What if Obama Accepted a Form of Annexation of Crimea by Russia?
The evolution of the situation in Ukraine in recent days is hard to predict. And a similar crisis is a test for President Obama: His management of it may indeed have a major impact on the realization of his goals and objectives in foreign policy.
Responding in an exaggerated fashion when faced with a case in which the United States has no interest, however, shows that the U.S. president is — at the moment — a very tender chess player opposite Vladimir Putin.
The Limited Effectiveness of Retaliation against Moscow
On Friday, Barack Obama warned Moscow that any intervention by armed forces in Ukraine would have a cost.
However, retaliatory measures available to the U.S. administration are very limited.
The options referred to include canceling the president’s travel plans to the G-8 Summit in Sochi in June, the restoration of the G-7 and thus the exclusion of Russia from an informal forum for international discussions, the suspension of negotiations on a trade agreement and the deployment of warships in the Black Sea.
Similar options were presented to President Bush in 2008 during the Russian military intervention in Georgia. American ships had then traveled the Black Sea, and discussions of Russian-American cooperation in the civil nuclear field were interrupted, relations with NATO were suspended and the U.S. Army had even repatriated Georgian forces operating in Iraq to Tbilisi.
What was the result? Sure, the Russian troops did not enter the Georgian capital. But because they did not leave the areas they were told to evacuate in accordance with the cease-fire, they secured the de facto independence of the two rebel provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for six years.
In addition, as of 2009 the relative diplomatic isolation of Moscow had ended. Newly elected to the White House, Barack Obama made the renewal of the relationship between Washington and Moscow one of the priorities of his foreign policy.
Thus, the case of Georgia shows that the effectiveness of any retaliatory measures envisaged by Washington is uncertain at best, if not at zero. All this, and the mention by Vladimir Putin that he is ready to accept any costs to his decisions if he considers that they serve national interests. And Barack Obama does not have special credibility when it comes to getting tough when dealing with leaders who are a bit headstrong.
The Russian president certainly has not forgotten that his American counterpart gave up enforcing his "red lines" when he didn’t launch a military operation against the regime of Bashar Assad, who used chemical weapons against his population in August 2013.
Ukraine Should Not Distract Obama's Foreign Policy Objectives
If Barack Obama seems unable to bend Vladimir Putin regarding the case of Ukraine, it would be wise to prevent a cooling in relations between the United States and Russia.
Washington must, in fact, rely on the cooperation of Moscow in much larger cases: Syria, the fight against proliferation and toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals, North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan.
Ukraine is not a member of the European Union or NATO. There is therefore no reason that President Obama would take the risk of any confrontation with Moscow.
For the latter, Ukraine — and Crimea — is of major importance from a historical and strategic perspective, as well as the presence of large Russian-speaking minorities.
Moreover, despite the current demonstrations of support and calls for Russian intervention on the part of the people of eastern and southern Ukraine, it is not assumed that a form of occupation or annexation by Moscow would be easily accepted. A nationalist background and the tensions between different communities may indeed be a source of serious problems for the Russian forces.
Washington would be well advised to seriously consider the parameters of an acceptable Russian influence in Ukraine — even including a form of annexation of Crimea — in exchange for the constructive cooperation of Moscow on the issues outlined above.
Such is the price, however modest: Barack Obama must agree to pay for the results of major issues in foreign policy.
Responding in an exaggerated fashion when faced with a case in which the United States has no interest, however, shows that the U.S. president is — at the moment — a very tender chess player opposite Vladimir Putin.
The Limited Effectiveness of Retaliation against Moscow
On Friday, Barack Obama warned Moscow that any intervention by armed forces in Ukraine would have a cost.
However, retaliatory measures available to the U.S. administration are very limited.
The options referred to include canceling the president’s travel plans to the G-8 Summit in Sochi in June, the restoration of the G-7 and thus the exclusion of Russia from an informal forum for international discussions, the suspension of negotiations on a trade agreement and the deployment of warships in the Black Sea.
Similar options were presented to President Bush in 2008 during the Russian military intervention in Georgia. American ships had then traveled the Black Sea, and discussions of Russian-American cooperation in the civil nuclear field were interrupted, relations with NATO were suspended and the U.S. Army had even repatriated Georgian forces operating in Iraq to Tbilisi.
What was the result? Sure, the Russian troops did not enter the Georgian capital. But because they did not leave the areas they were told to evacuate in accordance with the cease-fire, they secured the de facto independence of the two rebel provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for six years.
In addition, as of 2009 the relative diplomatic isolation of Moscow had ended. Newly elected to the White House, Barack Obama made the renewal of the relationship between Washington and Moscow one of the priorities of his foreign policy.
Thus, the case of Georgia shows that the effectiveness of any retaliatory measures envisaged by Washington is uncertain at best, if not at zero. All this, and the mention by Vladimir Putin that he is ready to accept any costs to his decisions if he considers that they serve national interests. And Barack Obama does not have special credibility when it comes to getting tough when dealing with leaders who are a bit headstrong.
The Russian president certainly has not forgotten that his American counterpart gave up enforcing his "red lines" when he didn’t launch a military operation against the regime of Bashar Assad, who used chemical weapons against his population in August 2013.
Ukraine Should Not Distract Obama's Foreign Policy Objectives
If Barack Obama seems unable to bend Vladimir Putin regarding the case of Ukraine, it would be wise to prevent a cooling in relations between the United States and Russia.
Washington must, in fact, rely on the cooperation of Moscow in much larger cases: Syria, the fight against proliferation and toward the reduction of nuclear arsenals, North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan.
Ukraine is not a member of the European Union or NATO. There is therefore no reason that President Obama would take the risk of any confrontation with Moscow.
For the latter, Ukraine — and Crimea — is of major importance from a historical and strategic perspective, as well as the presence of large Russian-speaking minorities.
Moreover, despite the current demonstrations of support and calls for Russian intervention on the part of the people of eastern and southern Ukraine, it is not assumed that a form of occupation or annexation by Moscow would be easily accepted. A nationalist background and the tensions between different communities may indeed be a source of serious problems for the Russian forces.
Washington would be well advised to seriously consider the parameters of an acceptable Russian influence in Ukraine — even including a form of annexation of Crimea — in exchange for the constructive cooperation of Moscow on the issues outlined above.
Such is the price, however modest: Barack Obama must agree to pay for the results of major issues in foreign policy.