Is the US Beginning To Grow Wary of Abe?
On Dec. 26, 2013, the day that Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe brazenly made a ceremonial visit to the Yasukuni War Shrine, the U.S. consulate in Japan issued an announcement on its homepage. It stated that Japan was a treasured ally and friend, but that the U.S. felt disappointment at Japan's leader for performing acts that would aggravate tensions with Japan's neighbors. Following this, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State also expressed a similar position.
There is significant meaning in these very brief statements from the U.S. — behind them lies the U.S. government's anger with Japan's pragmatism and the snaring issues its short-sighted policies create. It also suggests a hidden history of U.S.-Japan relations, a road that is littered with both gratitude and grudges.
First of all, America has suffered the intentional snub of a juvenile. She cannot tolerate this, and so she has no choice but to express her disappointment. America's view on Abe's intentions to visit the Yasukuni Shrine had been absolutely crystal clear. Earlier in October of 2013, when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Hagel visited Japan, they aligned their views with American perspectives on how ceremonies and burials at Arlington Cemetery were conducted as national traditions. Their efforts to lay flowers for war victims interred at the Chidorigafuchi public cemetery near the Imperial Palace had already been an adequate demonstration of sentiment, and they strongly suggested to Abe that he should not visit Yasukuni.
Furthermore, according to media reports around the beginning of December when Vice President Biden visited Japan, Biden had also rightly suggested to Abe once that he should not go to the Yasukuni shrine. But Abe went and did things his own way; he turned a deaf ear to the highest level of advice from the U.S. and promptly made a grandiose visit to Yasukuni. Abe showed the U.S. from the outset that his will prevailed over all.
Second, the U.S. is prevaricating over Abe's bad conduct; they criticize from a position of genuine discomfort. The American public has been filled with indignation over Abe's visit to Yasukuni. Time after time they have denounced him over it, and even members of Congress have repeatedly made veiled criticisms. In the end, here we have a problem based on an invasion-versus-resistance issue. To resist Japan's fascist inclinations and yet persevere with the oh-so-lofty image of the servicemen and women of the American military — how could they possibly not end up looking like Abe through such acts? But then to get mixed up in speaking of those that died in the war fighting for Japan's fascist expansion — where would be the conscience in that? So on such recent issues the White House has been losing its voice insofar as attaining its own interests is concerned; do they criticize Abe or do they exonerate him?
Third, the U.S. is at a loss to respond to Abe's hell-bent insistence upon reviving Japan's militarism. A year after Abe took to the stage, the reliance on Abenomics to bring a short-term recovery to Japan's economy, and the boost to his poll ratings such action gave, has in turn helped him monopolize his political position for a push toward ultra-nationalism and an ideology of militarism. He has expanded the armed forces in preparation to travel down the dangerous path of militaristic revival.
Abe's unrighteous conduct stems from America's ardent wish to maintain a U.S.-Japan military alliance, and here this mostly incites the U.S. into doing one of two things: either taking action to do something about it, or giving their implicit consent by remaining silent. By the U.S. expressing its disappointment toward Abe for visiting the Yasukuni shrine, can we somewhat understand America's need to be uneasy as Abe starts breaking the rules? The U.S. has already been put in check with this ploy of his; we shall now see how talented the U.S. really is when it comes to a countermove.
Fourth, the U.S. needs to do some deep soul searching over the U.S.-Japan alliance, and it genuinely needs to find a new strategy for deftly balancing power within the Asia-Pacific region. Through nurturing Japan's military apparatus, the U.S. will attempt to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and maintain its dominant position within the Asia-Pacific region. But appeasing the tiger will only bring about trouble, and it will eventuate in catastrophe for both the U.S. and the world.
China will be the important balancing force in maintaining peace within the Asia-Pacific and the world at large. China will be the friend that the U.S. needs — it is not an enemy of the United States. The objective is a new kind of relationship based on a mighty U.S. and Chinese co-power. There ought not to be resistance or conflict between the U.S. and China; they should always get along with each other peacefully and never enter a war. The U.S.-Japan alliance is a product of the Cold War era; with the end of the Cold War, that alliance also lost its reason for existence.
If the U.S. only seeks to strengthen its alliance with Japan to contain China, the most likely outcome will be that China will not be containable. She will just continue to grow in strength as usual. Moreover, a Japan that is passionately pursuing the path to re-militarization will, in the near future, become the hotbed for war. It will unceasingly challenge America's dominant position. America's strategy for the Asia-Pacific cannot serve as the basis for maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, it is likely to turn into an utter disaster.
