉克首都巴格达北部的基尔库克地区经历了惊魂的一幕,武装安保人员发现一位少年身上穿戴着自杀式炸弹背心。据悉他是被IS恐怖分子绑架,被迫当成人肉炸弹,袭击当地人民。而此前在土耳其发生的“婚礼爆炸”恐袭也被怀疑是IS制造的。
  然而,就在本月10日,美军打击IS行动指挥官肖恩·麦克法兰向媒体表示,国际联盟迄今已消灭4.5万名“伊斯兰国”武装分子,“伊斯兰国”的战斗力大不如前,甚至出现局部溃败的情况。结合当前局势,就连美国国会不少议员都质疑美军的说法存在美化打击IS行动战果的问题。
  作为牵头打击IS的主力,美国军方公布的相关信息一直被当做评估伊叙反恐战局的核心信源。如今,美军的战果评估受到公开质疑,至少从一个侧面提醒国际社会,由于各种因素的干扰,对打击IS进展成效的衡量,存在失真的可能性。
  首先,美俄竞争因素。去年9月份俄罗斯加 入对IS的军事打击以来,美国明显加大了释放自身主导下打击IS成果信息的密度,凸显自身的反恐战略能力。其二,两党斗争因素。执政的奥巴马政府急于用反 恐作战成果,凸显两年前做出打击IS决策的正确性,以此堵住反对美军在伊叙地区作战的共和党的嘴。其三,军方与国会的矛盾因素。自从美军发动对IS的直接 军事打击以来,美国军方在获取行动授权和争取行动期限上,多次面临国会的掣肘和质疑,因此积极强调反恐战场的乐观前景,以增加与国会讨价还价的筹码。
  同时,美军任务部队将领的自我评价,也是影响打击IS成效评估的重要因素。美军负责指挥协调打击IS军事行动的指挥官是任期制,大致一年一换,以此前面提到的麦克法兰为例,他本人8月底即将离任。离任前夕,他不仅声称IS在伊拉克和叙利亚境内“已分别丧失50%和20%的控制范围”,而且乐观认为如果下一步夺取摩苏尔,IS在伊拉克将只剩“零星抵抗”。这番乐观表态未必是夸大其词,但毕竟只是一份自己填写的“离任成绩单”,其客观性还需要时间来检验。
  对于饱受IS威胁之苦的国际社会而言,在最短时间内击败IS,夺取中东反恐战场的 决定性胜利,是再好不过的事情。但是,在真正做到这一点之前,有关打击效果和进展的评估必须尽可能客观真实,因为如果评估失真,不仅会将一线反恐力量置于 危险境地,而且容易引发各方面盲目乐观情绪,一旦情况有变容易自乱阵脚。一个典型的例子是,去年11月13日,也就是巴黎发生连环恐袭案前一天,美国总统 奥巴马信誓旦旦表示“‘伊斯兰国’已被遏制住”,但第二天就不得不紧急召开国家安全委员会会议,指示情报机构重新评估“伊斯兰国”威胁。
  因此,在打击IS的战场上,不论美俄,还是国际反恐阵营的其他力量,在评估和衡量 效果时,都要秉持审慎态度和务实精神,尽量避免外在因素乃至私心杂念的干扰。同时,要高度警惕防范中东“恐怖碎片”外溢,并将其作为是否战胜IS的硬指 标。
(作者是解放军南京政治学院教员)
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