The Strategic Consequences of Obama’s Afghanistan Decision
President Obama ignited a lively debate about the future approach toward Afghanistan with his decision to scale down the number of troops in the country. However, this is not the only serious consequence of his decision. The other — probably less recognizable, but arguably more important — is the need to reevaluate the American approach toward security — what I would call Obama’s “strategic doctrine.” Both of these consequences also affect Polish strategy toward national security. What is the essence of these decisions?
Emancipation from a Militaristic Mindset
Let’s start with the strategy in Afghanistan. Obama’s decision means liberation from a militaristic approach toward Afghanistan and replacing it with a political alternative. Up to this point, the key to formulating policy was the perceived military threat level in an area. This was a bottom-up strategy — and in essence a reactive one — dependent upon conditions in the theater of operations. The mission in Afghanistan was to make these conditions as favorable as possible, which was a very arbitrary approach. In other words, we were merely reacting to perceived threats, with the hope that someday the Afghan army would be able to replace us. In reality, we (NATO) were not in control of Afghanistan. Rather, it was the Afghans who were controlling us, exploiting our militaristic approach toward the development of their nation.
President Obama has given the signal to do away with this thinking. Let’s hope that this is the beginning of real strategic change in which politicians trade in their field binoculars, which they have grown to love, for strategic telescopes. Only then can Afghanistan be seen in the proper perspective. In conflicts where we participate by choice and not by necessity it should be logical to formulate strategy based on specific objectives, and not to settle for a strategy based on the situation on the ground. If we continue the strategy that we settled for, we will be like the U.S.S.R. As a result of its lack of a broad approach to Afghanistan, it didn’t leave, but was pushed out by operational circumstances.
Purposefulness should be one of the cornerstones of our strategy. It is strange how often strategists forget this. Now is the time to return to classic strategy. We have to define our goals and also reduce our expectations. We should try not to impose our vision of what we think the country should look like. The Afghans should build it in accordance with their desires and abilities. We will not be able to guarantee them full internal security and development — they are the ones who have to strive toward that goal. It should not be up to us to tell them what type of Islam they should practice, whether it is moderate or more fundamentalist. Our common goal should be to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base of operations for attacks beyond its borders. Any and every attempt should be prevented. The strategy of “total force” should be replaced with “selective containment.” In military strategy, we should abandon the counter-insurgent tactic in favor of a counter-terrorist approach.
From the Polish point of view, this is a desirable change because it liberates NATO from a strategic trap, where the alliance compromises the ability to carry out its primary objective — the ability and integrity of a collective defense. It is necessary to stress that this strategic change is fully synchronized with President Komorowski’s plan for the future of Polish forces in Afghanistan. According to the president, we should reduce the scope of our engagement, end the military mission next year and transition to a training and support operation. By 2014, we will continue our work with Afghanistan based solely on bilateral partnership agreements.
It is not easy to convince everyone of this new strategy, as there are many people in Poland who are also in favor of a militaristic approach toward Afghanistan. Let’s hope that Obama’s change of strategy will also influence a similar direction in Polish thinking.
Balance between Security and Development
The second important item in Obama’s speech was the new American approach toward security, both national and international. According to Obama, the U.S. will not become isolationist, but also will not combat every evil in the world. If the U.S. is directly threatened, it will use force, but not escalate it toward establishing operational theaters beyond its borders. In response to threats to international security, the U.S. will not act unilaterally, but as a part of international forces. Most resources will be spent on developing Americans’ own nation (“nation building at home”).
President Obama’s new strategy can be boiled down to three points. First, an aggressive defense in the face of direct security threats. Second, a conditioned and elastic response to international and indirect threats. Third, concentrating most resources on internal development. This plan can best be characterized as a change from the “security for the sake of security” approach to the “security for development” tactic. Up to this point, security was used to exert force outward; now it will be used to ensure the internal good.
If we look at Polish security strategy from this perspective, we will notice a similar shift. It is manifested in at least two tendencies.
The first tendency is the rationalization of our approach toward involvement in international operations. We have gradually shifted away from romantic strategizing toward realism. Until very recently, we mainly looked toward our partners (Iraq, for example). Now, we try to base our decisions on rational calculations of strategic interests and ability (Libya). These calculations acknowledge the priority of our ability to counter direct threats (this is why modernization of our armed forces is at the forefront, along with development of specialized units).
The second priority is the ability to participate in an international context. This arrangement mirrors the goals of President Obama and influences our future plans, programs and decisions with regard to national security.
The second tendency of Polish strategy is to look for a proper balance between force and development. This has become a paramount issue. It is reflected in two large projects. The first is the work of the government commission headed by, among others, Michal Boni, which has created a plan for strategic development, and the work of the National Security Strategic Review Commission. One of the challenges that we are currently facing is to align these efforts with the guiding principles of “no security without development” and “without development, security is meaningless.” If we can successfully complete these two undertakings in harmony, if we strike the right balance between security and development, Poland will be able to face the challenges of contemporary times.
