The Need for a Yellow Warning Light in the Taiwan Strait

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 28 September 2020
by Li Kaisheng (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Tyler Ruzicka. Edited by Helaine Schweitzer.
Tsai Ing-wen's administration and pro-Taiwan forces in the U.S. have been making increasingly more small moves toward Taiwanese independence. Based on the Anti-Secession Law, mainland China has drawn a red line that Taiwan does not dare cross. However, Taiwan has been actively scheming and putting a great deal of thought into ways to “de-Sinicize” and hollow out the One-China Policy instead.

For example, advocates for Taiwan independence have separated Taiwan from the mainland in education and culture. In politics and foreign relations as well, they have taken various actions to diminish the mainland's red line. These include both big moves, like seeking what it calls "international space" for Taiwan, and small tricks, like putting "Taiwan" in large print on its passports and changing Koxinga from a "national hero" into an "invader" in textbooks.*

American Pro-Taiwan forces are challenging the One-China policy as well, but it's not because of shared values between the U.S. and Taiwan, as they claim. In the 1970s and 1980s, when the U.S. renounced Taiwan in order to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China and signed the Three Joint Communiqués which recognized the One-China policy, it did not do so out of sympathy, of course, but out of a strategic need to cozy up to China and put pressure on the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Afterward, the U.S. continuously sought closer political ties with Taiwan, and even increased arms sales to the Taiwanese military, completely violating its promise within the Aug. 17 communiqué to "gradually reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan." Of course, this was not out of sympathy for Taiwanese "democracy," but because of a geopolitical scheme to check China's rise and maintain U.S. hegemony. Based on this reasoning, it is easy to understand why the more strained the U.S.-China relationship becomes, the more effort the U.S. devotes to manipulating the Taiwan issue.

What deserves noting is that, in the face of the mainland's resolute determination to uphold unification of the country, Taiwan Independence supporters and foreign pro-Taiwan forces have been continuously making small pushes toward independence, while simultaneously making declarations that they have no intention of changing the status quo, that they are not seeking jurisprudential independence, or that they support the Three Joint Communiqués and respect the One-China policy, and more. Some people describe this as the "sliced sausage" strategy, because it involves engaging in and supporting Taiwanese independence in increments. The hidden reasoning of Taiwan independence advocates and American pro-Taiwan forces is that before they cut off that last slice of sausage, their actions can't truly be considered separatist or supportive of Taiwanese independence. If they haven't brushed up against that red line, then they're still in the green; as long as they don't openly call for legal independence of Taiwan, then they can act unimpeded, and the mainland will have no way to enact any practical response measures.

Approaching the situation in the Taiwan Strait with this kind of "red and green" binary thinking is extremely risky. With this kind of logic, Taiwan independence supporters and pro-Taiwan forces are trying to change the mainland's bottom line from thick to thin. If openly declaring or supporting independence is the only action that crosses that red line, then all kinds of actions that are, in reality, working against the One-China policy are in the clear. Their wishful thinking is that if the "sausage" is all sliced up within that uninhibited and ever growing green zone, then when it is time to truly make that final cut, when the red line must be crossed, Taiwan independence will be like water in a ditch; even if the mainland tries to act against it, it will be too late.

Therefore, it is of utmost urgency that we tear down the U.S. and Taiwan's binary "red and green" logic. For one thing, we need to further clarify what the red line is, and bar the U.S. and Taiwan from intentionally applying a limited understanding of it. For another, we must also define a yellow warning zone based on the red line which is established. Just like a traffic light, there should always be a yellow warning light between the red and the green signals. The yellow light's purpose is to ensure that drivers brake in time, so that there is ample reaction time for vehicles meeting at the intersection.

The current situation in the Taiwan Strait is extremely complex, with many political and military forces intersecting; it is just like a traffic intersection, with its complex arrangement of roadways and multiple vehicles. A yellow warning light is absolutely essential. That's the only way we can force those who intentionally use dubious and dangerous "sliced sausage" tactics to hit the brakes in time to prevent a terrible traffic accident in the Taiwan Strait.

*Editor’s note: Koxinga refers to a prince known internationally by his Dutch-Romanized honorific and who was a Chinese Ming loyalist who resisted the Qing conquest of China in the 17th century.

The author is a researcher and deputy director of the Institute of International Relations of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.



李开盛: 在台海闯“黄灯”也很危险

蔡英文当局和美国亲台势力在“台独”方向上的小动作越来越多。面对中国大陆基于《反分裂国家法》划定的红线,他们不敢轻易触碰,但却处心积虑,在“去中国化”、掏空一中原则方面动了不少脑筋。

比如,“台独”分子不但在教育、文化上与大陆做切割,还在政治、对外关系上做出侵蚀大陆红线的种种举动,其中既有谋求台湾所谓国际空间的一些所谓“大动作”,也有在护照中放大“台湾”字样、在教科书中将郑成功从“民族英雄”改为“入侵者”的小伎俩。

美国亲台势力也是一中原则的挑战者,但这与他们宣称的“共同价值”无关。上世纪七八十年代,美国放弃台湾与大陆建交,并签署承认一中原则的三个联合公报,当然不是出自“同情”,而是出于在冷战中拉拢中国、打压苏联的战略需要。后来美国不断谋求密切与台湾的政治往来,甚至对台军售不断升级,完全违背了“八一七公报”中关于“逐步减少对台湾武器出售”的承诺,自然也不是出于对台湾“民主”的同情,而是出于遏制中国崛起、维护自己霸权的地缘政治算计。基于这一逻辑,我们就能理解为什么越是中美关系紧张,美国就越致力于操弄台湾议题。


值得注意的是,“台独”分子与境外亲台势力一方面小动作不断,另一方面面对大陆维护国家统一的坚定意志,往往宣称“无意改变现状”“不追求法理台独”或继续宣示“坚持三个联合公报”、尊重一个中国原则等等。对此,有人形容为“切香肠”战术,也就是以渐进方式搞“台独”和支持“台独”。“台独”分子与美国亲台势力的潜在逻辑是,在切下最后一块“香肠”之前,他们的所作所为都不能算是“台独”和“支持台独”;没有触及红线,就算是绿区,只要他们没公然亮出“法理台独”旗帜,就可畅行无阻,大陆没有办法采取切实应对措施。

这种对台海局势进行“红绿”二元划分的逻辑,具有极大危害性。正是在这一逻辑的基础上,“台独”分子与亲台势力试图把大陆的底线由一道“粗红杠”压缩成一根“细红线”,即只有公开宣布或支持“台独”才是踩红线之举,企图把各种事实上破坏一中原则的行为都划在所谓绿区之内。其如意算盘是,在无限放大的绿区里大切“香肠”,真正等到只剩下最后一块“香肠”要切、“红线”不得不踩时,“台独”也就水到渠成,到时大陆想反制也来不及了。

因此,当务之急是必须打破美台对这种“红绿”二元划分的认识逻辑。一方面,要进一步明确红线、绝不允许美台对大陆底线故意进行狭窄理解。另一方面,有必要在确定红线的基础上,再划出一片黄色警戒区域。就像交通灯一样,红灯亮起之前并不都是绿灯,中间还有一个黄灯。黄灯的作用就在于督促车辆及时踩刹车,以为路口的车辆交错留出足够的反应时间。

当前台海局势极其复杂,各种政治、军事势力纵横交错,就像交通路口一样路线复杂、车辆众多,黄灯的警示作用极其必要。只有这样,才能迫使那些蓄意且危险的擦边球、“切香肠”战术提前“刹车”,避免台海出现重大“交通事故”。(作者是上海社会科学院国际问题研究所副所长、研究员)
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