Biden’s China Policy: Détente, Strategic Competition and Trade

Published in UDN
(Taiwan) on 7 November 2020
by (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Pinyu Hwang. Edited by Olivia Parker.
Beijing is very concerned about the U.S. election, as the outcome of the election will have profound impacts on U.S.-China relations and China's future developments. However, some believe that no matter who is elected, the United States' trend of containment and confrontation with China will not change. With Joe Biden's victory certain, U.S.-China relations will go through a period of détente following Donald Trump's departure. The next two years will be critical for Xi Jinping in his quest to reach the pinnacle of power by the Chinese Communist Party's 20th Congress, and he must handle U.S.-China relations with care. Biden's victory is a reset button, and Beijing must seize this opportunity.

Biden has some personal ties to Xi. Over a period of a year and a half starting in 2011, Xi, then already the CCP's heir apparent, met with then-Vice President Biden no fewer than eight times. Biden has also said, "I've spent more time with Xi Jinping ... than any world leader has." However, Biden will not return to Barack Obama's "engagement policy" with China once he becomes president: He will not be Obama 2.0. In fact, already in the second half of Obama's second term, engagement with China had proven ineffective, and China had become a long-term strategic threat to the United States.

This is the critical element of the Thucydides Trap: the inevitable tension between a rising power and an already-existing one. This tension will not change much because of the leaders' personal relationships or the new U.S. administration's honeymoon period with Beijing. The Biden administration will respond to China's rise more effectively, and as strategic competition intensifies, the chances of a clash between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait will not decline.

After Biden is elected, the first target for observation is whether the current Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia—what has been called the "Asian NATO"—will take shape as scheduled. Writing on foreign policy in Foreign Affairs magazine earlier this year, Biden argued that the most effective way to meet the China challenge is to build a united front of U.S. allies and partners. Biden would restore the U.S. commitment to NATO; that is, he would likely continue the formation of "Asian NATO" and even continue Trump's national security strategy of treating China and Russia as strategic competitors.

However, in addition to confrontation, Biden's rise to power will also bring cooperation. Looking at the recent economic and trade trends between China and the U.S., China has been stepping up imports from the U.S. since July, and by the end of October, purchases from the U.S. had already amounted to $23 billion, or 71% of the pledged amount, with U.S. cattle and pig products reaching record highs. In doing so, it is not so much that China is campaigning for Trump as it is Beijing shifting to a peaceful, low-key approach to prevent the U.S.-China relationship from deteriorating out of control. The U.S. secretary of agriculture has also called the first phase of the U.S.-China trade agreement a "huge success" for the U.S. economy.

This shows that in the end there is, in fact, a limit to the economic and trade confrontation between the U.S. and China. More and more people are beginning to reconsider whether Trump's tariff war and decoupling war are really good for the U.S. economy. China's gross domestic policy grew by 4.9% in the third quarter of this year and may grow by 5% in the fourth quarter. In contrast, the U.S. economy is still in a slump, and it appears that in order to promote the recovery of the U.S. economy, economic cooperation between the two nations must be quickly accelerated.

Biden does not approve of Trump's economic clash with China, saying that Trump has been using the wrong approach in his trade war. This has been interpreted as a possible revisiting of the tariffs on China. His foreign policy adviser, Tony Blinken, has said that decoupling from China is not an effective solution, and the Democratic Party platform has also argued against a one-sided tariff war that would only hurt American workers. Biden wishes to keep long-term considerations in mind and focus on a win-win system of cooperation in the new international environment. For this, cooperation with China on global issues is essential. In particular, there is a lot of room for cooperation between the two countries on climate change and prevention of pandemics.

In this election, many people, from Taiwan and Hong Kong to the U.S, rooted for Trump's reelection, mainly because of his tough attitude toward Beijing, on many occasions making things difficult for the CCP. This mentality is not so much a sign of support for Trump as it is a sign of strong dissatisfaction with the CCP officials’ disregard for freedom and human rights, and thus these people are comforted by Trump's actions checking the CCP's power. This expectation will be projected on Biden when he takes office. In fact, the Democrats place more emphasis on democracy and human rights than the Republicans, and Biden once described Xi as a man who "doesn't have a democratic bone in his body." For Beijing, a U.S. administration that has a firm stance on democracy and human rights is much trickier to handle than a military or trade war.