Emancipation from a Militaristic Mindset
Let’s start with the strategy in Afghanistan. Obama’s decision means liberation from a militaristic approach toward Afghanistan and replacing it with a political alternative. Up to this point, the key to formulating policy was the perceived military threat level in an area. This was a bottom-up strategy — and in essence a reactive one — dependent upon conditions in the theater of operations. The mission in Afghanistan was to make these conditions as favorable as possible, which was a very arbitrary approach. In other words, we were merely reacting to perceived threats, with the hope that someday the Afghan army would be able to replace us. In reality, we (NATO) were not in control of Afghanistan. Rather, it was the Afghans who were controlling us, exploiting our militaristic approach toward the development of their nation.
President Obama has given the signal to do away with this thinking. Let’s hope that this is the beginning of real strategic change in which politicians trade in their field binoculars, which they have grown to love, for strategic telescopes. Only then can Afghanistan be seen in the proper perspective. In conflicts where we participate by choice and not by necessity it should be logical to formulate strategy based on specific objectives, and not to settle for a strategy based on the situation on the ground. If we continue the strategy that we settled for, we will be like the U.S.S.R. As a result of its lack of a broad approach to Afghanistan, it didn’t leave, but was pushed out by operational circumstances.
Purposefulness should be one of the cornerstones of our strategy. It is strange how often strategists forget this. Now is the time to return to classic strategy. We have to define our goals and also reduce our expectations. We should try not to impose our vision of what we think the country should look like. The Afghans should build it in accordance with their desires and abilities. We will not be able to guarantee them full internal security and development — they are the ones who have to strive toward that goal. It should not be up to us to tell them what type of Islam they should practice, whether it is moderate or more fundamentalist. Our common goal should be to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base of operations for attacks beyond its borders. Any and every attempt should be prevented. The strategy of “total force” should be replaced with “selective containment.” In military strategy, we should abandon the counter-insurgent tactic in favor of a counter-terrorist approach.
From the Polish point of view, this is a desirable change because it liberates NATO from a strategic trap, where the alliance compromises the ability to carry out its primary objective — the ability and integrity of a collective defense. It is necessary to stress that this strategic change is fully synchronized with President Komorowski’s plan for the future of Polish forces in Afghanistan. According to the president, we should reduce the scope of our engagement, end the military mission next year and transition to a training and support operation. By 2014, we will continue our work with Afghanistan based solely on bilateral partnership agreements.
It is not easy to convince everyone of this new strategy, as there are many people in Poland who are also in favor of a militaristic approach toward Afghanistan. Let’s hope that Obama’s change of strategy will also influence a similar direction in Polish thinking.
Balance between Security and Development
The second important item in Obama’s speech was the new American approach toward security, both national and international. According to Obama, the U.S. will not become isolationist, but also will not combat every evil in the world. If the U.S. is directly threatened, it will use force, but not escalate it toward establishing operational theaters beyond its borders. In response to threats to international security, the U.S. will not act unilaterally, but as a part of international forces. Most resources will be spent on developing Americans’ own nation (“nation building at home”).
President Obama’s new strategy can be boiled down to three points. First, an aggressive defense in the face of direct security threats. Second, a conditioned and elastic response to international and indirect threats. Third, concentrating most resources on internal development. This plan can best be characterized as a change from the “security for the sake of security” approach to the “security for development” tactic. Up to this point, security was used to exert force outward; now it will be used to ensure the internal good.
If we look at Polish security strategy from this perspective, we will notice a similar shift. It is manifested in at least two tendencies.
The first tendency is the rationalization of our approach toward involvement in international operations. We have gradually shifted away from romantic strategizing toward realism. Until very recently, we mainly looked toward our partners (Iraq, for example). Now, we try to base our decisions on rational calculations of strategic interests and ability (Libya). These calculations acknowledge the priority of our ability to counter direct threats (this is why modernization of our armed forces is at the forefront, along with development of specialized units).
The second priority is the ability to participate in an international context. This arrangement mirrors the goals of President Obama and influences our future plans, programs and decisions with regard to national security.
The second tendency of Polish strategy is to look for a proper balance between force and development. This has become a paramount issue. It is reflected in two large projects. The first is the work of the government commission headed by, among others, Michal Boni, which has created a plan for strategic development, and the work of the National Security Strategic Review Commission. One of the challenges that we are currently facing is to align these efforts with the guiding principles of “no security without development” and “without development, security is meaningless.” If we can successfully complete these two undertakings in harmony, if we strike the right balance between security and development, Poland will be able to face the challenges of contemporary times.