Washington Sets Moscow on a Nuclear “Striptease”
The absolute world champions from the U.S. State Department in the foreign policy game of cards are continuing to play their dishonest games successfully, under the title of the "Russian-American strategic disarmament race.” Hillary Clinton’s office staff revealed that both the U.S. and Russia are consistently acting upon the provisions of the third treaty regarding the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, having since Feb. 5, 2011 reduced the number of deployed warheads in Russia by 45 units and in the U.S. by 63. According to the reported data, as of March 1 of this year there are 1,492 on-duty nuclear warheads deployed on all types of carriers in Russia; in the U.S. there are 1,737.
Let us recall that on April 8 of last year the presidents of Russia and the U.S., Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, finally freed themselves from the heavy “burden of negotiation,” jointly bringing to light their favorite child — the “reset” in the form of the new START agreement which, if we omit the private details, entails the reduction of nuclear warheads down to 1,550 units and the reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers down to 700 units, by seven years after the initiation of the treaty. Thanks to this strident action, served with the starry-eyed rhetorical sauce of the struggle for a nuclear-free world, Barack Obama showed the progressives of the world essentially the only sane argument in favor of his receiving the status of Nobel peacemaker of planetary scale (and this at a time when the expansionist U.S. military machine continues to run without stopping, rolling through Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya!). His Russian colleague received some sort of moral right to arrange for him a “ride of unprecedented generosity.” In this regard, it suffices to mention Russia’s assistance in maintaining NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan until the opening of a hostile base in central Russia, her refusal to cooperate with Iran in supplying arms, and the infamous “missed” resolution regarding Libya in the UN Security Council.
However, it soon became clear that Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize laurels and Dmitry Medvedev’s arrangement of “reset” concessions were no more than a relatively harmless part of the multi-faceted plan put into play by the ruling American establishment. What is the ongoing implementation (and at an ever-increasing rate) of the Pentagon’s plans to neutralize Russia’s shriveling potential for a retaliatory nuclear strike (this last argument of the R.F. flies in the face of American foreign policy hawks who have recently been clearly suffering from “expansionist bulimia”) by means of the global missile defense system built by the U.S. about? Clearly, it means that that in circumstances when one (the offensive) part of a strategic deterrence system is situated in a dialectical unity (like a shield and a sword) with the means of missile defense, there is no need to say a thing regarding the maintenance of parity in the nuclear sphere. As a result, the increasing superiority of the U.S. over Russia in the sphere of high-precision weapons (such as cruise missiles that are guided by satellites to their targets) could turn out to be crucial: The notorious Russian “nuclear bat” is literally melting before our eyes like the Snow Maiden* in the treacherous rays of the “resetting” sun.
In this context, Barack Obama’s recent statements during a nuclear security summit in Seoul, at which he insistently demanded that Russia’s leaders continue their disarmament “striptease,” were not remotely surprising. “I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal,” insisted Obama. Let us recall that in February 2012 the Western media reported that the U.S. Department of Defense and representatives from the National Security Agency were looking over plans to radically downsize their nuclear forces in three stages: from 1,790 warheads to 1,000-1,100, down to 700-800, and finally down to 300-400. Naturally, it is assumed that this will not be carried out unilaterally: Russia will have to take similar steps.
As it happens, in order to lull the vigilance of the Russian players in the geopolitical game of cards, Washington, having induced Moscow to radically “emasculate” its strategic nuclear arsenal, is even ready to put the long-coveted obsession of Russian leadership into practice by providing a guarantee in writing that European defense systems will not target Russia. Regarding this, the U.S. special envoy on strategic stability and missile defense, Ellen Tauscher, followed the principle of, “since you need this toilet paper so much, I’ve got some.”
In this regard, it appears helpful to recall that Russia is endowed with an invaluable historical experience: the friendship and non-aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany that was concluded less than two years before the start of Nazi aggression directed towards the USSR. If the Russian leadership repeats this mistake, then in the context of the current nuclear issue, contrary to popular belief, there is practically no chance that events will repeat themselves like a farce.
