The Precarious Rejection of the Xi Jinping Regime: US-China Confrontation and the Curse of the Soviet Union

Published in Nikkei
(Japan) on 29 July 2020
by Katsuji Nakazawa (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Toya Jackson. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
“The Chinese Communist Party will not end up like the Soviet Union that collapsed all too easily, and under no circumstances will I let it.” This was the first thing Chinese President Xi Jinping swore after his rise from dark horse to the pinnacle status of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Yet today, China finds itself being forced down the same path as the Soviet Union by U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration. Not only that, but this is happening just as the country is preparing for the 100th anniversary of the party’s founding — only one year away. There is no doubt that currently, Xi is conflicted in his search for a way to retaliate.

In a recent address about China and U.S. foreign policy, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that Xi is “a true believer in a bankrupt totalitarian ideology,” and aroused hostility by saying “if the free world doesn’t change, Communist China will surely change us.”

Either way, the U.S. would have China meet an end similar to that of the Soviet Union, with Xi walking the same path as that of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Pompeo’s address, which implied a “peaceful evolution,” – a coup d’etat brought about by peaceful measures, and one that China has long been cautious of – contains content so provocative, it cannot be aired uncensored in China. Pompeo draws a clear distinction between the Communist Party and the Chinese people, and uses specific rhetoric to dichotomize the two.

It is worth mentioning that Pompeo’s address was given at the presidential library of Richard Nixon, the very president who paved the way to the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China. The Chinese Communist Party broke away from its big brother, the Soviet Union, and joined forces with the U.S. Nixon also took a risk by reaching out to China, another communist nation, for help in containing a major enemy.

The U.S.-China cooperation that changed the course of contemporary history almost half a century ago is beginning to take on a different nature. Frankly, it would have been better if the U.S. had begun targeting China, the remaining communist nation, once the Soviet Union had fallen. However, the influence of China in the first half of the 1990s was negligible to the U.S., the victor and last remaining superpower. This worked in China’s favor.

’Were There No Men?’

In order to talk about Xi and Gorbachev, we need to turn the clock back eight years. A sentiment not unrelated to the current U.S.-China conflict lies hidden in an address made by Xi soon after he came to power. The military, which had slipped from under the party’s absolute control due to misguided policy, did nothing, and in the end, the Soviet Union dissolved with only a brief farewell from Gorbachev. Herein lies the moral of the story.

“Was there not a single man (who could fight)?” These words of reproach, which sound almost like an approval of the coup that resulted in Gorbachev’s house arrest in Crimea, became the root of the various policies that Xi would later implement, i.e., the absolute rule of the Communist Party. This is the curse of the Soviet Union.

Xi was not against breaking precedent for the sake of achieving this goal. First, he created “leading small groups” one after the other within the party’s Central Committee to facilitate policymaking, and gave himself a seat at the top as leader. He also took full advantage of the authority of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection to conduct a political purge known as the “anti-corruption campaign” that ousted his political opponents.

This also functioned as a way to hijack authority from the State Council that Xi's rival, Premier Li Keqiang, presided over. As a result, even macroeconomic policy, which was under Li’s authority, was gradually absorbed by Xi.

The undercutting of Li was also apparent at a large-scale, entrepreneurial roundtable event that Xi held on July 21. It was a huge conference that saw attendance from not only Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co., Ltd., China’s industry leader in surveillance cameras (a company that is under pressure from the U.S. government), but also from Microsoft and the Panasonic Corporation of China. Yet, for some reason Li was nowhere to be found.

On that day, even though Li was confirmed to have been in Beijing, he was not asked to attend. Meanwhile, the other three members of the top leadership were present. It was a rare economic roundtable that was even attended by the Politburo Standing Committee; the heads of foreign diplomacy. Policymaking was led by the Communist Party, which was headed by Xi — the de facto structure of the Chinese government was enshrined in one man.

Upon his accession, Xi tabled previous efforts to separate the government and the party, the government and enterprise as well as the military and enterprise. For the sake of appearances, he carried out “reverse reforms” that would reinstate a governance structure prioritizing the Communist Party.

