The US Will Make Russia and Europe Drown in Afghanistan’s Heroin
The U.S., long suspected of being unwilling to fight against drug production in U.S.-occupied Afghanistan, presented a new coordination plan for anti-drug organizations in Central Asia in mid-February. However, Russia, who has suffered the most from Afghanistan’s drug trafficking, blocked the U.S. initiatives. This is because the American initiative could potentially produce the opposite of the effect that Washington expects.
The core of the American proposal, named “Central Asian Anti-drug Initiative,” is the creation of special operations forces, guided and supported by the U.S., to battle the drug mafia. These special operations forces would have a wide range of authority, including access to secret information that belongs to other special agencies located in the countries of that region. According to the American proposal, the project must include all five countries of Central Asia. The U.S., Russia and Afghanistan, in addition to these five Central Asian countries, must sign this proposal to indicate their support. The declaration of support for CACI was expected to be presented by the U.S. during a conference of the Paris Pact Initiative, the biggest international forum against drug trafficking in Afghanistan, which was held in Vienna in mid-February. However, the declaration was not accepted due to Russian resistance.
Washington’s aspiration to get access to confidential information, which might be used to put pressure on Central Asian countries, is the most suspicious element of the U.S. initiative. It was precisely this argument that helped Moscow persuade the Collective Security Treaty Organization (composed of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) to oppose signing the American declaration. According to Russia, the U.S. initiative is another version of political-military penetration into Central Asia that masks American unwillingness to battle drug trafficking. The proof for this statement, according to Russia, is the U.S. tendency to concentrate on double-sided relationships with Central Asia, ignoring the interests of Russia and the CSTO. The explanation provided by William Brownfield, the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, that the U.S. is not part of the CSTO and does not even have the status of an observer in it is not very persuasive. Brownfield’s explanation has no relation to any cooperation in the battle against drug trafficking.
In the meantime, drug production in Afghanistan is increasing with frightening speed. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, opium poppy production in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has grown 61 percent since 2010. In addition, opium poppy crops grew only seven percent, while production estimates were much higher. The most interesting thing is the continuing rise in the price of opium, which increased 133 percent in 2011. In 2010, the price increase was due to the fact that poppy crops were damaged by disease. However, in 2011, production began to recover and Afghanistan’s provinces began growing opium again. During the period of U.S. presence in the country, opium production became one of the main economic sources for Afghanistan. According to the U.N., Afghan peasants who harvested opium earned more than $1.4 billion in 2011, which is nine percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product.
It is not the first time the U.S. has penetrated Central Asia. For example, in September of 2009, the Pentagon stated its plans to establish special operations forces for security reasons in the region’s five countries. Then, the U.S. declared its decision to build several military bases in the region in August of 2010. In particular, the U.S. Central Command’s counter-narcotics fund planned to give more than $40 million to sponsor the creation of military training centers in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and Karatog, Tajikistan, as well as in canine centers and helicopter hangers in Almaty, Kazakhstan. They also intended to equip border checkpoints in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Most of these military centers are located in strategically important points. For instance, Turkmenistan’s Serahs checkpoint is located near the Iranian border, while Kyrgyzstan’s checkpoint is near Batken, in an important part of the Fergana Valley.
The U.S. attention towards South Kyrgyzstan is most noticeable. There are rumors that the U.S. is trying to create another war base. South Kyrgyzstan’s geographical location is beneficial for drug trafficking, as Afghan drugs are delivered through this territory to Russia and Europe. What is interesting is that the idea of a Russian war base in South Kyrgyzstan was not welcomed by the Kyrgyz government, while the possibility of establishing the U.S.’s military training was welcomed during Bakiev’s presidency.
Despite this, the CSTO’s efforts in fighting drug trafficking show progress. As the result of the communal operation “Canal-2011” in December of 2011, the CSTO’s special operations forces confiscated 16 tons of narcotics, including 500 kg of heroin, more than nine tons of opium, more than two tons of hashish and nearly 130 kg of cocaine. Nearly 4,000 people were found to have been involved in criminal activity. In a similar operation conducted in 2010, nearly seven tons of drugs were confiscated. The effectiveness of these efforts demonstrates Russia’s cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. For example, Kyrgyzstan was able to increase drug trafficking confiscation 23 times over with Russia’s help.
Against this background, the U.S.’s aspirations to create its own alternative anti-trafficking system in Central Asia are very suspicious, especially when the Americans are unwilling to fight drugs in Afghanistan. During the last Paris Pact Initiative conference in Vienna, the Russians presented various anti-narcotics initiatives, including strengthening border control and implementing advanced technologies. However, nothing inspired the Americans. They still refuse to destroy Afghan’s drug crops, reasoning that Afghan’s peasants would be limited in their means of subsistence. Another Russian initiative which was ignored by the Americans is the control of precursors – the main ingredient for heroin and opium production. Establishing a system of codification for precursors would make it possible to trace their suppliers, which would decrease drug production. However, the U.S. is not interested in this.
