Why Barzani Cannot Be Blamed
Everything that is currently going on in Iraq appears to be the logical outcome of a situation that has been developing for decades, that is, since the founding of the state of Iraq after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the bloody coup against the monarchy during this time of year in 1958. The monarchic regime came to an end in a tragic way, in a serious attempt to bring Iraqis together, regardless of denomination, sect or ethnicity, in the context of a state that to a large extent preserves the social fabric of the country.
In light of what Iraq has gone through since its inception, it is only natural that this morning, Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, would bring up the topic of establishing an independent Kurdish state. What seems even more natural is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's opposition to Barzani's proposal, considering that al-Maliki has never brought anything new to Iraq. Perhaps the one new thing he brought was the implementation of a totalitarian regime, this time with a sectarian twist. Among the direct results of this [sectarian twist] is the complete breakdown of national cooperation and the elimination of what was left of the bonds that tied Iraqis together in the framework of a modern state under the rule of law, and nothing else besides the law.
The unnatural part is the American administration's opposition to the proposal of the president of the Kurdistan region, who agreed in 2002 to jump on board the war train aimed at taking out Saddam Hussein's Baath family regime, under certain conditions.
Chief among these conditions was the inception of a democratic regime in Iraq, not a clone of the Iranian regime. In more explicit terms, there was an agreement between components of the Iraqi opposition, which held a series of meetings and conferences before the American military operation was executed, with Iran's participation, to establish a secular state in Iraq in place of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and the one-party system.
Eleven years after the big change that happened in Iraq, the Kurds discovered that Iraq was still the same place. The sectarian Dawa Party took the place of the Baath Party, which is ostensibly secular. The Kurds did not participate in the war, nor the political processes that followed it, because of which they became, once again, victims of the person in power in Baghdad. It was clear from the beginning that their goal was to reach an arrangement under which they would be allowed to be partners in power, not simply subordinates to al-Maliki who, in time, became a subordinate of Iran.
From this standpoint, it is evident that the American opposition to Masoud Barzani's move is out of place. What we have to remember is that Barzani was convinced to join and participate in America's meetings after receiving certain guarantees that al-Maliki breached. In other words, the Americans' problem is, at the end of the day, with the Iraqi prime minister, who did not manage to deal with all sectors of Iraqi society, nor in any way with Masoud Barzani and the Kurds.
It would have been possible to take advantage of the time — over 10 years now — to solve the pending problems between Baghdad on the one hand and the Kurds on the other. There was an opportunity for this, if Baghdad had thoroughly accepted the idea of peaceful transition of power instead of one party having a monopoly on it. This would have meant, of course, respect for those in charge of the regime at any given time, and Iraq would have been a "federal" state. That is what was provided in the agreement that the opposition parties reached at the conference held in London in December 2002 under American-Iranian sponsorship, in which Masoud Barzani participated.
After Saddam Hussein's fall, the Kurds learned that al-Maliki does not want to read the text of the agreement that the opposition reached except for one term: "the Shiite majority in Iraq." This is a term that the Iranian side insisted on for certain groups, among them the "Supreme Council," to be allowed to participate in the conference in London.
The Kurdish side took advantage of the uprising in the Sunni-majority areas in Iraq in order to put its hand on Kirkuk. In reality, it improved its positions in the disputed city. After the fall of Mosul and al-Maliki's loss of control over it, the Kurds proposed the idea of Kurdish independence.
Masoud Barzani would not have taken such a step if he had not lost all hope in al-Maliki, who, on his own, has become sufficient cause to break apart Iraq and rip what was left of its social fabric under the banner of the "order of law," which is the farthest thing from my understanding of order of law.
The U.S. administration has no right to blame Masoud Barzani in any way. He was the first one, even before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, to call for avoiding revenge. He called for tolerance, unlike al-Maliki, whose movement was nothing other than primitive revenge in a purely sectarian spirit. Saddam Hussein was not executed for Iraqi reasons. He was executed for outright sectarian reasons related to the "Dawa's" disappointment, and an issue particular to the party — the Dujail affair — wherein the late Iraqi dictator was the target of an assassination attempt in the early ‘80s at the beginning of the long war between Iraq and Iran.
The Americans refuse to recognize that al-Maliki's failure to bring Iraqis together under one umbrella is a failure on the part of Washington first and foremost. The Americans bear the responsibility for this failure through and through.
If the matter were up to the Kurds, they would have preferred to be a part of a united Iraq, benefiting from its resources like all other Iraqis. But what can be done when equality between citizens is nonexistent and citizenship becomes a class in the shadow of a regime ranked as one of the most corrupt on the face of the earth?
In such a case, does the U.S. administration, which insists on its role in getting rid of Nouri al-Maliki, have any room to give lessons and advice to anyone, including the Kurds?
What we are seeing today is the extraordinary result of years of denominational and sectarian practices perpetrated by al-Maliki by joining the war that the Syrian regime is launching against its people on a sectarian basis. That being the case, what are the Kurds waiting for? Isn't their opportunism justified after everything they have suffered over the last century, even overlooking the fact that it was established in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which stated that they are a nation among the others nations of the region and that they deserve the same as the others?