The slogan “military-civil fusion” is a prime example of this. Here, “military” does not refer to the “national military” that is a country’s armed forces. Instead, it refers to a system in which private enterprise fully cooperates with the People’s Liberation Army, which is under the party’s absolute command. This is also a result of Xi taking to heart the lessons learned from the Soviet Union. And while we’re on the subject of party dominance, the reverse phenomenon, where the Communist flag overshadows the national flag, has recently become quite ubiquitous at official ceremonies.

The Contradictions of Party-Controlled Chinese Businesses

Above all else, the goal of business is the pursuit of profit. However, Chinese businesses contain party-affiliated apparatuses (i.e., party cells), and with the party lurking in the shadows, they become something other than the simple businesses we know them to be. Moreover, as a result of legislation such as the National Intelligence Law, Chinese businesses and citizens are obligated to provide any requested information to the government — in reality, the party.

The unique structure of a communist state proves to be an obstacle when companies like China’s industry leader in telecommunication devices, Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. or surveillance camera producer Hikvision operate in more libertarian countries like the U.S.

When we look back at how China came to open its doors to the rest of the world, Richard Nixon is quoted as saying, “We may have created a Frankenstein." From the perspective of free-market countries, these Chinese businesses that have no choice but to show ultimate loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, even when operating overseas, appear as enigmatic Frankenstein-like monstrosities.

At the 2017 National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi further strengthened this system in which everything is decided by the party. North, South, East, West, the Center — China was required to create a party apparatus within the organizational structure of any and all political parties, governments, military organizations, private enterprises, schools, nonprofit organizations, etc.

At the same National Congress, Xi presented concrete guidelines about how China would rise to effectively match the U.S. economically, and then overtake it – building on a plan to achieve modernization by 2035. “We will surpass you,” he said. After such provocation, one could expect that the Trump administration would try its hardest to prevent that from happening.

The internationally unpopular decision to suddenly implement the Hong Kong National Security Law, which makes a sham of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” principle, prioritized the interests of domestic politics that place the survival of the Communist Party above all else. The effect this would have on the national economy was of secondary importance.

Everything Is a Threat, and the Party Is the Target

As anticipated, the U.S.-China conflict has become radicalized, and matters are the worst they have been since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The Trump administration has targeted the actual system of the Chinese Communist Party itself, and began to use rhetoric that distinguished the party from average Chinese citizens who are forced to obey its orders.

A closer look at this rationale reveals there is even a possibility measures will be taken to restrict the entry of problematic party members and their families into the United States. The number of Chinese Communist Party members exceeds 92 million members – more than the entire population of Germany. If you include their families, the total is said to be close to 300 million people, nearing the population of the United States.

A few years ago in China, it was revealed for the first time that Jack Ma, the founder of Alibaba Group Holding Limited, China's industry leader in e-commerce, is a member of the Communist Party. Even private citizens can choose to declare their affiliation if they are public figures; but for the most part, unless someone outs himself, it is possible to hide one’s affiliation with the Party. Nevertheless, if the U.S. makes an enemy of this class of Chinese elite, rather than a full-scale conflict, it could lead to the virtual collapse of U.S.-China relations, an admittedly dangerous situation.

Since Xi’s accession to the top, he has poured all of his efforts into strengthening the party’s governance. Though he is determined not to end up like Gorbachev, all of Xi’s decisions up to this point have proven to be his undoing. It is undeniably ironic, if Xi had not tried so hard, things might have turned out differently.

News about the closure of the Chinese consulate general in Houston, Texas, was released simultaneously with Pompeo’s address. The reason the U.S. gave for the closing was that “it was a hub of spying and intellectual property theft.” In retaliation, China closed the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in Sichuan province.

The U.S. completely refuses to acknowledge the achievements of Xi Jinping's regime (which has been in power since 2012) and has started to target the Communist Party itself. This conflict between the U.S. and China is falling into a trap caused by the specter of the Soviet Union that collapsed 29 years ago. There is no easy way for Xi to change the path he is on. This confrontation between the two powers has entered into dangerous and uncharted territory.


