With his predisposition toward Latin American style strongman rule, Trump could well be tempted by authoritarianism, especially when he sees that his populist measures, if that is the route he takes, don’t work in the medium and long term.
The imminence of the transition of power in Washington has everyone on edge, expecting a “reality” that will repel and attract.* A few deceive themselves about it; some because they have a gut feeling about liking Trump, some because they are anti-American and would like to see the U.S. stumble and then be left wringing its hands, as though China (or perhaps neo-czarist Russia) might promise a paradise on earth. In fact, it is common to believe that an election will radically change things. We remember when the election of Barack Obama promised something completely new. We now see the benefits that his administration brought – and there are more than a few of them – in the United States’ continuing dynamism, rather than in one spectacular project (we do crave spectacles). Or when it is said that Europe has turned to the right or to the left after a couple of elections, that there is no turning back now, and so forth. And then with the next tick of the clock, that assertion is contradicted.
This doesn’t mean that demagogues don’t sometimes keep their word and open the floodgates to adventurism or more, as with Hitler in 1933; those who supported him in the decisive final step bragged that they had him under control, well under control. Things took their natural course.
Certainly, Trump is not Hitler, and the U.S. is not the Weimar Republic. Rather, it is a 240-year-old political tradition, one of the paradigms of modernity, with institutional resilience; its agencies and services (I’m speaking Chilean here) are autonomous to a degree that would be unimaginable for us. Senators are hugely influential, although they talk a lot about how it’s not like it used to be in the era of Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater. Biennial elections almost always weaken the incumbent president, especially at midterm. And all the wonderful promises that were made come crashing into reality. But if the administration starts keeping some of those promises, the Federal Reserve may have to narrow its margin. And this is the landscape seen from an optimistic point of view.
There may also be another possibility. With his predisposition toward Latin American style strongman rule, Trump could well be tempted by authoritarianism, especially when he sees that his populist measures, if that is the route he takes, don’t work in the medium and long term. He might slide down the slope of adventurism, along with his principles. Earlier in the campaign, he showed three traits that are characteristic of the erosion of a commitment to constitutionality: not unequivocally condemning the use of violence; showing contempt for certain civil liberties; and denying the legitimacy of the process (unless he wins). Already as president-elect, he has doubled down on some of these traits, as he has doubled down on discrediting certain institutions and refusing even to discuss the basis for his beliefs. These points have been raised recently by Harvard professors Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt in The New York Times. Democracies live by rules by which everyone abides, even though they are unwritten. The disdain for tradition and for accepted ways, if it becomes a systematic attitude, will, in the end, erode the foundation of the democracy.
There’s more. Obama, and even more so George W. Bush, gathered power in the presidency around issues of security and the right to intervene militarily, in such a way that the War Powers Act of 1973 – which limited the legal capacity of the president to start or protract a conflict – has been eclipsed. This has consequences not only internationally, but also for the rule of law domestically. It depends as well on the president’s level-headedness. A reckless president could use it as a legal loophole (we Chileans know something about those); in the hands of an exceptional president, it might become the norm. Democracy has a mysterious persistence and strength, but it is not unlimited. We’ll see what happens.
*Editor’s note: This article was written prior to Donald Trump’s inauguration as president on Jan. 20, 2017 but its perspective remains relevant.
Trump, ¿ahora qué?
"Con los aprestos de un caudillo latinoamericano que tiene, bien podría tentarse por el autoritarismo, sobre todo cuando vea que sus medidas populistas, si es que las toma, son contraproducentes en el mediano y largo plazo...".
El mercurio (Chile)
Por Joaquín Fermandois
17 de enero de 2017
La inminencia del cambio de mando en Washington tiene al mundo en vilo, a la expectativa de un reality que repele y atrae; unos pocos se ilusionan, ya sea porque les gusta Trump desde las entrañas o porque comparten la fobia antinorteamericana y acarician la idea de que EE.UU. dará tumbos y por lo tanto habría que frotarse las manos, como si China (y quizás el neozarismo de Rusia) prometiera un mundo angelical. En fin, es común creer que con una elección las cosas van a cambiar de manera radical; recordemos que la elección de Obama prometía algo completamente nuevo; los beneficios que trajo su administración -no son pocos- los percibimos en que EE.UU. ha continuado con su dinamismo, y no en un proyecto espectacular (nos apetecen los espectáculos). O cuando se dice que Europa giró a la derecha o a la izquierda por un par de elecciones, que ya no hay vuelta atrás, etc. Y al siguiente recodo del tiempo la afirmación es desmentida.
Ello no quiere decir que a veces los demagogos cumplen con su palabra y abren las compuertas del aventurerismo, o algo más, como Hitler en 1933; quienes lo apoyaron en el decisivo salto final se jactaban de que lo tenían atado y bien atado. Las cosas siguieron su curso.
Decididamente Trump no es Hitler y EE.UU. no es Weimar, sino que una tradición política de 240 años, uno de los paradigmas de la modernidad con reciedumbre institucional; ministerios y servicios (hablo en chileno) poseen una autonomía inimaginable para nuestras categorías. Los senadores tienen un peso enorme, aunque se habla mucho de que ya no es el de antes, de la época de Lyndon Johnson y Barry Goldwater. Las elecciones cada dos años debilitan casi siempre al Presidente de turno, en especial las que caen dentro de un período presidencial ( midterm ). Y el cuadro maravilloso de promesas se estrellará contra la realidad; si se pone a emitir, la Reserva Federal le va a acotar su margen. Este es el panorama mirado desde el optimismo.
Cabe también la otra posibilidad. Con los aprestos de un caudillo latinoamericano que tiene, bien podría tentarse por el autoritarismo, sobre todo cuando vea que sus medidas populistas, si es que las toma, son contraproducentes en el mediano y largo plazo. Se deslizaría por la pendiente del aventurerismo con las normas. Ya en la campaña demostró tres rasgos que son propios de la degradación constitucional: no condenar de manera unívoca el uso de la violencia; menosprecio por algunas libertades públicas, y la negación de la legitimidad del proceso (salvo que gane). Ya como Presidente electo ha reforzado algunas características suyas, como desprestigiar las instituciones más allá de la deliberación. Estos puntos los han expuesto recientemente los profesores de Harvard Steven Levitsky y Daniel Ziblatt en el New York Times. Las democracias viven de reglas no escritas pero acatadas conscientemente por todos. El desdén por la tradición y por las formas, si se convierte en actitud sistemática, al final erosiona la base intangible de la democracia.
Hay más. Obama y antes sobre todo Bush acumularon poderes en la presidencia en torno a la seguridad y al derecho de intervención militar, de manera que la Ley de Poderes de Guerra de 1973 -que limitaba la capacidad legal del Ejecutivo de provocar o arrastrarse a un conflicto- ha sido eclipsada. Esto no solo tiene consecuencias internacionales, sino también para el Estado de Derecho interno. Depende además de la ecuanimidad del Presidente. Uno que sea temerario lo puede emplear como resquicio legal (algo sabemos); lo excepcional se convierte en norma. La democracia tiene una persistencia y fortaleza misteriosa, pero no es ilimitada. Veremos qué sucede.
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link
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These countries ... have demonstrated that moral courage can coexist with diplomacy and that choosing humanity over expediency carries weight on the international stage.