The U.S.’s position in terms of anti-drug trafficking in Afghanistan and its attempts to prolong American military presence in Afghanistan suggest that increased drug flow towards Russia and Europe does not contradict the U.S.’s interests.
The core of the American proposal, named “Central Asian Anti-drug Initiative,” is the creation of special operations forces, guided and supported by the U.S., to battle the drug mafia. These special operations forces would have a wide range of authority, including access to secret information that belongs to other special agencies located in the countries of that region. According to the American proposal, the project must include all five countries of Central Asia. The U.S., Russia and Afghanistan, in addition to these five Central Asian countries, must sign this proposal to indicate their support. The declaration of support for CACI was expected to be presented by the U.S. during a conference of the Paris Pact Initiative, the biggest international forum against drug trafficking in Afghanistan, which was held in Vienna in mid-February. However, the declaration was not accepted due to Russian resistance.
Washington’s aspiration to get access to confidential information, which might be used to put pressure on Central Asian countries, is the most suspicious element of the U.S. initiative. It was precisely this argument that helped Moscow persuade the Collective Security Treaty Organization (composed of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) to oppose signing the American declaration. According to Russia, the U.S. initiative is another version of political-military penetration into Central Asia that masks American unwillingness to battle drug trafficking. The proof for this statement, according to Russia, is the U.S. tendency to concentrate on double-sided relationships with Central Asia, ignoring the interests of Russia and the CSTO. The explanation provided by William Brownfield, the assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, that the U.S. is not part of the CSTO and does not even have the status of an observer in it is not very persuasive. Brownfield’s explanation has no relation to any cooperation in the battle against drug trafficking.
In the meantime, drug production in Afghanistan is increasing with frightening speed. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, opium poppy production in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has grown 61 percent since 2010. In addition, opium poppy crops grew only seven percent, while production estimates were much higher. The most interesting thing is the continuing rise in the price of opium, which increased 133 percent in 2011. In 2010, the price increase was due to the fact that poppy crops were damaged by disease. However, in 2011, production began to recover and Afghanistan’s provinces began growing opium again. During the period of U.S. presence in the country, opium production became one of the main economic sources for Afghanistan. According to the U.N., Afghan peasants who harvested opium earned more than $1.4 billion in 2011, which is nine percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product.
It is not the first time the U.S. has penetrated Central Asia. For example, in September of 2009, the Pentagon stated its plans to establish special operations forces for security reasons in the region’s five countries. Then, the U.S. declared its decision to build several military bases in the region in August of 2010. In particular, the U.S. Central Command’s counter-narcotics fund planned to give more than $40 million to sponsor the creation of military training centers in Osh, Kyrgyzstan and Karatog, Tajikistan, as well as in canine centers and helicopter hangers in Almaty, Kazakhstan. They also intended to equip border checkpoints in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. Most of these military centers are located in strategically important points. For instance, Turkmenistan’s Serahs checkpoint is located near the Iranian border, while Kyrgyzstan’s checkpoint is near Batken, in an important part of the Fergana Valley.
The U.S. attention towards South Kyrgyzstan is most noticeable. There are rumors that the U.S. is trying to create another war base. South Kyrgyzstan’s geographical location is beneficial for drug trafficking, as Afghan drugs are delivered through this territory to Russia and Europe. What is interesting is that the idea of a Russian war base in South Kyrgyzstan was not welcomed by the Kyrgyz government, while the possibility of establishing the U.S.’s military training was welcomed during Bakiev’s presidency.
Despite this, the CSTO’s efforts in fighting drug trafficking show progress. As the result of the communal operation “Canal-2011” in December of 2011, the CSTO’s special operations forces confiscated 16 tons of narcotics, including 500 kg of heroin, more than nine tons of opium, more than two tons of hashish and nearly 130 kg of cocaine. Nearly 4,000 people were found to have been involved in criminal activity. In a similar operation conducted in 2010, nearly seven tons of drugs were confiscated. The effectiveness of these efforts demonstrates Russia’s cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. For example, Kyrgyzstan was able to increase drug trafficking confiscation 23 times over with Russia’s help.
Against this background, the U.S.’s aspirations to create its own alternative anti-trafficking system in Central Asia are very suspicious, especially when the Americans are unwilling to fight drugs in Afghanistan. During the last Paris Pact Initiative conference in Vienna, the Russians presented various anti-narcotics initiatives, including strengthening border control and implementing advanced technologies. However, nothing inspired the Americans. They still refuse to destroy Afghan’s drug crops, reasoning that Afghan’s peasants would be limited in their means of subsistence. Another Russian initiative which was ignored by the Americans is the control of precursors – the main ingredient for heroin and opium production. Establishing a system of codification for precursors would make it possible to trace their suppliers, which would decrease drug production. However, the U.S. is not interested in this.
The U.S.’s position in terms of anti-drug trafficking in Afghanistan and its attempts to prolong American military presence in Afghanistan suggest that increased drug flow towards Russia and Europe does not contradict the U.S.’s interests.
Previous article![]( "Gimme That Old Time Everything")