危うい「習近平政治」全否定、米中衝突誘うソ連の呪縛

編集委員 中沢克二


中国共産党はあっけなく崩壊したソ連共産党のようにはならないし、私が絶対にさせない――。それがダークホースから頂点の総書記に上り詰めた習近平(シー・ジンピン)の最初の誓いだった。なのに今になって米トランプ政権からソ連と同じ轍(てつ)を踏むよう仕向けられるとは。しかも中国共産党創設100年の晴れ舞台を1年後に控え、準備に入ろうとする矢先に。習は今、複雑な思いで反攻を探っているに違いない。

米国務長官、ポンぺオは先の対中国政策演説で、共産党総書記としての習近平を「破綻した全体主義イデオロギーの信奉者だ」と断じ、「自由世界が共産主義の中国を変えなければ、中国が我々を変えるだろう」と敵がい心をあおった。

いずれ中国共産党をソ連共産党と似た死地に追い込む。そして習には最後の指導者となったゴルバチョフと同じ道を歩んでもらう。中国が長く警戒してきた平和的手段による政権転覆を指す「和平演変」を暗示したポンぺオの演説は、中国内でまともに報道できないほど挑戦的な中身だ。共産党と国民を明確に区別し、その間にくさびを打ち込む言葉が並んでいる。

特筆すべきはポンぺオ演説が米中国交正常化に道を開いた米元大統領、ニクソンを記念する博物館で行われたことだ。中国共産党は恩ある先輩、ソ連共産党と決別し、米国と手を組んだ。ニクソンも主要な敵、ソ連を封じ込めるため、あえて同じ共産主義の中国に白羽の矢を立てた。

現代史を変えた米中連携が半世紀近くを経て変質しようとしている。本来、ソ連が崩壊した時点で残る共産主義の大国、中国が米国の標的になってもよかった。だが1990年代前半の中国の実力は、勝ち残った唯一の超大国、米国にとって取るに足らないものだった。その構図が中国に幸いした。

■「男はいなかったのか」

習近平とゴルバチョフの話をするには時を8年前に戻す必要がある。総書記に就いたばかりの習の内部演説には、現在の米中対立につながる重要な言葉が隠れている。誤った政策により共産党の絶対的な指揮から脱した軍が動かず、最後はゴルバチョフの軽い一言でソ連共産党は解散した。そういう教訓である。


「(戦う)男は一人もいなかったのか」。クリミア半島にいたゴルバチョフを軟禁したクーデターさえ暗に肯定するような叱責の言葉は、その後、習がとった様々な施策の原点になった。ひと言でいえば共産党による絶対的な統治。まさにソ連の呪縛である。

その実現のためには慣例破りもいとわなかった。まず共産党中央に次々と政策決定のための「小組」を設け、自ら組長という名のトップに就いた。政敵を追い落とした「反腐敗」運動という名の汚職追放も共産党中央の規律検査委員会の権限をフルに使って進めた。

これはライバルだった首相の李克強(リー・クォーチャン)が仕切る政府(国務院)から権限を奪い取る仕組みとしても機能した。この結果、李の権限だったマクロ経済政策まで徐々に習の所管のようになってゆく。

それは7月21日に開いた習が主宰する大規模な企業家座談会でも明らかだった。米政府から圧力を受ける中国の監視カメラ最大手、海康威視数字技術(ハイクビジョン)のほか、米マイクロソフトや松下電器中国法人からも関係者を招いた大々的な会議なのに、なぜか李の姿はない。

李はその日、北京にいたのが確認されているのに呼ばれなかった。一方、李以外の別の最高指導部メンバー3人が出席。外交担当の政治局委員らも顔をそろえる珍しい経済絡みの座談会だった。習をトップとする共産党主導による政策決定。それが今の政治の姿である。

習は就任時から過去に進んだ政府と共産党の分離、政府と企業の分離、軍と企業の分離にブレーキをかけ、形のうえでも共産党を上位に置く支配構造に押し戻す「逆改革」を断行した。

