Washington Wanders in Its Afghan Options
What is the biggest foreign policy issue facing President Barack Obama? Is it the emergence of China as the global competitor of the United States? Or is it the relationship with Russia, which does not seem satisfied with the current situation? Is it trying to dissuade Israel from always being ready for war or from attacking Iran? Or America’s failure in putting pressure on Israel for the sake of a peace settlement with the Palestinians in addition to the damage to America’s relationships with the Arab world that will result from this failure, especially with the youth revolutions referred to as the “Arab Spring”?
There is little doubt that these questions concern several officials in Washington, but this is overshadowed by a more urgent problem: what to do in Afghanistan.
America has been stuck in the war in Afghanistan for 10 years, and it seems that there is no end in sight and no reasonable strategy for withdrawal. NATO has sent 140,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, including 100,000 American soldiers; it is set to continue combat operations until the end of 2014, if not beyond — what threatens to be three or four additional years of suffering. In Afghanistan, 1,500 American soldiers have already been killed, with 11,500 others wounded.
The number of victims of this conflict is painful, but there have been record numbers at the financial level. This war has cost the U.S. $420 billion to date (about half the cost of the destructive war in Iraq). The bill for the Afghanistan war for this fiscal year is estimated to be $113 billion, with an additional $107 billion allocated for 2012. Imagine if this money was spent on job creation in the Arab world or in Africa. It could solve the Palestinian refugee problem, provide millions of people with drinking water and eradicate diseases, in addition to solving other problems. Instead, this money was spent on a war that cannot be won. Sen. John Kerry said that expenditures at this level cannot continue at a time when America’s budget deficit is rising.
To add to the strangeness of the war in Afghanistan, the United States spent $28 billion to support the Afghan army, which today includes 350,000 troops; the Pentagon requested an additional $12.8 billion for this for the year 2012. But who will cover the expenses of this army after its American supporters leave the country? No Afghan government can afford this luxury. Will the U.S. bear the burden of these expenses for the foreseeable future?
The situation in Afghanistan cannot be separated from the deteriorating situation along the border with Pakistan. Indeed, America invented the term “Afpak” to refer to the theater of operations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of these two countries, which possesses nuclear weapons, has 200 million people, mostly poor and anti-American because of the death and destruction caused by the war. There still remains a risk of political and social upheaval on a large scale.
Most observers in Afghanistan agree that no conflict can be solved militarily but politically. But how would that happen? When and by whom will this solution be proposed? It seems that the Obama administration is not yet prepared to answer these pressing questions.
It is known that Vice President Joe Biden supports a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. He was not enthusiastic about the idea of the “surge” from the beginning, even though Obama went ahead with it and agreed to send 30,000 additional troops. Another senior advisor to Obama, Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, expressed his doubts about maintaining high troop levels in Afghanistan. He had impressed Obama and was appointed to replace Adm. Mike Mullen, who serves as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
However, Cartwright was left out after failing to give his advice directly to the president without informing Adm. Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who strongly supported the surge. It seems that Gen. Martin Dempsey, who currently serves as chief of staff of the U.S. military, will become the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will practically be the chief military advisor to the president. Cartwright will pay the price of his mistake as he retires.
Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the forces in Afghanistan, was one of the most prominent supporters of the surge. He had hoped to achieve the same success in Afghanistan as had been done in Iraq with the same strategy, but Petraeus is expected to leave Afghanistan in September to begin his work as director of the CIA.
These varying views indicate the current differences between Washington and its allies. On the other side is the secretary-general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who is a powerful voice in this debate on whether to reduce the number of U.S. troops. In an interview with the Financial Times on May 31, he announced that reducing the number of troops is a mistake and that he does not want to leave a security vacuum in the country after NATO leaves. He said that the continued use of large military pressure on the Taliban would facilitate the reconciliation process. Many experts believe that this result is uncertain and that Rasmussen’s objectives are questionable. It seems that he is keen to maintain the prestige of NATO, and the thought of a quick exit from Afghanistan would tarnish the image of NATO.
While Rasmussen supports the continuation of counterinsurgency operations that require a large number of soldiers, other experts recommend that the U.S. transfers its focus to counterterrorism operations that require teams as small as the one that killed bin Laden.
Other experts believe that the use of America to hunt down members of the Taliban and to kill them is absolute nonsense; instead, they need to negotiate a political solution with them. In this context, it is necessary to create a favorable atmosphere for peace talks by reducing the rocket attacks by unmanned aircraft and the air attacks and night raids on residential areas that cause civilian deaths. NATO carried out airstrikes on May 28, killing 14 Afghan civilians, including 11 children between two and seven years old. President Hamid Karzai “finally” issued an angry warning to NATO, asking them to stop these attacks. NATO issued an apology, but the damage had occurred nonetheless.
In an article published last March 24 in the International Herald Tribune, Lakhdar Brahimi, a former U.N. envoy to Afghanistan, and Thomas Pickering, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state, suggested the appointment of a neutral international mediator to have discussions with all parties to find and negotiate an end to the conflict. This mediator could be a person, group, international organization, neutral country or group of states.
They added that this solution requires clearing space for the participation of representatives of the Taliban in the central government and provincial governments to ensure the withdrawal of foreign troops. The necessary financial assistance will represent a fraction of the cost of the war, while the international community sought to maintain peace and enforce any agreement reached.
