US and China: A Game of Patience*

Published in O Povo
(Brazil) on 18 August 2022
by Igor Faria de Abreu (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Thiago Sebben. Edited by Wes Vanderburgh.
At the end of the Cold War and after the U.S.' consolidation as a hegemonic power since at least the early 1990s, American foreign policy toward China has been oriented by the same logic that launched the U.S. into wars such as in Iraq: a crusade-like line of thinking whose purpose is the global expansion of free markets and democracy as universal and superior values. So, it's not surprising that the rise of China, with its self-proclaimed market socialism, became a matter of concern for Americans.

From the outset, the strategy the U.S. adopted to deal with the advance of the Asian giant was to try to incorporate it into the post-World War II liberal regime — for example, with the entry of the Chinese into the World Trade Organization in 2001. The Americans correctly assumed that by inserting the Chinese into an international regime whose rules were set mainly by the U.S., they would maintain a privileged position in determining the terms within which China could continue to progress.

However, the hypothesis that has always been implicit is that, for China to continue to develop, it would have to open up to private capital and eventually become a liberal democracy. 20 years later, China is the second largest economy on the planet and the largest military power in Asia, with the power highly concentrated in Xi Jinping.

The U.S.' crusade-like line of thinking prevents a more pragmatic interpretation of international politics. For example, the Chinese Communist Party, which is facing more modest growth prospects after its unpopular COVID-19 strategy, understands that demonstrations of weakness in the international arena can affect internal stability. Thus, an aggressive stance is expected in its strategic surroundings, especially in the Taiwan Strait.

It should be clear that gestures like Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would provoke the Chinese government to adopt a hostile stance and do not benefit anyone, not even Taiwan. On the contrary, if one sticks to a perspective focused strictly on power, it is clear that the game is one of patience: It is up to the U.S. to destabilize the Chinese regime. By this same logic, to China, the task is to accelerate Taiwan's process of economic and cultural assimilation. Bets based on faith and risk are unsuitable in this context.

*Editor's Note: The original foreign language version of this article is available with a paid subscription.


EUA e China, um jogo de paciência

Ao menos desde o início dos anos 1990, com o fim da Guerra Fria e a consolidação dos Estados Unidos como potência hegemônica, a política externa americana em relação à China tem sido pautada pelo mesmo hábito que lançou os EUA em guerras como a do Iraque: um cruzadismo cujo propósito é expandir, em todo o mundo, o par livre mercado-democracia, que compreenderia valores universais e superiores. Logo, não surpreende que a ascensão da China, com seu autoproclamado socialismo de mercado, se tornasse motivo de preocupação para os americanos.

Desde um primeiro momento, a estratégia que os EUA adotaram para lidar com o avanço do gigante asiático foi tentar incorporá-lo ao regime liberal do pós-Segunda Guerra — por exemplo, com a entrada dos chineses na OMC, em 2001. O que os americanos supunham, corretamente, é que ao inserir os chineses em um regime internacional cujas regras foram estabelecidas, em grande medida, pelos EUA, manteriam uma posição privilegiada para determinar os termos dentro dos quais a China poderia continuar a progredir.

Contudo, aqui sempre esteve implícita a hipótese de que, para que continuasse a se desenvolver, a China teria de se abrir ao capital privado e, eventualmente, tornar-se uma democracia liberal. Vinte anos depois, a China é a 2ª maior economia do planeta, maior potência militar da Ásia, e o poder está altamente concentrado em Xi Jinping.

O cruzadismo impede a interpretação da política internacional em bases mais pragmáticas. Por exemplo: da parte da China, sabe-se que o Partido Comunista, após a impopular política de Covid zero e diante de perspectivas de crescimento mais modestas, entende que demonstrações de fraqueza na arena internacional podem afetar a estabilidade interna. Assim, é mais que esperada uma postura agressiva no seu entorno estratégico, especialmente no Estreito de Taiwan.

Deveria estar claro que gestos como a visita de Nancy Pelosi a Taiwan provocam o governo chinês a adotar uma postura hostil e não trazem benefício a ninguém - nem a Taiwan. Ao contrário, se atendo a uma ótica estritamente do poder, percebe-se que o jogo é de paciência: aos EUA, cabe desestabilizar o regime chinês - em silêncio; à China, acelerar o processo de assimilação econômica e cultural de Taiwan. O que não cabe são apostas de fé e risco.
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