「軍民融合」というスローガンはその最たるものだ。この軍は国家の軍隊を意味する「国軍」を指していない。共産党が絶対的な指揮権を持つ人民解放軍に民間企業が全面協力する枠組みだ。これもソ連共産党の教訓を踏まえている。共産党優位の雰囲気を反映して、最近は儀式で使われる共産党の旗が国旗より前に出て目立つ逆転現象さえしばしば見られる。

■共産党が支配する中国企業の矛盾

そもそも企業の目的は利益追求だ。だが企業の内部に共産党の細胞である支部組織があり、バックに共産党が控えている以上、それは我々が知る単なる企業ではなくなる。しかも国家情報法などにより中国の企業や国民は政府(実質的に共産党)に必要な情報提供をする協力義務がある。

共産国家の特異な構造が、中国の通信機器最大手、ファーウェイ(華為技術)、監視カメラのハイクビジョンなどが米国など自由主義諸国で活動する際、大きな足かせになっている。

ニクソンはかつて共産中国に世界への門戸を開いた経緯を振り返り、「フランケンシュタインを作ってしまったのではないかと心配している」と語ったという。自由主義諸国側からすると、海外で活動していても中国共産党という一政党に最大の忠誠を尽くさざるをえない中国の大企業はフランケンシュタインのようなえたいの知れない怪物に見えてしまう。

2017年の共産党大会で習はこの共産党が全てを決める体制を一段と強めた。東、西、南、北、まん中……。中国内に存在するあらゆる政党、政府、軍事機構、民間企業、学校、非営利団体などの組織内に共産党支部を作らなければいけなくなったのだ。

同じ党大会では35年までに現代化建設の目標を基本的に達成するとし、実質的に経済面で米国に追い付き、その後、追い越すという具体的な目安を示した。「あなた方を追い越す」。そう挑発されたトランプ政権としては全力で阻止するのが当然である。

香港の「一国二制度」を形骸化させる香港国家安全維持法を突如、施行する国際常識からかけ離れた決断も共産党の生き残りを至上価値とする内政上の党益が優先された。それが国民経済にどういう打撃を与えるのかは二の次だった。

■全てがあだ、共産党が標的

案の定、米中対立は先鋭化し、国交樹立以来、最悪の事態に。ついにトランプ政権は中国共産党体制そのものを標的にし、党の命令に従わざるをえない一般の中国国民と区別する論理も使い始めた。

この論理を敷衍(ふえん)すると、問題である中国共産党員やその家族の米国入国を制限する措置がとられる可能性さえ出てくる。中国共産党員数はドイツの人口を上回る9200万人。家族を含めれば3億人近くという。こちらは米国の人口に迫る数だ。

中国の電子商取引最大手、アリババ集団の創始者である馬雲(ジャック・マー)は数年前、共産党員であることが中国の発表で初めて明らかになった。民間人でも有名人なら特定できるが、多くは自己申告がなければ党員の身分を隠せる。とはいえ米国がこれら中国のエリート層を敵に回すとなると、全面対立というより事実上の断交状態に陥りかねない。かなり危険である。

習がトップ就任以来、ただ一つ全力を注いできた共産党による統治強化。ゴルバチョフにだけはならないと決意した習が良かれと思ってやってきた全てが今、あだになっている。皮肉としか言いようがない。もしも習がそこまで頑張らなかったとしたら、状況は少し違っていたかもしれない。

ポンぺオ演説と並行して打ち出されたテキサス州ヒューストンにある中国総領事館の閉鎖。これに対抗して中国が取ったのが四川省成都の米総領事館の閉鎖だ。米側が挙げたヒューストン閉鎖の理由は「スパイ活動と知的財産窃盗の拠点だった」というもの。これは安全保障に絡む技術覇権争いを巡る対立だ。情勢がエスカレートすれば偶発的な軍事的衝突がないとは言い切れない。

米側は8年にわたる「習近平政治」の成果を全否定し、共産党そのものを標的にし始めた。米中衝突は、29年前に崩壊したソ連の呪縛が誘(いざな)うワナに陥りつつある。習には簡単に路線を変える選択肢はない。米中対立はかつて足を踏み入れた経験のない危うい局面に入った。(敬称略)
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