The Heteronyms of America
Published in Diario De Noticias
(Portugal) on 3 March 2014
by Bernardo Pires De Lima (link to
original)
We can summarize the analyses of U.S. action in the Ukrainian crisis into three schools of thought. The first emphasizes the chronic weakness of this administration in dealing with the great questions of international security. This analysis takes into account the inconsistency of the strategy in Afghanistan, the "red lines" in Syria, and the lack of response to the Russian intrusion into Crimea. Many see the passivity in Obama as a return to Jimmy Carter, lying down as Brezhnev invaded Afghanistan.
The second defends Obama’s prudence in following a medium-term roadmap, which forces Putin to show everyone all the cards on which his regime is founded. Or perhaps, by supposedly permitting the predictable actions of Moscow, he isolates Putin with a cord of international consensus without precedent. In this way, he can threaten coordinated sanctions with the EU to achieve an advantage in negotiations with the Kremlin. This instigates more protests within Russia, deprives it of integration into the G-8 and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, accelerates alternatives to European energy policy, and recovers something of the Euro-Atlantic coordination tainted by the wire-tapping case.
The third recognizes Washington's loss of influence in European politics, a predisposition on the part of Obama to not confront the large powers and the necessity to work closely with Moscow on three questions of the highest priority to Obama: stopping nuclear Iran; controlling Assad and extremism in the region; withdrawing without incident from Afghanistan.
All have valid arguments and their mixture can help to better explain the foreign policy of Obama. But is it accepted and noticed by the Americans? Could an inconsistent commander-in-chief have an impact on Congressional election in November? On top of all the confusion from Obamacare and the disillusionment with the promised political and financial change, any argument serves to corral Obama. It may seem paradoxical, but Putin may be the ally that the Republicans needed.
The second defends Obama’s prudence in following a medium-term roadmap, which forces Putin to show everyone all the cards on which his regime is founded. Or perhaps, by supposedly permitting the predictable actions of Moscow, he isolates Putin with a cord of international consensus without precedent. In this way, he can threaten coordinated sanctions with the EU to achieve an advantage in negotiations with the Kremlin. This instigates more protests within Russia, deprives it of integration into the G-8 and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, accelerates alternatives to European energy policy, and recovers something of the Euro-Atlantic coordination tainted by the wire-tapping case.
The third recognizes Washington's loss of influence in European politics, a predisposition on the part of Obama to not confront the large powers and the necessity to work closely with Moscow on three questions of the highest priority to Obama: stopping nuclear Iran; controlling Assad and extremism in the region; withdrawing without incident from Afghanistan.
All have valid arguments and their mixture can help to better explain the foreign policy of Obama. But is it accepted and noticed by the Americans? Could an inconsistent commander-in-chief have an impact on Congressional election in November? On top of all the confusion from Obamacare and the disillusionment with the promised political and financial change, any argument serves to corral Obama. It may seem paradoxical, but Putin may be the ally that the Republicans needed.