The 'Credibility' of the United States Facing Syria
In military matters there are two conditions that are essential for all deterrent policies, to have credibility with both enemies and allies. One is to have the capacity to strike profound blows at the adversary. The other, to have the willingness to use that capacity.
The Syrian crisis has highlighted a key factor of international relations: credibility. President Barack Obama announced a red line that if crossed would automatically trigger military retaliation. That threshold, which marked the limit of the United States’ tolerance, was the use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. So, after the gas attack against the civilian population, Damascus became the prime suspect, and Washington initiated war-like preparations to follow through with what it had promised.
In this new situation, which presumed Assad to be guilty, Obama moved warships into place for a discharge of Tomahawk missiles that would weaken the military capacity of Damascus. In military matters there are two conditions that are essential for all deterrent policies. Or, if you prefer, to have credibility with both enemies and allies. One is to have the capacity to strike profound blows at the adversary. This, clearly, requires a convincing firepower. Something that, as everyone knows, the United States has in excess. But it is not enough to have a great arsenal: They have to have the will to use it. If there are doubts about this second condition, all of the weapons stop exercising their power of intimidation.
American military history leaves little doubt surrounding the willingness of the Pentagon to employ force. In fact, the credibility deficit points to the White House, which in the past has preferred to employ cruise missiles rather than diplomatic processes. The resolution of the Syrian crisis will tell in what direction the balance tilts.
The Syrian crisis has highlighted a key factor of international relations: credibility. President Barack Obama announced a red line that if crossed would automatically trigger military retaliation. That threshold, which marked the limit of the United States’ tolerance, was the use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad’s regime. So, after the gas attack against the civilian population, Damascus became the prime suspect, and Washington initiated war-like preparations to follow through with what it had promised.
In this new situation, which presumed Assad to be guilty, Obama moved warships into place for a discharge of Tomahawk missiles that would weaken the military capacity of Damascus. In military matters there are two conditions that are essential for all deterrent policies. Or, if you prefer, to have credibility with both enemies and allies. One is to have the capacity to strike profound blows at the adversary. This, clearly, requires a convincing firepower. Something that, as everyone knows, the United States has in excess. But it is not enough to have a great arsenal: They have to have the will to use it. If there are doubts about this second condition, all of the weapons stop exercising their power of intimidation.
American military history leaves little doubt surrounding the willingness of the Pentagon to employ force. In fact, the credibility deficit points to the White House, which in the past has preferred to employ cruise missiles rather than diplomatic processes. The resolution of the Syrian crisis will tell in what direction the balance tilts.