Diaoyu Islands: A Card up the Sleeve of the US
In international relations there are no eternal friendships, only permanent interests. The position and attitude of the U.S. with regard to the Diaoyu Islands issue once again confirms this truth. To the U.S., impartiality and objective standards do not matter when it comes to the Diaoyu Islands, which has always been a card up its sleeve. When and to what extent to play that card depend entirely on the needs of the international situation and the amount of benefits it can bring to the U.S.
Japanese media recently claimed that government documents found in the U.S. National Archives indicated that, before the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971, the Nixon administration at one point demanded that the Japanese government — who did not acknowledge the territorial dispute around the Diaoyu Islands — make concessions and communicate directly with Taiwan, for the purpose of drawing the latter to the U.S.’ side. The big picture, then, is that the U.S. government was in close contact with the mainland government, striving hard to push forward Nixon’s visit to China. At this time, the U.S. and Taiwan had entered a critical period in the negotiations over textiles trade; although there were still serious differences, the two sides had reached a preliminary understanding. The ice-breaking message about Sino-U.S. relations made Taiwan very unhappy. The two-China policy also made Taiwan feel that it had been treated unfairly, which could have affected the negotiations. In order to win over Taiwan, the U.S. negotiator, Kennedy, recommended that Nixon maintain the status quo and not return the Diaoyu Islands to Japan’s jurisdiction for the time being. Nixon showed understanding in this proposal.
The Japanese media is bringing up this debate again, in a way that suggests that Japan had been lied to and fooled; they claim that even allies are sometimes unreliable. According to the understanding on the Japanese side, the decision to return jurisdiction to Japan and let sovereignty be resolved by negotiations between the parties formed the basic policy of the U.S. with regard to the Diaoyu Islands issue. This sowed the seeds for argument and led to the current state, where China is strongly fighting for sovereignty over the islands. Japan, of course, hopes that the U.S. will stand completely on its side on the issue. Along with the return of jurisdiction, it also wants it to be made clear that Japan has sovereignty over the islands and that when a threat surfaces, the U.S. will instantly enact a security treaty to back it up. But the U.S. is clearly not naive. Compared to explicitly choosing sides and solving the problem once and for all, maintaining the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands matches its interests better.
The shadow of the U.S. can be seen in almost every one of the world’s hot spots today, and in every place where that shadow exists, the disputes are often deliberately arranged by the U.S. Leaving potential catalysts of conflict is more important than quelling the disputes and advocating justice. From the Middle East to Africa, from Latin America to Asia, the U.S. is pursuing this strategy everywhere, all the time. The more international disputes there are, the more the U.S. can highlight its value, and the more space there is for its actions.
The Diaoyu Islands issue is the same. The dispute stemmed from the actions of the U.S., and it is precisely because of the U.S. that the conflict has reached its current state of tension. A serious study of history will indicate three things: First, given its efforts to closely follow world events and maintain the international order after World War II, there is no way that the U.S. was unsure of who should rightly be given sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Secondly, there is no way that the U.S. would have placed the Diaoyu Islands, which originally should have been returned to China, under its own custody in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the private transactions that took place later over the geographical boundary of the Ryukyu Islands. Lastly, there is no way that the U.S. would have intentionally included the Diaoyu Islands in the areas to be put under Japanese jurisdiction when signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971, which would give Japan the excuse to claim sovereignty over them. As the initiator of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, the U.S. cannot be the impartial magistrate who solves the dispute. Given the terms that the U.S. agreed to in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty with regard to the Diaoyu Islands, its declaration that it will stay neutral over the issue of sovereignty is clearly a lie. The Diaoyu Islands’ past and future will serve as a card for the U.S. to use to contain China’s rise as part of its strategy in Asia and even the whole world. The U.S. will profit at others’ expense in the dispute.
Japanese media recently claimed that government documents found in the U.S. National Archives indicated that, before the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971, the Nixon administration at one point demanded that the Japanese government — who did not acknowledge the territorial dispute around the Diaoyu Islands — make concessions and communicate directly with Taiwan, for the purpose of drawing the latter to the U.S.’ side. The big picture, then, is that the U.S. government was in close contact with the mainland government, striving hard to push forward Nixon’s visit to China. At this time, the U.S. and Taiwan had entered a critical period in the negotiations over textiles trade; although there were still serious differences, the two sides had reached a preliminary understanding. The ice-breaking message about Sino-U.S. relations made Taiwan very unhappy. The two-China policy also made Taiwan feel that it had been treated unfairly, which could have affected the negotiations. In order to win over Taiwan, the U.S. negotiator, Kennedy, recommended that Nixon maintain the status quo and not return the Diaoyu Islands to Japan’s jurisdiction for the time being. Nixon showed understanding in this proposal.
The Japanese media is bringing up this debate again, in a way that suggests that Japan had been lied to and fooled; they claim that even allies are sometimes unreliable. According to the understanding on the Japanese side, the decision to return jurisdiction to Japan and let sovereignty be resolved by negotiations between the parties formed the basic policy of the U.S. with regard to the Diaoyu Islands issue. This sowed the seeds for argument and led to the current state, where China is strongly fighting for sovereignty over the islands. Japan, of course, hopes that the U.S. will stand completely on its side on the issue. Along with the return of jurisdiction, it also wants it to be made clear that Japan has sovereignty over the islands and that when a threat surfaces, the U.S. will instantly enact a security treaty to back it up. But the U.S. is clearly not naive. Compared to explicitly choosing sides and solving the problem once and for all, maintaining the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands matches its interests better.
The shadow of the U.S. can be seen in almost every one of the world’s hot spots today, and in every place where that shadow exists, the disputes are often deliberately arranged by the U.S. Leaving potential catalysts of conflict is more important than quelling the disputes and advocating justice. From the Middle East to Africa, from Latin America to Asia, the U.S. is pursuing this strategy everywhere, all the time. The more international disputes there are, the more the U.S. can highlight its value, and the more space there is for its actions.
The Diaoyu Islands issue is the same. The dispute stemmed from the actions of the U.S., and it is precisely because of the U.S. that the conflict has reached its current state of tension. A serious study of history will indicate three things: First, given its efforts to closely follow world events and maintain the international order after World War II, there is no way that the U.S. was unsure of who should rightly be given sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Secondly, there is no way that the U.S. would have placed the Diaoyu Islands, which originally should have been returned to China, under its own custody in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the private transactions that took place later over the geographical boundary of the Ryukyu Islands. Lastly, there is no way that the U.S. would have intentionally included the Diaoyu Islands in the areas to be put under Japanese jurisdiction when signing the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971, which would give Japan the excuse to claim sovereignty over them. As the initiator of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, the U.S. cannot be the impartial magistrate who solves the dispute. Given the terms that the U.S. agreed to in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty with regard to the Diaoyu Islands, its declaration that it will stay neutral over the issue of sovereignty is clearly a lie. The Diaoyu Islands’ past and future will serve as a card for the U.S. to use to contain China’s rise as part of its strategy in Asia and even the whole world. The U.S. will profit at others’ expense in the dispute.