The settlement of commercial arbitration claims, established by the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), may take a year and be determined in the second half of 2023 or early 2024
This may be somewhat unfair, given that the Mexican administration is trying to ensure that there is no problem in investment conditions or trade with its major partners.
But the dilemma is the perception, and it is created in part by the government's rhetoric and the ongoing legal back-and-forth over U.S. and Canadian complaints about reforms in the Mexican energy industry.
The situation, in terms of the settlement of commercial arbitration claims established by USMCA, could take around a year and be wrapped up completely in the second half of 2023 or the beginning of 2024, during the period of candidate selection and before the presidential elections in June 2024.
In the worst case scenario, if there is no prior settlement and the decisions of the dispute settlement panels are in conflict with the Mexican government, the burden of retaliatory sanctions or tariffs will fall on the next regime.
Potential payments, whether they are fines, sanctions or reparations, are estimated to be in the range of $10 billion to 12 billion. But the most worrying part would be the diminished enthusiasm in investing in Mexico as a consequence of commercial and legal disputes with the U.S., which is the primary destination for Mexican exports.
The main problem is that while issues with Washington are the most important owing to its proximity and size, the situation is viewed with caution by other foreign nations and investors.
It may be that López Obrador is counting on the fact that the free trade agreement between Mexico and the U.S. remains in effect, as well as Mexico’s geographic proximity to the world’s largest consumer market. But these days everyone is talking about near-shoring and ally-shoring: in other words, the difference between being close and being trusted.
Furthermore, there are countries in the region that are interested in establishing close economic and geopolitical relationships with the U.S., and they are becoming, like it or not, competitors for investment and trade advantages.
Rightly or wrongly, the main problem is the legal uncertainty, as it has been from the start of the current government, which, like its predecessors, has signed documents and treaties and whose non-compliance provokes established sanctions and, what is perhaps worse, mistrust.
The loss or limitation of investments could reveal itself in the coming years. Expansion plans for 2025 and beyond are already in motion, and the companies making them will be looking both to the markets and their confidence in legal regimes.
Unfair? Perhaps. Real? Undoubtedly.
¿Ante un problema a futuro?
La situación en el arbitraje comercial, establecido por el T-MEC, puede tomar un año y definirse en el segundo semestre de 2023 o principios de 2024
Una de las principales caracterÃsticas de los diferendos aparentes entre el gobierno mexicano y algunos de sus socios, es que para los interlocutores externos lo que está en juego es su credibilidad y la confianza en los compromisos adquiridos, y que las eventuales consecuencias pueden ser resentidas por el presidente que siga a López Obrador.
La cuestión puede ser un tanto injusta, dado que la administración mexicana trata de asegurar que no hay problema en las condiciones de inversión ni en su comercio con sus mayores socios.
Pero el dilema es la percepción, creada en parte por la retórica del gobierno y por el actual toma y daca legal por las quejas de Estados Unidos y Canadá en torno a las reformas mexicanas en la industria de energÃa.
El problema mayor es que si bien los temas con Washington son los más significativos por cercanÃa y tamaño, la situación es vista con cuidado por naciones e inversionistas extranjeros.
Y tan justa o injustamente como se quiera, el problema principal es la certidumbre legal, como lo ha sido desde el principio del actual gobierno, que al igual que sus antecesores firmó documentos y tratados cuyo incumplimiento provoca sanciones establecidas, pero tal vez peor, desconfianza.
We are faced with a "scenario" in which Washington's exclusive and absolute dominance over the entire hemisphere, from Greenland and Canada in the north to the southern reaches of Argentina and Chile.
Venezuela is likely to become another wasted crisis, resembling events that followed when the U.S. forced regime changes in Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq.
We are faced with a "scenario" in which Washington's exclusive and absolute dominance over the entire hemisphere, from Greenland and Canada in the north to the southern reaches of Argentina and Chile.