Careful Revenge: Why the United States and Iran Did Not Start a Full-Scale War
Published in RBC
(Russia) on 10 January 2020
by Nikolai Kozhanov (link to original)
(Russia) on 10 January 2020
by Nikolai Kozhanov (link to original)
Translated from
by Iana Shchetinskaia.
Edited by Laurence Bouvard.
The death of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani has become yet another element in the cruel game the United States and Iran have been playing since the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018.
Iran’s missile attack on U.S. bases in Iraq should have disappointed people who have a negative view of the United States, in Russia and abroad. They perceive Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian major general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was killed in Baghdad, as a leading fighter against imperialism, so they expected that after such a despicable act of murder, bloody vengeance would ensue. Instead of this, they got a limited missile strike, which the Iranians warned the U.S. about in advance. This was not an eye for an eye situation; even the financial damage to the United States was minimal. Those who thought that the missile strike was the first step in a big retaliation plan also were left heartbroken. Almost immediately after the attack, Iranian leaders announced that they had avenged Soleimani’s death, and would not seek further aggression.
A Retaliatory Blow
Iran’s revenge turned out to be more limited than even the most moderate case scenarios had suggested. U.S. analysts had initially asserted that the conflict would not affect U.S. citizens, since Tehran was not ready to engage in a full-scale conflict. However, analysts expected Iran to retaliate via proxy actors in the region: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel. Predictions that Iran would launch an attack on the oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf or disrupt oil tanker transits caused oil prices to exceed the $70 per barrel benchmark. However, the feared attacks did not follow.
Iran stood down primarily because it was not ready to exacerbate its relations with the Persian Gulf states after managing to improve its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2019. After Soleimani’s death, Qatar offered to be an intermediary between Washington and Tehran amid rising tensions. Ironically, the reaper drone which fired the missile that killed Soleimani was launched from the U.S. base in Qatar. One might say that it looked like an attempt to pit Doha and Tehran against each other. According to several sources, Qatar gave informal guarantees that it would not allow its territory to be used to conduct strikes against Iran or its citizens.
Taking revenge through Israel was also a potentially problematic endeavor. On one hand, with Lebanon being unstable, it would have been dangerous to involve Hezbollah. On the other, Israel has proved multiple times over the last few years that in case of conflict, Iran and its allies would suffer consequences. Russia would not be the one to support Iran either, because so far, it has been very sensitive to issues concerning Israel’s security.
As a result, Iran has found itself in a very complicated position, where it cannot not afford an open confrontation with the United States, partially because sanctions have already significantly weakened its economy. In 2019, Iran’s gross domestic product dropped by more than 9%. High unemployment rates, a 40% inflation rate, and a 63% increase in food prices within one year have fueled public discontent and caused protests last fall. The public pressured Iran to retaliate since Soleimani had been a legendary figure for the country. This belief was not necessarily justified, yet millions of ordinary people, who believed that Soleimani was a hero, demanded revenge.
There might have been more rational representatives among Iran’s leadership who were not in favor of responding to Soleimani’s killing at all. They were aware that even though his death created domestic instability, they could capitalize on the killing. It is true that, so far, Iran does not have a military official as charismatic as Soleimani, but on the other hand, it was state propaganda that constructed his image. It is also true that it will be hard at first to establish the network of personal contacts with Iranian allies in the Middle East that the general had, but this will happen at some point.
Furthermore, Hezbollah, the Syrian militia forces, and the Shiite extremist groups in Iran did not work for Soleimani, they worked for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian leadership, often for money. Thus, the person who serves as an intermediary is not necessarily important. What is important is that Soleimani’s death helped the current Iranian regime to unite Iran's population. Now, Iranian conservatives and nationalists have a stronger chance of winning in the parliamentary elections this February. On an international level, Iran now has the image of a victim which had to face an attack from the United States against all international norms.