The author is the executive director of the China Foundation for International Studies’ Center for American Studies.
There is significant meaning in these very brief statements from the U.S. — behind them lies the U.S. government's anger with Japan's pragmatism and the snaring issues its short-sighted policies create. It also suggests a hidden history of U.S.-Japan relations, a road that is littered with both gratitude and grudges.
First of all, America has suffered the intentional snub of a juvenile. She cannot tolerate this, and so she has no choice but to express her disappointment. America's view on Abe's intentions to visit the Yasukuni Shrine had been absolutely crystal clear. Earlier in October of 2013, when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Defense Secretary Hagel visited Japan, they aligned their views with American perspectives on how ceremonies and burials at Arlington Cemetery were conducted as national traditions. Their efforts to lay flowers for war victims interred at the Chidorigafuchi public cemetery near the Imperial Palace had already been an adequate demonstration of sentiment, and they strongly suggested to Abe that he should not visit Yasukuni.
Furthermore, according to media reports around the beginning of December when Vice President Biden visited Japan, Biden had also rightly suggested to Abe once that he should not go to the Yasukuni shrine. But Abe went and did things his own way; he turned a deaf ear to the highest level of advice from the U.S. and promptly made a grandiose visit to Yasukuni. Abe showed the U.S. from the outset that his will prevailed over all.
Second, the U.S. is prevaricating over Abe's bad conduct; they criticize from a position of genuine discomfort. The American public has been filled with indignation over Abe's visit to Yasukuni. Time after time they have denounced him over it, and even members of Congress have repeatedly made veiled criticisms. In the end, here we have a problem based on an invasion-versus-resistance issue. To resist Japan's fascist inclinations and yet persevere with the oh-so-lofty image of the servicemen and women of the American military — how could they possibly not end up looking like Abe through such acts? But then to get mixed up in speaking of those that died in the war fighting for Japan's fascist expansion — where would be the conscience in that? So on such recent issues the White House has been losing its voice insofar as attaining its own interests is concerned; do they criticize Abe or do they exonerate him?
Third, the U.S. is at a loss to respond to Abe's hell-bent insistence upon reviving Japan's militarism. A year after Abe took to the stage, the reliance on Abenomics to bring a short-term recovery to Japan's economy, and the boost to his poll ratings such action gave, has in turn helped him monopolize his political position for a push toward ultra-nationalism and an ideology of militarism. He has expanded the armed forces in preparation to travel down the dangerous path of militaristic revival.
Abe's unrighteous conduct stems from America's ardent wish to maintain a U.S.-Japan military alliance, and here this mostly incites the U.S. into doing one of two things: either taking action to do something about it, or giving their implicit consent by remaining silent. By the U.S. expressing its disappointment toward Abe for visiting the Yasukuni shrine, can we somewhat understand America's need to be uneasy as Abe starts breaking the rules? The U.S. has already been put in check with this ploy of his; we shall now see how talented the U.S. really is when it comes to a countermove.
Fourth, the U.S. needs to do some deep soul searching over the U.S.-Japan alliance, and it genuinely needs to find a new strategy for deftly balancing power within the Asia-Pacific region. Through nurturing Japan's military apparatus, the U.S. will attempt to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and maintain its dominant position within the Asia-Pacific region. But appeasing the tiger will only bring about trouble, and it will eventuate in catastrophe for both the U.S. and the world.
China will be the important balancing force in maintaining peace within the Asia-Pacific and the world at large. China will be the friend that the U.S. needs — it is not an enemy of the United States. The objective is a new kind of relationship based on a mighty U.S. and Chinese co-power. There ought not to be resistance or conflict between the U.S. and China; they should always get along with each other peacefully and never enter a war. The U.S.-Japan alliance is a product of the Cold War era; with the end of the Cold War, that alliance also lost its reason for existence.
If the U.S. only seeks to strengthen its alliance with Japan to contain China, the most likely outcome will be that China will not be containable. She will just continue to grow in strength as usual. Moreover, a Japan that is passionately pursuing the path to re-militarization will, in the near future, become the hotbed for war. It will unceasingly challenge America's dominant position. America's strategy for the Asia-Pacific cannot serve as the basis for maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, it is likely to turn into an utter disaster.
The author is the executive director of the China Foundation for International Studies’ Center for American Studies.