In an interview with KM.RU, Anatoly Tsyganok, the director of the Center for Military Forecasting at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, shared his concerns about the fact that Russia could fall into the “disarmament trap” carefully established by U.S. administration:
"We must understand clearly that Russia and the U.S. together control 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal. That is to say, all of the remaining countries account for approximately 10 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. That is why we can afford such reduction with respect to the third world. After all, nobody needs a planet-wide nuclear winter. But the problem is that we must pay attention to the strategic capacity not only of the U.S., but of the other NATO countries as well. When we speak about nuclear arms reduction at international conferences, our colleagues from Great Britain and France, as a rule, shirk the question. The leaders of the latter country assert that they are, allegedly, employing an independent strategy with regard to this issue. And England is extremely dependent upon the Americans.
"Finally, we must not forget that the Americans are continuing to develop their own missile defense systems. Of course, their naval SM-3 missiles still have not reached completion; in other words, even at an accelerated rate they won’t be able to catch up to our nuclear missiles. However, elements of the Aegis system, which could turn up in the Mediterranean Sea, are frankly alarming. Furthermore, anti-missile technology is constantly improving and, with time, the U.S. could acquire more modernized systems that could neutralize our retaliatory strike. For now, Washington prefers to act upon the 'foot in the door' principle; in other words, first consolidate its antimissile operations in the European theater with systems of limited functionality, and to improve upon them later on in the future. Given this, Washington will not heed Russia’s protests. This is why the current situation may be called dangerous.
"As such, in the position of the U.S. there lies a large element of deceit: They offer to embark together with us upon a radical reduction in nuclear warheads but, unlike us, they continue develop their own antimissile capabilities. Nevertheless, Russia still has the ability to deliver an asymmetrical response. I am speaking about the strengthening of our radar protection system. That is, the radar stations that the Americans have placed on our borders can simply be drowned out by more powerful signals.
"As for the written guarantee, it certainly does not solve a thing. And really, it would be beneficial for us not to negotiate with the U.S. or the NATO bloc as a whole, but instead to conduct negotiations with individual countries — with Germany, with England, or with France. For each of the 27 members of the bloc has veto power, and this extends to the issue of the development of European missile defense systems. There exists one more important factor concerning tactical weapons: For now, we have more of this type of ammunition than do the Americans. However, if we were to remove our tactical weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, the Americans would retain theirs — according to some sources, from 400 to 600 units. This is the so-called 'returned arsenal,' that is, warheads which have been removed from carriers but rather than being destroyed, are stored."
*Translator's note: This is a reference to a character in a Russian fairy tale.
Let us recall that on April 8 of last year the presidents of Russia and the U.S., Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, finally freed themselves from the heavy “burden of negotiation,” jointly bringing to light their favorite child — the “reset” in the form of the new START agreement which, if we omit the private details, entails the reduction of nuclear warheads down to 1,550 units and the reduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers down to 700 units, by seven years after the initiation of the treaty. Thanks to this strident action, served with the starry-eyed rhetorical sauce of the struggle for a nuclear-free world, Barack Obama showed the progressives of the world essentially the only sane argument in favor of his receiving the status of Nobel peacemaker of planetary scale (and this at a time when the expansionist U.S. military machine continues to run without stopping, rolling through Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya!). His Russian colleague received some sort of moral right to arrange for him a “ride of unprecedented generosity.” In this regard, it suffices to mention Russia’s assistance in maintaining NATO’s military presence in Afghanistan until the opening of a hostile base in central Russia, her refusal to cooperate with Iran in supplying arms, and the infamous “missed” resolution regarding Libya in the UN Security Council.
However, it soon became clear that Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize laurels and Dmitry Medvedev’s arrangement of “reset” concessions were no more than a relatively harmless part of the multi-faceted plan put into play by the ruling American establishment. What is the ongoing implementation (and at an ever-increasing rate) of the Pentagon’s plans to neutralize Russia’s shriveling potential for a retaliatory nuclear strike (this last argument of the R.F. flies in the face of American foreign policy hawks who have recently been clearly suffering from “expansionist bulimia”) by means of the global missile defense system built by the U.S. about? Clearly, it means that that in circumstances when one (the offensive) part of a strategic deterrence system is situated in a dialectical unity (like a shield and a sword) with the means of missile defense, there is no need to say a thing regarding the maintenance of parity in the nuclear sphere. As a result, the increasing superiority of the U.S. over Russia in the sphere of high-precision weapons (such as cruise missiles that are guided by satellites to their targets) could turn out to be crucial: The notorious Russian “nuclear bat” is literally melting before our eyes like the Snow Maiden* in the treacherous rays of the “resetting” sun.