A Tough Game
At the same time, it is important to understand that Soleimani’s death is just an element in the game between the United States and Iran aimed at stabilizing bilateral relations, a game which they have been playing since the United States withdrew from the Iran deal in 2018. By last fall, both Washington and Iran had realized that they needed to cooperate. They established communication lines through Kuwait, Oman, Switzerland and France. Thanks to that arrangement, the two countries managed to resolve several disagreements concerning nuclear safety and issues specific to the region. According to several sources, during the United Nations General Assembly session last fall, U.S. and Iranian representatives nearly agreed to a telephone call between President Donald Trump and President Hassan Rouhani. However, the two sides could not agree on who would take the first step.
Both countries think that they can buy time by trying to coerce the other side, at times in very rough ways, by using both a stick and a carrot, and combining hostile acts with diplomacy. Tehran is taking steps to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and using force in the region, at the same time it is giving its adversaries a month or two to think about how to respond. A few months before Soleimani was killed, Washington responded to Iran’s aggressive acts by imposing sanctions and taking political steps. With each military action – capturing oil tankers, alleged attacks on Saudi oil facilities and attacks on the U.S. Embassy and military base at the end of 2019 – Iran has become increasingly assertive, which helped U.S. hawks argue for the necessity of launching a military attack against the country. Essentially, U.S. forces killed Soleimani not as a punishment for his actions, but as part of a tit-for-tat game to force Iran to cooperate.
It is clear that the U.S. was sailing too close to the wind. If Iran had responded violently, the region would have been on the brink of a new war. That did not happen, because Iran played by the rules: it decided not to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, but just to narrow the extent of its commitments. The United States was warned about the retaliatory attack beforehand, but it chose to allow the strikes to proceed so that Iran could have a chance to appease its mourning population. After the attack, Trump threatened Iran with sanctions, and again, proposed that its leaders consider starting negotiations.
So, the logic behind America and Iran's behavior remains this: they poke at each other and then step away, encouraging the other side to think about diplomacy. Now, both Iran and the United States are pausing to think about which will be the first to sit down at the negotiating table, and if either side is going to do that at all. If there is no consensus, the region has to expect another wave of instability. The most important thing is that nobody overdoes the poking like the United States did when it killed Soleimani.
Iran’s missile attack on U.S. bases in Iraq should have disappointed people who have a negative view of the United States, in Russia and abroad. They perceive Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian major general in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was killed in Baghdad, as a leading fighter against imperialism, so they expected that after such a despicable act of murder, bloody vengeance would ensue. Instead of this, they got a limited missile strike, which the Iranians warned the U.S. about in advance. This was not an eye for an eye situation; even the financial damage to the United States was minimal. Those who thought that the missile strike was the first step in a big retaliation plan also were left heartbroken. Almost immediately after the attack, Iranian leaders announced that they had avenged Soleimani’s death, and would not seek further aggression.
A Retaliatory Blow
Iran’s revenge turned out to be more limited than even the most moderate case scenarios had suggested. U.S. analysts had initially asserted that the conflict would not affect U.S. citizens, since Tehran was not ready to engage in a full-scale conflict. However, analysts expected Iran to retaliate via proxy actors in the region: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel. Predictions that Iran would launch an attack on the oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf or disrupt oil tanker transits caused oil prices to exceed the $70 per barrel benchmark. However, the feared attacks did not follow.
Iran stood down primarily because it was not ready to exacerbate its relations with the Persian Gulf states after managing to improve its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in 2019. After Soleimani’s death, Qatar offered to be an intermediary between Washington and Tehran amid rising tensions. Ironically, the reaper drone which fired the missile that killed Soleimani was launched from the U.S. base in Qatar. One might say that it looked like an attempt to pit Doha and Tehran against each other. According to several sources, Qatar gave informal guarantees that it would not allow its territory to be used to conduct strikes against Iran or its citizens.
Taking revenge through Israel was also a potentially problematic endeavor. On one hand, with Lebanon being unstable, it would have been dangerous to involve Hezbollah. On the other, Israel has proved multiple times over the last few years that in case of conflict, Iran and its allies would suffer consequences. Russia would not be the one to support Iran either, because so far, it has been very sensitive to issues concerning Israel’s security.
