Military Competition Between the US and China is a Clear and Present Danger
Since the end of last year, American foreign policy in the South China Sea has undergone significant adjustments, particularly in the development of America’s strategic approach to Chinese military affairs. One such example is the establishment of five new military bases in the Philippines. This new development is in addition to America’s previous naval encroachments in the region, which includes the deployment of marines in Australia’s Darwin Bay and the deployment of Littoral Combat Ships and anti-submarine patrol aircraft. All such military advances make up the first steps in America’s offshore containment of China.
Secondly, along with the normalization of battleship and aircraft deployment, the political climate in the South China Sea has gone from stability and peace to tense opposition. For a long time now, the American military has viewed the South China Sea as a crucial area for marine passage, with naval ships rarely requiring long-term detainment while traversing the region. This year, however, U.S. forces celebrated a major change. In the past three months, the U.S. military successfully normalized the deployment of a team of aircraft carriers in the region. Specifically, this June the USS John C. Stennis CVN-74 and the USS Ronald Reagan CVN-76 convened in the South China Sea.
Thirdly, under the pretense of “Freedom of Navigation,” the U.S. has challenged Chinese autonomy and security.
Fourthly, U.S.-China military affairs have been further complicated due to American forged alliances with ASEAN nations, causing further marginalization in China and furthering the construction of certain U.S.-led Asia-Pacific “security mechanisms.” U.S. claims of “enhancing regional security” have been used as grounds to affirm the country’s self-appointed position of leadership throughout the region. Specifically, the problem of authority in the South China Sea has been an important starting point for U.S. partnerships with ASEAN countries and encouraging cooperation and support of American interests in the region.
These circumstances make it apparent that U.S. policy in the South China Sea has undergone a significant adjustment, from not supporting China’s position in the area to acts of open aggression and provocation, and from prioritizing diplomatic methods or resolution to relying mainly on military methods.
This substantial alteration of American foreign policy, which involves the territorial sovereignty of China and conflicts of interest for peripheral countries in the region, has taken the issue from being one of strategic scheming between China and the U.S. to a local problem for the South China Sea region, and has now culminated in a substantial strategic problem that directly impacts the secure development of China overall. This change in U.S. approach is directed at both the time sensitive nature of the current situation in the South China Sea and is also part of its deep consideration of the long-term value in consolidating its position of leadership in the South China Sea. Correspondingly, the outcome of this strategy will have a far-reaching impact on U.S.-China relations as well.
Although exchange and cooperation between the U.S. and China is still an important method, this aspect of risk management is no longer enough to avoid an outburst. Communication between countries, mutually beneficial cooperation and risk management; these are the three primary methods of developing constructive military relations between the U.S. and China. In these past two years, the two countries have made obvious headway, but due to significant disagreements on some fundamental issues, meaningful interchanges between the two militaries have been difficult to achieve.
Let us approach the situation from the perspective of cooperation in U.S.-China military affairs. In recent years, there have been breakthroughs on all fronts of the U.S.-China military alliance. However, due to a lack of mutual trust in terms of both nations’ military strategies, the foundation of this cooperation remains extremely fragile. A mutual interest in managing potential conflict between the two countries is a common foundation for cooperation and agreement. Both sides are equally invested in doing their utmost to avoid future military conflict. Although the situation in the South China Sea has been heating up, there have been no instances of collision between vessels, indicating that the navies of both countries have diligently adhered to previously agreed upon standards of conduct.
Secondly, although the likelihood of a military conflict between the U.S. and China is not great, the possibility of conflict resulting friction due to a “third party factor” has noticeably increased. In recent years, as we look closer at U.S.-China regional strategy, this kind of “third party factor” has gone from the rapid expansion of the Taiwan problem to the Korean Peninsula, as well as problems involving the East and South China Sea.
Though the U.S. claims to not take sides in conflicts regarding territorial claims to the Diaoyu Islands and the Spratley Islands, it has simultaneously collaborated with ASEAN ally countries to conduct “island seizing” exercises. Furthermore, while the U.S. claims to oppose altering Taiwan’s current situation, at the same time it has increased Taiwanese military capability and strengthened capital for the “Taiwan Independence Movement,” a movement that pushes to significantly alter current circumstances. Such “third party factors” result in heightened risks of unforeseen scenarios in addition to mutual distrust and unease in regards to both countries’ overarching political strategies. Furthermore, in such a complicated situation, it becomes extremely easy to make interpretive errors and errors in judgment.
Secondly, U.S.-Chinese security is an increasingly difficult issue, particularly as the two nations fall into pertinent methods of preparation for military conflict. Looking to the long-term, the basis of American Chinese policy is to “keep in contact” and “keep on guard.” China’s policy toward the U.S. is that of “cooperation” and “struggle”; both emphasize a hands-on approach with equally prominent attitudes of both competition and cooperation.
But the current state of unrest in the South China Sea continues unabated, inevitably adding to competition and opposition between the U.S. and China. If we expand our outlook to the Eastern Pacific region as a whole, there has been a noteworthy increase in Chinese military deployment as a response to U.S. action, as well as a strengthening of its system of allies to address concerns of Japanese interests. Correspondingly, the U.S. harbors fears that China is engaging in political strategies of “anti-access” and “territorial denial.” If this momentum continues to develop, the U.S. and China will slide further into confrontational military preparation and competition, to the extent that the continuation of such military developments are undoubtedly a pressing cause for concern.