In this context, Barack Obama’s recent statements during a nuclear security summit in Seoul, at which he insistently demanded that Russia’s leaders continue their disarmament “striptease,” were not remotely surprising. “I firmly believe that we can ensure the security of the United States and our allies, maintain a strong deterrent against any threat and still pursue further reductions in our nuclear arsenal,” insisted Obama. Let us recall that in February 2012 the Western media reported that the U.S. Department of Defense and representatives from the National Security Agency were looking over plans to radically downsize their nuclear forces in three stages: from 1,790 warheads to 1,000-1,100, down to 700-800, and finally down to 300-400. Naturally, it is assumed that this will not be carried out unilaterally: Russia will have to take similar steps.
As it happens, in order to lull the vigilance of the Russian players in the geopolitical game of cards, Washington, having induced Moscow to radically “emasculate” its strategic nuclear arsenal, is even ready to put the long-coveted obsession of Russian leadership into practice by providing a guarantee in writing that European defense systems will not target Russia. Regarding this, the U.S. special envoy on strategic stability and missile defense, Ellen Tauscher, followed the principle of, “since you need this toilet paper so much, I’ve got some.”
In this regard, it appears helpful to recall that Russia is endowed with an invaluable historical experience: the friendship and non-aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany that was concluded less than two years before the start of Nazi aggression directed towards the USSR. If the Russian leadership repeats this mistake, then in the context of the current nuclear issue, contrary to popular belief, there is practically no chance that events will repeat themselves like a farce.
In an interview with KM.RU, Anatoly Tsyganok, the director of the Center for Military Forecasting at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, shared his concerns about the fact that Russia could fall into the “disarmament trap” carefully established by U.S. administration:
"We must understand clearly that Russia and the U.S. together control 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal. That is to say, all of the remaining countries account for approximately 10 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. That is why we can afford such reduction with respect to the third world. After all, nobody needs a planet-wide nuclear winter. But the problem is that we must pay attention to the strategic capacity not only of the U.S., but of the other NATO countries as well. When we speak about nuclear arms reduction at international conferences, our colleagues from Great Britain and France, as a rule, shirk the question. The leaders of the latter country assert that they are, allegedly, employing an independent strategy with regard to this issue. And England is extremely dependent upon the Americans.
"Finally, we must not forget that the Americans are continuing to develop their own missile defense systems. Of course, their naval SM-3 missiles still have not reached completion; in other words, even at an accelerated rate they won’t be able to catch up to our nuclear missiles. However, elements of the Aegis system, which could turn up in the Mediterranean Sea, are frankly alarming. Furthermore, anti-missile technology is constantly improving and, with time, the U.S. could acquire more modernized systems that could neutralize our retaliatory strike. For now, Washington prefers to act upon the 'foot in the door' principle; in other words, first consolidate its antimissile operations in the European theater with systems of limited functionality, and to improve upon them later on in the future. Given this, Washington will not heed Russia’s protests. This is why the current situation may be called dangerous.
"As such, in the position of the U.S. there lies a large element of deceit: They offer to embark together with us upon a radical reduction in nuclear warheads but, unlike us, they continue develop their own antimissile capabilities. Nevertheless, Russia still has the ability to deliver an asymmetrical response. I am speaking about the strengthening of our radar protection system. That is, the radar stations that the Americans have placed on our borders can simply be drowned out by more powerful signals.
"As for the written guarantee, it certainly does not solve a thing. And really, it would be beneficial for us not to negotiate with the U.S. or the NATO bloc as a whole, but instead to conduct negotiations with individual countries — with Germany, with England, or with France. For each of the 27 members of the bloc has veto power, and this extends to the issue of the development of European missile defense systems. There exists one more important factor concerning tactical weapons: For now, we have more of this type of ammunition than do the Americans. However, if we were to remove our tactical weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, the Americans would retain theirs — according to some sources, from 400 to 600 units. This is the so-called 'returned arsenal,' that is, warheads which have been removed from carriers but rather than being destroyed, are stored."
*Translator's note: This is a reference to a character in a Russian fairy tale.