And What If bin Laden’s DeathServed Pakistan’s Interests?
The possibility that the Pakistani intelligence services are fallible, to the point of not knowing that the leader of al-Qaida was living in close proximity to a heavily militarized area in Pakistan, cannot be completely ignored. At the same time, we also can ask ourselves if the military establishment was present — as a protective force or perhaps just indifferent — during the American raid that led to the death of the most wanted man on the planet.
The official reaction certainly brought to light a new violation of Pakistani territory by the Americans, but is it not the case that the elimination of bin Laden is in Pakistan’s interests? Let’s look at a number of points supporting this argument.
First, a number of shady areas remain. To begin with, there is the fact that a military air operation could go ahead without alerting the Pakistani armed forces at any point. In particular, though, was bin Laden still of some use to the Pakistani authorities? We are used to seeing them repeatedly cooperate in arresting members of al-Qaida. In his book of memoirs, Musharraf, the former president, took glory in recounting the amount of money received for handing over members of the terrorist organization to the Americans.
Osama bin Laden, contrary to Jihad or Taliban groups, never really served Pakistan’s strategic interests, such as they are viewed by the army headquarters in Rawalpindi. On the other hand, leaving him free had at least two advantages. The first was his contribution at the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan — desirable both for Islamabad and President Obama — as of July. Let’s not forget here that the primary aim of American intervention in Afghanistan was to track down al-Qaida.
The second advantage is to appease President Hamid Karzai, who has long been in favor of terrorists hiding in Pakistan rather than in his own country. Several months ago, the two countries began a rapprochement, marked by the joint visit in mid-April of Pakistan’s prime minister, accompanied by the head of the armed forces, General Kayani, and the head of the ISI, Ahmed Shuja Pasha. The Afghan head of state deems that both distancing Afghanistan from the Americans, who have become less cooperative, and integrating the Taliban into the process of ending the war are politically necessary. Furthermore, rapprochement with Pakistan, albeit half-hearted due to a considerable amount of mistrust, is inevitable. The opening of a Taliban office in Turkey, responsible for facilitating contact between the main protagonists (Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Pakistan) searching for a political solution to the war in Afghanistan, is a means to achieving this aim. With the prospect of international forces leaving Afghanistan and rehabilitation of Taliban members, the goal of withdrawing Indian and American influences in Afghanistan would thus be achieved by the Pakistani military establishment.
Error or collusion?
Undoubtedly, in the eyes of a large number of international onlookers, Pakistan reinforces its archetypal image of a two-faced country — on the one hand, harboring terrorists, while at the same time cooperating, in official terms, in the war against terrorism. The announcement that bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan does not come as a complete surprise. Members of the American Congress question the appropriateness of granting substantial aid to a country that has harbored the person responsible for the September 11 attacks, but also, they would not have a problem with being able to make savings in their budget through the gradual withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, facilitated by the elimination of bin Laden.
On the Pakistani side, significant popular support for the emblematic figure of al-Qaida is not evident. It’s also clear that the authorities, having taken care not to associate themselves with the Navy Seals’ operation, can expect to limit the amount of bloody fallout among the same security forces who led the attack against the Red Mosque in July 2007. Whether it’s an embarrassing lack of judgment by the intelligence services or an unspoken collusion, has bin Laden become more useful to Pakistan dead than alive?
The official reaction certainly brought to light a new violation of Pakistani territory by the Americans, but is it not the case that the elimination of bin Laden is in Pakistan’s interests? Let’s look at a number of points supporting this argument.
First, a number of shady areas remain. To begin with, there is the fact that a military air operation could go ahead without alerting the Pakistani armed forces at any point. In particular, though, was bin Laden still of some use to the Pakistani authorities? We are used to seeing them repeatedly cooperate in arresting members of al-Qaida. In his book of memoirs, Musharraf, the former president, took glory in recounting the amount of money received for handing over members of the terrorist organization to the Americans.
Osama bin Laden, contrary to Jihad or Taliban groups, never really served Pakistan’s strategic interests, such as they are viewed by the army headquarters in Rawalpindi. On the other hand, leaving him free had at least two advantages. The first was his contribution at the beginning of the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan — desirable both for Islamabad and President Obama — as of July. Let’s not forget here that the primary aim of American intervention in Afghanistan was to track down al-Qaida.
The second advantage is to appease President Hamid Karzai, who has long been in favor of terrorists hiding in Pakistan rather than in his own country. Several months ago, the two countries began a rapprochement, marked by the joint visit in mid-April of Pakistan’s prime minister, accompanied by the head of the armed forces, General Kayani, and the head of the ISI, Ahmed Shuja Pasha. The Afghan head of state deems that both distancing Afghanistan from the Americans, who have become less cooperative, and integrating the Taliban into the process of ending the war are politically necessary. Furthermore, rapprochement with Pakistan, albeit half-hearted due to a considerable amount of mistrust, is inevitable. The opening of a Taliban office in Turkey, responsible for facilitating contact between the main protagonists (Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Pakistan) searching for a political solution to the war in Afghanistan, is a means to achieving this aim. With the prospect of international forces leaving Afghanistan and rehabilitation of Taliban members, the goal of withdrawing Indian and American influences in Afghanistan would thus be achieved by the Pakistani military establishment.
Error or collusion?
Undoubtedly, in the eyes of a large number of international onlookers, Pakistan reinforces its archetypal image of a two-faced country — on the one hand, harboring terrorists, while at the same time cooperating, in official terms, in the war against terrorism. The announcement that bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan does not come as a complete surprise. Members of the American Congress question the appropriateness of granting substantial aid to a country that has harbored the person responsible for the September 11 attacks, but also, they would not have a problem with being able to make savings in their budget through the gradual withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, facilitated by the elimination of bin Laden.
On the Pakistani side, significant popular support for the emblematic figure of al-Qaida is not evident. It’s also clear that the authorities, having taken care not to associate themselves with the Navy Seals’ operation, can expect to limit the amount of bloody fallout among the same security forces who led the attack against the Red Mosque in July 2007. Whether it’s an embarrassing lack of judgment by the intelligence services or an unspoken collusion, has bin Laden become more useful to Pakistan dead than alive?
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