The author is the director of Military Studies at the Research Center for Chinese American Defensive Relations
Secondly, along with the normalization of battleship and aircraft deployment, the political climate in the South China Sea has gone from stability and peace to tense opposition. For a long time now, the American military has viewed the South China Sea as a crucial area for marine passage, with naval ships rarely requiring long-term detainment while traversing the region. This year, however, U.S. forces celebrated a major change. In the past three months, the U.S. military successfully normalized the deployment of a team of aircraft carriers in the region. Specifically, this June the USS John C. Stennis CVN-74 and the USS Ronald Reagan CVN-76 convened in the South China Sea.
Thirdly, under the pretense of “Freedom of Navigation,” the U.S. has challenged Chinese autonomy and security.
Fourthly, U.S.-China military affairs have been further complicated due to American forged alliances with ASEAN nations, causing further marginalization in China and furthering the construction of certain U.S.-led Asia-Pacific “security mechanisms.” U.S. claims of “enhancing regional security” have been used as grounds to affirm the country’s self-appointed position of leadership throughout the region. Specifically, the problem of authority in the South China Sea has been an important starting point for U.S. partnerships with ASEAN countries and encouraging cooperation and support of American interests in the region.
These circumstances make it apparent that U.S. policy in the South China Sea has undergone a significant adjustment, from not supporting China’s position in the area to acts of open aggression and provocation, and from prioritizing diplomatic methods or resolution to relying mainly on military methods.
This substantial alteration of American foreign policy, which involves the territorial sovereignty of China and conflicts of interest for peripheral countries in the region, has taken the issue from being one of strategic scheming between China and the U.S. to a local problem for the South China Sea region, and has now culminated in a substantial strategic problem that directly impacts the secure development of China overall. This change in U.S. approach is directed at both the time sensitive nature of the current situation in the South China Sea and is also part of its deep consideration of the long-term value in consolidating its position of leadership in the South China Sea. Correspondingly, the outcome of this strategy will have a far-reaching impact on U.S.-China relations as well.
Although exchange and cooperation between the U.S. and China is still an important method, this aspect of risk management is no longer enough to avoid an outburst. Communication between countries, mutually beneficial cooperation and risk management; these are the three primary methods of developing constructive military relations between the U.S. and China. In these past two years, the two countries have made obvious headway, but due to significant disagreements on some fundamental issues, meaningful interchanges between the two militaries have been difficult to achieve.
Let us approach the situation from the perspective of cooperation in U.S.-China military affairs. In recent years, there have been breakthroughs on all fronts of the U.S.-China military alliance. However, due to a lack of mutual trust in terms of both nations’ military strategies, the foundation of this cooperation remains extremely fragile. A mutual interest in managing potential conflict between the two countries is a common foundation for cooperation and agreement. Both sides are equally invested in doing their utmost to avoid future military conflict. Although the situation in the South China Sea has been heating up, there have been no instances of collision between vessels, indicating that the navies of both countries have diligently adhered to previously agreed upon standards of conduct.
Secondly, although the likelihood of a military conflict between the U.S. and China is not great, the possibility of conflict resulting friction due to a “third party factor” has noticeably increased. In recent years, as we look closer at U.S.-China regional strategy, this kind of “third party factor” has gone from the rapid expansion of the Taiwan problem to the Korean Peninsula, as well as problems involving the East and South China Sea.
Though the U.S. claims to not take sides in conflicts regarding territorial claims to the Diaoyu Islands and the Spratley Islands, it has simultaneously collaborated with ASEAN ally countries to conduct “island seizing” exercises. Furthermore, while the U.S. claims to oppose altering Taiwan’s current situation, at the same time it has increased Taiwanese military capability and strengthened capital for the “Taiwan Independence Movement,” a movement that pushes to significantly alter current circumstances. Such “third party factors” result in heightened risks of unforeseen scenarios in addition to mutual distrust and unease in regards to both countries’ overarching political strategies. Furthermore, in such a complicated situation, it becomes extremely easy to make interpretive errors and errors in judgment.
Secondly, U.S.-Chinese security is an increasingly difficult issue, particularly as the two nations fall into pertinent methods of preparation for military conflict. Looking to the long-term, the basis of American Chinese policy is to “keep in contact” and “keep on guard.” China’s policy toward the U.S. is that of “cooperation” and “struggle”; both emphasize a hands-on approach with equally prominent attitudes of both competition and cooperation.
But the current state of unrest in the South China Sea continues unabated, inevitably adding to competition and opposition between the U.S. and China. If we expand our outlook to the Eastern Pacific region as a whole, there has been a noteworthy increase in Chinese military deployment as a response to U.S. action, as well as a strengthening of its system of allies to address concerns of Japanese interests. Correspondingly, the U.S. harbors fears that China is engaging in political strategies of “anti-access” and “territorial denial.” If this momentum continues to develop, the U.S. and China will slide further into confrontational military preparation and competition, to the extent that the continuation of such military developments are undoubtedly a pressing cause for concern.
The author is the director of Military Studies at the Research Center for Chinese American Defensive Relations
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