Trump, Maduro, Bolsonaro, and Alberto’s Foreign Policy

Published in Clarín
(Argentina) on 2 November 2019
by Ricardo Kirschbaum (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Charlotte Holmes. Edited by Elizabeth Cosgriff.
At Washington’s request, Argentina would not leave the Lima Group. But it would reduce its involvement and would not recognize Juan Guaidó.

Alberto Fernández’s forthcoming dialogue with Mexican leader Andrés Manuel López Obrador will be his first such meeting as president-elect. His visit to meet with a leader who plays a significant role in the region’s rhetorically left-leaning sphere is an indicator of the general direction his foreign policy will take; however, at the same time, he will have to constantly negotiate and reach agreements with his all-powerful neighbor, the United States. AMLO, as the Mexican president is referred to by those who brag about their close relationship with him, has a big, complex agenda with Washington. He is still searching for a formula that will allow him to completely fulfill this and, at the same time, outwardly project a more distanced stance in relation to Washington.

Fernández, who, on Friday, received a welcome from Donald Trump, as well as the conventional promise of collaboration, faces the same dilemma. The task of efficiently resolving this dilemma for the country will be one of the big challenges of this historic transfer of power. The first sign that the decision about how to proceed is undergoing serious analysis is the fact that the proposed stopover in Houston, after Mexico, to speak with investors interested in the Vaca Muerta Formation has been canceled. Realism took precedence; the first U.S. visit could not exclude Washington and the tasks waiting there with regard to the International Monetary Fund.

The U.S. government requested two things: 1) that Argentina not break away from the Lima Group, which was formed to put pressure on Maduro; 2) that it repays its debt to the IMF in accordance with the new repayment plan that is to be negotiated.

The first matter will be discussed with López Obrador. Mexico is a member of the Lima Group but not an active participant. It fulfills its agreement with Washington on an official level, but, in practice, it is fostering a different strategy with Uruguay and the European Union. Fernández has praised this position, although he is alert to the possibility of an unfavorable outcome for the Broad Front in the electoral run-off. It is assumed that Fernández’s state department will follow López Obrador’s strategy—remain in the Lima Group with very little involvement. The matter of establishing a position on Maduro’s regime is yet to be resolved and will be discussed with the Mexican president.

Fernández has been congratulated by the authoritarian Venezuelan president and has issued a response. He received a similar reaction from Juan Guaidó, who has been declared acting president by the National Assembly. He has not responded to this, and is considered unlikely to do so. This means that Mauricio Macri’s decision to recognize Guaidó and his ambassador here will be reversed. This change could cause a great deal of friction with the Trump administration, which, on the other hand, could help to assuage the raging dispute between Jair Bolsonaro and Fernández. The Itamaraty Palace has forbidden the Brazilian ambassador in Buenos Aires from communicating with emissaries of the future government.

Venezuela will be one of the topics raised at the upcoming Puebla Group forum here. This meeting of the region’s center-left leaders has been organized by Marcos Enriquez Ominami, who is a friend of the president-elect and is (or was) responsible for his travel schedule.

The turmoil in South America is changing the president-elect’s original plans: He was to visit Chile first as a gesture of friendship. Now, everything has changed.





Trump, Maduro, Bolsonaro y la política de Alberto
Argentina no abandonaría el Grupo de Lima, por pedido de Washington. Pero bajaría su perfil y desconocería a Juan Guaidó.

El diálogo que Alberto Fernández tendrá con el mexicano López Obrador es el primero que mantendrá como presidente electo. Es un indicador de la dirección general que tendrá su política exterior al visitar a un líder que ocupa un lugar central en ese espacio retóricamente de izquierda en la región, pero que al mismo tiempo debe negociar constantemente y acordar con su poderosísimo vecino, los Estados Unidos. AMLO, como le dicen al presidente mexicano quienes presumen de ser cercanos a él, tiene una nutrida y complicada agenda con Washington. Está buscando todavía una fórmula para cumplirla entera y, al mismo tiempo, mostrar un perfil público más alejado de Washington.

Ese dilema lo tiene Alberto Fernández, que el viernes recibió el saludo de Trump y la promesa protocolar de trabajar juntos. Resolver ese dilema con eficacia para el país será uno de los grandes desafíos de este turno histórico. El primer indicio de que se está estudiando en serio qué hacer es que se suspendió una escala en Houston, a continuación de México, para hablar con interesados en Vaca Muerta. Primó el realismo: la primera visita de Estados Unidos no podía evitar Washington y las tareas que allí esperan con el FMI​.

La diplomacia americana pidió dos cosas: 1) que Argentina no rompa con el Grupo de Lima, formado para presionar a Maduro; 2) que cumpla con la deuda del FMI de acuerdo a los nuevos plazos que se van a negociar.

El primer punto se hablará con López Obrador. México está en el Grupo de Lima pero no participa. Cumple formalmente con Washington pero en la práctica está alentando una vía distinta con Uruguay y la Unión Europea. Es lo que Alberto Fernández ha elogiado, aunque está atento al resultado posiblemente adverso al Frente Amplio en el balotaje. Se supone que la diplomacia de Fernández hará lo mismo que López Obrador: seguir en el Grupo de Lima con perfil muy bajo. Queda pendiente definir una posición sobre el régimen de Maduro, cuestión se conversará con el presidente mexicano.

Alberto F. ha recibido una felicitación del autoritario presidente venezolano y la ha respondido. También tiene en su manos una similar de Juan Guaidó, presidente designado por la Asamblea Nacional. Todavía no la ha contestado y se estima que no lo hará. Significa que se rectificará la decisión de Macri de reconocer a Guaidó y a su embajadora aquí. Este cambio puede ser un punto de fricción alto con el gobierno de Trump, quién en cambio puede ayudar a bajar los decibeles en la disputa feroz entre Bolsonaro y Fernández. El embajador de Brasil en Buenos Aires tiene prohibido por Itamaraty hablar con emisarios del futuro gobierno.

Venezuela​ será uno de los temas que se plantearán cuando se reúna aquí el Foro de Puebla, una reunión de líderes de la centro-izquierda de la región, que organiza Marcos Enrique Ominami, un amigo del presidente electo, que tiene (o tuvo) a su cargo su agenda de viajes.

La ebullición en Sudamérica está cambiando planes originales del presidente electo: su primer viaje iba a ser a Chile como un gesto de amistad. Todo cambió.

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