Change in Priorities*

*Editor’s note: On March 4, 2022, Russia enacted a law that criminalizes public opposition to, or independent news reporting about, the war in Ukraine. The law makes it a crime to call the war a “war” rather than a “special military operation” on social media or in a news article or broadcast. The law is understood to penalize any language that “discredits” Russia’s use of its military in Ukraine, calls for sanctions or protests Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It punishes anyone found to spread “false information” about the invasion with up to 15 years in prison.

Analyst Tigran Meloyan discusses why is it currently easier for the U.S. to negotiate with Moscow than with Kyiv.

The London summit, with participation by the U.S., the European Union, the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian delegation fell through, so we shouldn’t expect a possible cease-fire in Ukraine any time soon.

A few hours before the summit, the level of the negotiations was downgraded from a meeting of ministers to a meeting of technical experts. This happened after Ukraine declined the Trump administration’s offer, which asked, along with everything else, for Kyiv to officially recognize the Crimean Peninsula as a territory of Russia.

Soon after Kyiv, London and Paris once again torpedoed the American initiative, JD Vance echoed the previous threat from Donald Trump: It’s time for Ukraine and Russia to say “yes,” or the U.S. will withdraw from the process. However, questions are instantly raised: What does this “withdrawal from the process” mean? Will the U.S. cease to act as an intermediary between Russia and Ukraine, while continuing to provide comprehensive support to Kyiv? Or will Trump seize the initiative to freeze that support altogether?

Perhaps Washington thought that it would be able to nudge Ukraine toward concessions through threats and blackmail, but Kyiv, we must admit, is still holding out and, at the very least, continues its battle against Trump, a shrewd negotiator. This is also evident in the fact that, for now, the U.S. hasn’t been able to bend Ukraine into signing the rare-earth metals agreement*. That would be an important achievement under Trump’s belt, an outcome of his first 100 days in the presidency.

Thus, Washington is facing a complex choice: How should it proceed? The first option, and the most favorable to Russia, is to distance itself from the Ukrainian conflict and allow Moscow to rout Kyiv on the battlefield, while engaging in matters with higher priority for U.S. interests — but without the support of its allies. The second option is to adhere to the line of action conducted by the EU and the UK and return to the policy Joe Biden preferred when he was in power: unconditional support for Ukraine. In the latter case, we can expect some warming of Euro-Atlantic relations.

Of the two options listed, the second one presently looks less likely; the situation is evolving in such a way that it would be easier for Trump to negotiate with Russia than it would be to find common ground with Kyiv. There’s an understanding between the current U.S. administration and Moscow that they bear some sort of responsibility for peace; considering the fact that the U.S. had to personally deal with Kyiv’s inability to negotiate, such an understanding between the two countries will probably only grow.

Russian diplomatic services play an important role; they are quite successful in their goals on the American track. But that’s not a reason to relax, since Russia owes that outcome, in part, to Ukraine’s destructive behavior.

By the end of this week, Moscow will have to sit through another consultation round with the U.S., for which Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, will arrive in the Russian capital. During a possible meeting with Vladimir Putin, he intends to discuss the prospects for settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. Depending on the results, the White House will then decide which of the two considered strategies is more suitable for Washington.

Although future developments in U.S. policy on Ukraine are not entirely clear, it is important to note that events in London have revealed a Europe that remains strong in its desire to act independently of Washington’s opinion. Thus, there is a significant shift in the view of the U.S. as the undisputed leader of the "collective West."

This has become the direct consequence of the current U.S. administration's distancing from a key principle long adhered to by the Biden administration: “Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” — and nothing about the European security structure without European allies.

As for Russia, it will be, in some sense, important to demonstrate a degree of interest toward Trump’s peaceful initiatives. Such a strategy from Moscow pursues two goals. First: wait until NATO allies fall out completely. Second: Demonstrate that the current military-political regime in Kyiv is hopeless and untrustworthy. In the end, it all should lead to Europe and Ukraine being responsible for the failure of the negotiation process, which would be broadcast to the entire world.

Meanwhile, a deadline that Trump set for himself is approaching. In two weeks, we will learn whether the U.S. will withdraw from the negotiation process and what its future strategy regarding Russia will be. At present, Trump is probably the only one in the West who understands that time is not on the Ukrainian side. By launching the negotiations, the American president is trying his best to save Ukraine and deliver this idea to Europe.

*Editor's note: On Wednesday, April 30, 2025, the United States and Ukraine signed a long-awaited rare-earth mineral deal.