Tactics or a Strategic Decision? New “Old” Nuances of Russian Foreign Policy
The fact that Vladimir Putin, who has recently taken office as Russia's president, refused to meet President Barack Obama, came to the fore in the international media as a sensation and as a reason for numerous comments. Many view this as the Russian leadership’s dissatisfaction with Washington's position. At least the influential British BBC recalls in this connection that on the day of Putin’s inauguration, Washington criticized the actions taken by the Russian police against the participants of the opposition rallies in Moscow. The Department of State then announced that the U.S. was disappointed by the attitude taken toward peaceful demonstrators. However, the international community was surprised by Putin’s decision not to attend the G8 Summit at Camp David on May 18-19, which means that China again -- for the third time in a row -- will be the first major country that Putin will visit after his election to the president's office. Apparently, he will visit China in early June.
There is no doubt that Russia-U.S. relations are currently characterized by a number of issues that are unlikely to be solved until the new presidential elections in the United States take place. They are not limited to the constant criticism of Russia’s human rights situation, its undisguised support of the "non-system" opposition or its different approaches to solving international issues, either in Syria or in Iran. One of the main points of contention is the establishment of missile defense in Europe. This stumbling block is a fundamental issue: the lack of legal guarantees that the emerging missile defense in Europe will not be directed against Russia. Anti-NATO sentiments have become particularly strong after the U.S. Missile Defense Agency recently successfully test-launched a new interceptor missile called Standard Missile 3 Block IB developed by the U.S. company Raytheon, which, according to some experts, could be the next stage in the development of the missile defense. A series of SM-3 missiles could be installed both on ships equipped with Aegis system and ashore. In particular, the U.S. plans to place the new Block IB interceptors on Romanian territory within the framework of the European ground-based Midcourse Defense as a part of the U.S. missile defense system. Arguably, such missiles could also be placed in Israel and Poland.
Of course, the possibility of improving the European defense should be considered since it is part of a global anti-missile shield, which is designed to protect the West (especially NATO countries) from any military, economic or political surprises. It will make it possible to minimize the damage from the future actions of any potential enemy that might possess ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. and its allies.
It is no coincidence that in their analysis of the situation around missile defense in Europe, experts of a Berlin-based think-tank, the Foundation for Science and Policy, emphasize that it would target any potential adversary. Without a doubt, the term "prevention of blackmailing," used in their analysis, requires special attention. Of course, it implies an ability to exercise both political and economic pressure on the NATO countries and other U.S.-friendly countries on various occasions and in different cases.
It is worth recalling that the Russian president signed a decree just after his inauguration that commissioned the foreign ministry to introduce a new conception of Russia's cooperation with other countries by December 2012. It is known that the new president has declared the reduction and limitation of offensive weapons to be a priority. Currently, it is impossible to guarantee the country’s security without addressing the missile defense issue.
However, it is too early to talk about the change of the Russian foreign policy vectors. In this regard, similarly to the manner of the first Russian president, Putin is prone to tactical maneuvers, using both Western and Asian trump cards in the foreign policy game.
There is no doubt that Russia-U.S. relations are currently characterized by a number of issues that are unlikely to be solved until the new presidential elections in the United States take place. They are not limited to the constant criticism of Russia’s human rights situation, its undisguised support of the "non-system" opposition or its different approaches to solving international issues, either in Syria or in Iran. One of the main points of contention is the establishment of missile defense in Europe. This stumbling block is a fundamental issue: the lack of legal guarantees that the emerging missile defense in Europe will not be directed against Russia. Anti-NATO sentiments have become particularly strong after the U.S. Missile Defense Agency recently successfully test-launched a new interceptor missile called Standard Missile 3 Block IB developed by the U.S. company Raytheon, which, according to some experts, could be the next stage in the development of the missile defense. A series of SM-3 missiles could be installed both on ships equipped with Aegis system and ashore. In particular, the U.S. plans to place the new Block IB interceptors on Romanian territory within the framework of the European ground-based Midcourse Defense as a part of the U.S. missile defense system. Arguably, such missiles could also be placed in Israel and Poland.
Of course, the possibility of improving the European defense should be considered since it is part of a global anti-missile shield, which is designed to protect the West (especially NATO countries) from any military, economic or political surprises. It will make it possible to minimize the damage from the future actions of any potential enemy that might possess ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. and its allies.
It is no coincidence that in their analysis of the situation around missile defense in Europe, experts of a Berlin-based think-tank, the Foundation for Science and Policy, emphasize that it would target any potential adversary. Without a doubt, the term "prevention of blackmailing," used in their analysis, requires special attention. Of course, it implies an ability to exercise both political and economic pressure on the NATO countries and other U.S.-friendly countries on various occasions and in different cases.
It is worth recalling that the Russian president signed a decree just after his inauguration that commissioned the foreign ministry to introduce a new conception of Russia's cooperation with other countries by December 2012. It is known that the new president has declared the reduction and limitation of offensive weapons to be a priority. Currently, it is impossible to guarantee the country’s security without addressing the missile defense issue.
However, it is too early to talk about the change of the Russian foreign policy vectors. In this regard, similarly to the manner of the first Russian president, Putin is prone to tactical maneuvers, using both Western and Asian trump cards in the foreign policy game.
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