The author is a Lebanese media personality.
In light of what Iraq has gone through since its inception, it is only natural that this morning, Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan region, would bring up the topic of establishing an independent Kurdish state. What seems even more natural is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's opposition to Barzani's proposal, considering that al-Maliki has never brought anything new to Iraq. Perhaps the one new thing he brought was the implementation of a totalitarian regime, this time with a sectarian twist. Among the direct results of this [sectarian twist] is the complete breakdown of national cooperation and the elimination of what was left of the bonds that tied Iraqis together in the framework of a modern state under the rule of law, and nothing else besides the law.
The unnatural part is the American administration's opposition to the proposal of the president of the Kurdistan region, who agreed in 2002 to jump on board the war train aimed at taking out Saddam Hussein's Baath family regime, under certain conditions.
Chief among these conditions was the inception of a democratic regime in Iraq, not a clone of the Iranian regime. In more explicit terms, there was an agreement between components of the Iraqi opposition, which held a series of meetings and conferences before the American military operation was executed, with Iran's participation, to establish a secular state in Iraq in place of Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and the one-party system.
Eleven years after the big change that happened in Iraq, the Kurds discovered that Iraq was still the same place. The sectarian Dawa Party took the place of the Baath Party, which is ostensibly secular. The Kurds did not participate in the war, nor the political processes that followed it, because of which they became, once again, victims of the person in power in Baghdad. It was clear from the beginning that their goal was to reach an arrangement under which they would be allowed to be partners in power, not simply subordinates to al-Maliki who, in time, became a subordinate of Iran.
From this standpoint, it is evident that the American opposition to Masoud Barzani's move is out of place. What we have to remember is that Barzani was convinced to join and participate in America's meetings after receiving certain guarantees that al-Maliki breached. In other words, the Americans' problem is, at the end of the day, with the Iraqi prime minister, who did not manage to deal with all sectors of Iraqi society, nor in any way with Masoud Barzani and the Kurds.
It would have been possible to take advantage of the time — over 10 years now — to solve the pending problems between Baghdad on the one hand and the Kurds on the other. There was an opportunity for this, if Baghdad had thoroughly accepted the idea of peaceful transition of power instead of one party having a monopoly on it. This would have meant, of course, respect for those in charge of the regime at any given time, and Iraq would have been a "federal" state. That is what was provided in the agreement that the opposition parties reached at the conference held in London in December 2002 under American-Iranian sponsorship, in which Masoud Barzani participated.
After Saddam Hussein's fall, the Kurds learned that al-Maliki does not want to read the text of the agreement that the opposition reached except for one term: "the Shiite majority in Iraq." This is a term that the Iranian side insisted on for certain groups, among them the "Supreme Council," to be allowed to participate in the conference in London.
The Kurdish side took advantage of the uprising in the Sunni-majority areas in Iraq in order to put its hand on Kirkuk. In reality, it improved its positions in the disputed city. After the fall of Mosul and al-Maliki's loss of control over it, the Kurds proposed the idea of Kurdish independence.
Masoud Barzani would not have taken such a step if he had not lost all hope in al-Maliki, who, on his own, has become sufficient cause to break apart Iraq and rip what was left of its social fabric under the banner of the "order of law," which is the farthest thing from my understanding of order of law.
The U.S. administration has no right to blame Masoud Barzani in any way. He was the first one, even before the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, to call for avoiding revenge. He called for tolerance, unlike al-Maliki, whose movement was nothing other than primitive revenge in a purely sectarian spirit. Saddam Hussein was not executed for Iraqi reasons. He was executed for outright sectarian reasons related to the "Dawa's" disappointment, and an issue particular to the party — the Dujail affair — wherein the late Iraqi dictator was the target of an assassination attempt in the early ‘80s at the beginning of the long war between Iraq and Iran.
The Americans refuse to recognize that al-Maliki's failure to bring Iraqis together under one umbrella is a failure on the part of Washington first and foremost. The Americans bear the responsibility for this failure through and through.
If the matter were up to the Kurds, they would have preferred to be a part of a united Iraq, benefiting from its resources like all other Iraqis. But what can be done when equality between citizens is nonexistent and citizenship becomes a class in the shadow of a regime ranked as one of the most corrupt on the face of the earth?
In such a case, does the U.S. administration, which insists on its role in getting rid of Nouri al-Maliki, have any room to give lessons and advice to anyone, including the Kurds?
What we are seeing today is the extraordinary result of years of denominational and sectarian practices perpetrated by al-Maliki by joining the war that the Syrian regime is launching against its people on a sectarian basis. That being the case, what are the Kurds waiting for? Isn't their opportunism justified after everything they have suffered over the last century, even overlooking the fact that it was established in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which stated that they are a nation among the others nations of the region and that they deserve the same as the others?
The author is a Lebanese media personality.