As a result, Iran has found itself in a very complicated position, where it cannot not afford an open confrontation with the United States, partially because sanctions have already significantly weakened its economy. In 2019, Iran’s gross domestic product dropped by more than 9%. High unemployment rates, a 40% inflation rate, and a 63% increase in food prices within one year have fueled public discontent and caused protests last fall. The public pressured Iran to retaliate since Soleimani had been a legendary figure for the country. This belief was not necessarily justified, yet millions of ordinary people, who believed that Soleimani was a hero, demanded revenge.
There might have been more rational representatives among Iran’s leadership who were not in favor of responding to Soleimani’s killing at all. They were aware that even though his death created domestic instability, they could capitalize on the killing. It is true that, so far, Iran does not have a military official as charismatic as Soleimani, but on the other hand, it was state propaganda that constructed his image. It is also true that it will be hard at first to establish the network of personal contacts with Iranian allies in the Middle East that the general had, but this will happen at some point.
Furthermore, Hezbollah, the Syrian militia forces, and the Shiite extremist groups in Iran did not work for Soleimani, they worked for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Iranian leadership, often for money. Thus, the person who serves as an intermediary is not necessarily important. What is important is that Soleimani’s death helped the current Iranian regime to unite Iran's population. Now, Iranian conservatives and nationalists have a stronger chance of winning in the parliamentary elections this February. On an international level, Iran now has the image of a victim which had to face an attack from the United States against all international norms.
A Tough Game
At the same time, it is important to understand that Soleimani’s death is just an element in the game between the United States and Iran aimed at stabilizing bilateral relations, a game which they have been playing since the United States withdrew from the Iran deal in 2018. By last fall, both Washington and Iran had realized that they needed to cooperate. They established communication lines through Kuwait, Oman, Switzerland and France. Thanks to that arrangement, the two countries managed to resolve several disagreements concerning nuclear safety and issues specific to the region. According to several sources, during the United Nations General Assembly session last fall, U.S. and Iranian representatives nearly agreed to a telephone call between President Donald Trump and President Hassan Rouhani. However, the two sides could not agree on who would take the first step.
Both countries think that they can buy time by trying to coerce the other side, at times in very rough ways, by using both a stick and a carrot, and combining hostile acts with diplomacy. Tehran is taking steps to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and using force in the region, at the same time it is giving its adversaries a month or two to think about how to respond. A few months before Soleimani was killed, Washington responded to Iran’s aggressive acts by imposing sanctions and taking political steps. With each military action – capturing oil tankers, alleged attacks on Saudi oil facilities and attacks on the U.S. Embassy and military base at the end of 2019 – Iran has become increasingly assertive, which helped U.S. hawks argue for the necessity of launching a military attack against the country. Essentially, U.S. forces killed Soleimani not as a punishment for his actions, but as part of a tit-for-tat game to force Iran to cooperate.
It is clear that the U.S. was sailing too close to the wind. If Iran had responded violently, the region would have been on the brink of a new war. That did not happen, because Iran played by the rules: it decided not to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, but just to narrow the extent of its commitments. The United States was warned about the retaliatory attack beforehand, but it chose to allow the strikes to proceed so that Iran could have a chance to appease its mourning population. After the attack, Trump threatened Iran with sanctions, and again, proposed that its leaders consider starting negotiations.
So, the logic behind America and Iran's behavior remains this: they poke at each other and then step away, encouraging the other side to think about diplomacy. Now, both Iran and the United States are pausing to think about which will be the first to sit down at the negotiating table, and if either side is going to do that at all. If there is no consensus, the region has to expect another wave of instability. The most important thing is that nobody overdoes the poking like the United States did when it killed Soleimani.
Previous article![]( "Sanctions To Weaken Iran")
Next article![]( "Persian Shadows")