This is a wise view, but Obama seems to give more attention to his advisers who want to wage war rather than those who seek to establish peace. Obama has failed to make peace between the Arabs and Israel. Will he also fail to do so in Afghanistan?
There is little doubt that these questions concern several officials in Washington, but this is overshadowed by a more urgent problem: what to do in Afghanistan.
America has been stuck in the war in Afghanistan for 10 years, and it seems that there is no end in sight and no reasonable strategy for withdrawal. NATO has sent 140,000 soldiers to Afghanistan, including 100,000 American soldiers; it is set to continue combat operations until the end of 2014, if not beyond — what threatens to be three or four additional years of suffering. In Afghanistan, 1,500 American soldiers have already been killed, with 11,500 others wounded.
The number of victims of this conflict is painful, but there have been record numbers at the financial level. This war has cost the U.S. $420 billion to date (about half the cost of the destructive war in Iraq). The bill for the Afghanistan war for this fiscal year is estimated to be $113 billion, with an additional $107 billion allocated for 2012. Imagine if this money was spent on job creation in the Arab world or in Africa. It could solve the Palestinian refugee problem, provide millions of people with drinking water and eradicate diseases, in addition to solving other problems. Instead, this money was spent on a war that cannot be won. Sen. John Kerry said that expenditures at this level cannot continue at a time when America’s budget deficit is rising.
To add to the strangeness of the war in Afghanistan, the United States spent $28 billion to support the Afghan army, which today includes 350,000 troops; the Pentagon requested an additional $12.8 billion for this for the year 2012. But who will cover the expenses of this army after its American supporters leave the country? No Afghan government can afford this luxury. Will the U.S. bear the burden of these expenses for the foreseeable future?
The situation in Afghanistan cannot be separated from the deteriorating situation along the border with Pakistan. Indeed, America invented the term “Afpak” to refer to the theater of operations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of these two countries, which possesses nuclear weapons, has 200 million people, mostly poor and anti-American because of the death and destruction caused by the war. There still remains a risk of political and social upheaval on a large scale.
Most observers in Afghanistan agree that no conflict can be solved militarily but politically. But how would that happen? When and by whom will this solution be proposed? It seems that the Obama administration is not yet prepared to answer these pressing questions.
It is known that Vice President Joe Biden supports a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. He was not enthusiastic about the idea of the “surge” from the beginning, even though Obama went ahead with it and agreed to send 30,000 additional troops. Another senior advisor to Obama, Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, expressed his doubts about maintaining high troop levels in Afghanistan. He had impressed Obama and was appointed to replace Adm. Mike Mullen, who serves as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
However, Cartwright was left out after failing to give his advice directly to the president without informing Adm. Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who strongly supported the surge. It seems that Gen. Martin Dempsey, who currently serves as chief of staff of the U.S. military, will become the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will practically be the chief military advisor to the president. Cartwright will pay the price of his mistake as he retires.
Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the forces in Afghanistan, was one of the most prominent supporters of the surge. He had hoped to achieve the same success in Afghanistan as had been done in Iraq with the same strategy, but Petraeus is expected to leave Afghanistan in September to begin his work as director of the CIA.
These varying views indicate the current differences between Washington and its allies. On the other side is the secretary-general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who is a powerful voice in this debate on whether to reduce the number of U.S. troops. In an interview with the Financial Times on May 31, he announced that reducing the number of troops is a mistake and that he does not want to leave a security vacuum in the country after NATO leaves. He said that the continued use of large military pressure on the Taliban would facilitate the reconciliation process. Many experts believe that this result is uncertain and that Rasmussen’s objectives are questionable. It seems that he is keen to maintain the prestige of NATO, and the thought of a quick exit from Afghanistan would tarnish the image of NATO.
While Rasmussen supports the continuation of counterinsurgency operations that require a large number of soldiers, other experts recommend that the U.S. transfers its focus to counterterrorism operations that require teams as small as the one that killed bin Laden.
Other experts believe that the use of America to hunt down members of the Taliban and to kill them is absolute nonsense; instead, they need to negotiate a political solution with them. In this context, it is necessary to create a favorable atmosphere for peace talks by reducing the rocket attacks by unmanned aircraft and the air attacks and night raids on residential areas that cause civilian deaths. NATO carried out airstrikes on May 28, killing 14 Afghan civilians, including 11 children between two and seven years old. President Hamid Karzai “finally” issued an angry warning to NATO, asking them to stop these attacks. NATO issued an apology, but the damage had occurred nonetheless.
In an article published last March 24 in the International Herald Tribune, Lakhdar Brahimi, a former U.N. envoy to Afghanistan, and Thomas Pickering, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state, suggested the appointment of a neutral international mediator to have discussions with all parties to find and negotiate an end to the conflict. This mediator could be a person, group, international organization, neutral country or group of states.
They added that this solution requires clearing space for the participation of representatives of the Taliban in the central government and provincial governments to ensure the withdrawal of foreign troops. The necessary financial assistance will represent a fraction of the cost of the war, while the international community sought to maintain peace and enforce any agreement reached.
This is a wise view, but Obama seems to give more attention to his advisers who want to wage war rather than those who seek to establish peace. Obama has failed to make peace between the Arabs and Israel. Will he also fail to do so in Afghanistan?