Joe Biden’s Options and the Iranian Nuclear Issue

The Democratic Party’s presidential nominee is becoming more willing to exploit Iran’s disrepair in order to improve the terms of the nuclear deal and address Israel’s concerns.

After becoming the Democrats’ presidential nominee, Joe Biden quickly rose to the top of the polls with a wide lead as expected. Given that the upcoming election is not until Nov. 3 and that the electoral process may produce surprises, we must proceed with caution and not assume that Biden will necessarily win.

Given this disclaimer, we can discuss the situation that awaits Biden should he win. He will face two fundamental and pressing issues. First, the COVID-19 pandemic and its spread in the United States. Second, the need to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis, in particular due to the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign, which has resulted in zero victories and a number of disappointments!

Accordingly, Biden will face a difficult test if he wins, a moment of truth in which the crucial issue will be what he should do given the Trump administration's crushing defeat in the U.N. Security Council. Iran emerged the winner after the U.S. proposal failed to pass in the Security Council, and as a result, the standard arms embargo imposed on Iran’s military is due to expire in October. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the Trump administration will make one final effort, but it will go back to the Security Council only to find its proposal to impose sanctions quickly rejected once again.

Former European partners have not sided with the Trump administration in any similar votes. They are pursuing a different strategy in dealing with Iran, and it seems that they have received reassurance from Iran in return. As part of their goals, the Iranians seek to demonstrate, through the flexibility shown by Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, the futility of the Trump administration's policy toward Iran. In the end, a revised U.S. proposal will end in one of two ways: Either the Security Council will pay no attention to it, or else the plan will be definitively defeated. Ironically, the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran (which has many other signatories) eliminated its right to vote on the agreement in the Security Council!

In a strange twist, Trump’s recent enthusiasm for helping Israel achieve its policy goals in the Arab world is the result of Donald Trump’s gratitude to the Israeli administration, which embarrassed the Iranians at the International Energy Agency by presenting what it described as evidence obtained during Mossad's raid of Iranian nuclear records. Trump believes that this action redeems his course of action despite repeated failure. The Israelis report that Iran suffered 10 explosions from the end of June to early August, and claim that these explosions impaired the Natanz reactor centrifuge program. Apparently, Biden ascribed great importance to this event, and he has become more willing to exploit Iran’s disrepair in order to improve the terms of the nuclear deal and address Israel’s concerns for diplomatic reasons. At least this is what his aides and close associates suggested, including Tony Blinken, Jake Sullivan and Michelle Flournoy during recent video conferences, these three being among those expected to receive central roles in Biden's administration should he win.

In fact, Biden’s position on the Iran nuclear agreement is still a mystery, and it is related to Biden’s capacity to influence international politics. So far, he does not know if he will recommit to the nuclear agreement, as desired by a large segment of his supporters and members of the Democratic Party, or if in spite of serious Iranian requests for concessions, he will remain firm and continue to apply pressure like his predecessor, an approach that has not led to any results.

From this perspective, the Israeli security milieu sees the second position, i.e. the hard-liner position, as the one Biden will choose. Israeli sources such as Sima Shine, the former Mossad intelligence officer directly responsible for the Iran file, and Eldad Shavit, from Israeli army intelligence, see opening discussions with Russia and China as necessary in order to convince them to not sell “highly-advanced” weapons to Iran. These two individuals have called on the Israeli political establishment to immediately begin coordinating with the Trump administration and the Biden team about what must be done once the arms embargo on Iran has been lifted.

It goes without saying that the repercussions of the Trump administration's loss at the Security Council were not limited to the arms embargo on Iran. It also made diplomatic solidarity between the Western countries unrealistic, and it demonstrated to the American president that no one will stand by him in putting pressure on the Iranian regime over the nuclear issue in the way that he has done. Perhaps some Europeans in fact prefer extending the embargo, but they abstained from voting to avoid escalation, especially since the basic nuclear constraints of the agreement are still technically in effect and will remain so until 2030 or shortly before!

Despite this, other European circles are talking about Iran's disregard for some of the restrictions, claiming that Iran possesses enough enriched uranium to produce two nuclear bombs. Meanwhile, others in American circles close to the Republican Party are saying that even before the nuclear deal, the European position was opening the door to Iran to continue uranium stockpiling, and that Iran now possesses enough low-enriched uranium to produce at least 10 bombs. Maybe this is what made Biden’s election team discuss the need to cooperate with the Europeans in convincing the Iranians to make concessions, in order to ease tensions at least until current restrictions imposed on Iran’s nuclear project expire in 2025 or 2030. The Trump administration began its campaign against Iran by making five demands, and now hints at only two, while the Iranians are violating all five, which are: accepting the extension of the nuclear agreement beyond 2030; ceasing the development and testing of ballistic missiles; noninterference in the Gulf region and Arab countries; halting the development of advanced centrifuges; and allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to revisit military sites and two additional sites where availability for inspection was disputed.

In conclusion, whoever wins the American presidential election, the Europeans will make him choose between committing to their handling of the Iranian issue, or continuing the dead-end Trump approach that has yet to produce any results. In the case of the first option, the Europeans and Biden’s administration, should he win, may be able to convince the Iranians to back down from ramping up their armament levels.