北京對這次美國大選極為關注,因為選舉結果影響美中關係及中國發展相當深遠;但也有人認為,無論誰當選,美國遏制及對抗中國的態勢不會改變。如今拜登幾已篤定當選,美中關係將隨川普下台出現一段和緩期,未來兩年是習近平走向「廿大」權力頂峰的關鍵期,他必須處理好美中關係;拜登上台是一個重設按鈕,北京必須抓住機會。

拜登與習近平間存在一些私人交情。二○一一年起的一年半間,已是「儲君」的習近平和當時的副總統拜登至少見過八次面。拜登也說,「我與習近平相處的時間,超過任何一個世界領導人」。然而,拜登上任總統後,不會重回歐巴馬對中的「交往政策」,他將不是歐巴馬2.0版的總統。事實上,在歐巴馬的第二任期後半,與中國交往已證明無效,大陸已成為美國的長期戰略威脅。

這是「修昔底德陷阱」的結構性因素:崛起的強權與守成的強權之間,必然會有的緊張關係。這項緊張,不會因為領導人的私人關係,或是美國新政府與北京的蜜月期,而有太大改變。拜登政府將以更有效的手段來應對中國崛起,而隨著戰略競爭加劇,中美在南海或台海發生衝撞的機會也不會下降。

拜登當選後,第一個觀察的指標是,目前的「美日印澳四方安全對話」─即所謂的「亞洲北約」,是否會如期形成?拜登年初在《外交事務》上撰文闡述外交政策說:應對中國挑戰的最有效方式,是建立一個美國盟友及合作夥伴的統一戰線。拜登既將恢復美國對北約的承諾,即有可能繼續「亞洲北約」的組建,甚至延續川普的國安策略,把中國與俄羅斯視為戰略競爭者。

但除了對抗,拜登上台後,還會有合作的一面。觀察最近的中美經貿趨勢,中國大陸在七月後加緊自美國進口,至十月下旬採購金額已高達二三○億美元,達到承諾金額的七一%,美國牛豬產品均創下歷史新高。中方這麼做,與其說是替川普助選,不如說是北京轉向和平低調,以防止美中關係惡化到不可收拾。美國農業部長還稱,中美首階段貿易協定,對美國經濟已是「巨大成功」。

由此可見,美中的經貿對抗畢竟有其極限。越來越多人開始檢討,川普的「關稅戰」和「脫鉤戰」是否真有益於美國經濟。中國今年第三季GDP成長四・九%,第四季可能成長五%,對比美國經濟仍深陷泥沼,恐需加深加快兩國經濟合作才能促進美國經濟復甦。

拜登對川普與中國的經濟衝突並不以為然,他認為川普的貿易戰「用錯方法」;這點,被解讀為可能重新審視對中關稅。他的外交顧問布林肯說,與中國「脫鉤」並不是好辦法;而民主黨黨綱也認為不該片面展開關稅戰,這只會傷害美國勞工。拜登尤其希望把眼光放遠,聚焦新國際環境中的合作雙贏,為此,必須在全球問題上與中國合作;尤其在氣候變遷和防疫上,兩國合作空間很大。

這次選戰中,從台港到美國有很多華人希望川普能夠連任,主要因素是川普敢對北京態度強硬,屢屢出招讓中共難堪。這種心理,與其說是對川普的支持,不如說是對中共高層漠視自由和人權強烈不滿,因而樂見川普制衡。拜登上台後,這股期待會投射在拜登身上。事實上,民主黨比共和黨更重視民主與人權,拜登曾形容習近平,「這個人身上沒有一根民主的骨頭」。對北京而言,比起軍事與貿易戰,一個堅持民主人權的美國政府,其實還更棘手。
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