Will the United States Once Again Reclaim Its Global Leadership Role?

Published in Raeson
(Denmark) on 20 January 2021
by Andreas Sugar (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Benedicte Thymann Nielsen. Edited by Gillian Palmer.
After four years with Donald Trump, it is obvious that the world knows one thing: the United States has at least temporarily lost its moral leadership and status as key figure. Washington is currently isolated on several matters and is not even at the negotiating table when the world discusses issues such as climate and health. Joe Biden promises a policy change in regard to America's status and role in the world, but it is still unclear whether time has run out for the United States as the world's leading superpower.

Four more years with Trump could have seriously changed the world's geopolitical structure, or at least weakened the United States even more internationally. Its title as the world’s leader was challenged even before Trump took office in 2017, but his “America First” presidency has seriously diminished the country's role in the world. When campaigning, Trump made it clear that he would advance the idea of putting the United States and Americans first, and that the country’s interplay with the rest of the world should be governed by the question, “What’s in it for us?” The consequence would be that the United States would lose influence in the long term, but the short-term-minded outgoing president could not care less.

According to Trump, for far too long Washington spent too much money and too much energy on incompetent alliances and organizations that did not benefit the United States. America as global policeman and defender of the rights of people elsewhere in the world should be history. For the past four years, this fundamental shift in the role and prioritization of American foreign policy has only resulted in withdrawal from the diplomatic scene, withdrawals from various alliances and reduction of resources spent on international relations. This policy will most likely change during the Biden administration. When Biden selected his national security and foreign policy teams, the newly elected president declared in a speech that the United States was "ready to lead the world, not retreat from it."

Demoralized Foreign Service

Since World War II, the United States has dominated world affairs, perhaps challenged only by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The root of this dominance lies above all else in the country's economic, military and political power. In addition, maintaining this status requires effort and a global system spreading its tentacles across all corners of the world. For decades, the U.S. Foreign Service has by far been the largest in the world, surpassed in the last few years only by China’s Foreign Service. The State Department in Washington, D.C. is a huge complex housing around 5,000 employees who supervise over 270 representations worldwide (in comparison, Denmark has 103). From Freetown to Jakarta, the U.S. embassies often possess the best intelligence and the sharpest analysis of the situation, as well as a direct channel to local leaders.

However, Trump has reduced and demoralized this enormous system, the formerly proud Foreign Service. He has deliberately left many ambassadorial positions and key appointments in Washington unfilled; because they could not see themselves as representatives of the administration, ranking diplomats have also walked out, leaving in frustration or experiencing pressure to resign.

From the onset, it has been clear that Trump has had no great enthusiasm for diplomats or the role of diplomacy. His first secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, came from a leadership position in the oil industry and his primary task was to cut down a significant portion of the State Department's budget. He never became popular with employees and was quickly fired as he failed to become part of Trump's inner circle.

His successor, Mike Pompeo, has had more luck being in the erratic president’s good books and became one of his most loyal aides. Pompeo also disappointed many in Foggy Bottom, aka the U.S. State Department, when he endorsed Trump’s insult of several employees involved in the Trump-Ukraine scandal. Moreover, he has led a foreign policy and been the vanguard of a style that even seasoned officials have had difficulty digesting. The classic diplomat appreciates virtues such as experience, good manners, patience and an appreciation of history, culture and geography, which are not exactly character traits that have been associated with Trump and his foreign policy team.

Leading the Way?

The United States is not just a superpower because of its military, economy and enormous bureaucracy. America continues to represent something very special to many people around the world: a multicultural experiment and a place to live out your dreams and live in freedom. For decades, Washington has emerged as the world's moral guardian. The country's reputation has been tarnished by wars, support of several dictators and a hypocritical role in Cuba, the Middle East and elsewhere. However, the United States has generally been on the right side of history and has led the way for democratic principles and the international system we know today.

Without the United States, the United Nations, NATO, decolonization, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and countless peace agreements would not exist. When describing their beloved homeland, Ronald Reagan spoke of "the shining city upon a hill" and George H.W. Bush of "a thousand points of light” — a country that was a shining example for the rest of the world. At a campaign rally a few years ago, Trump mocked Bush's description, saying he never quite got “the thousand points of light.” Of course he did not get it. "I know one thing: Make America great again, we understand. Putting America first, we understand," he said.

The world knows at least one thing after four years with Trump: The United States has — at least temporarily — lost its moral voice and status as a country leading the way. In December, when Pompeo called Venezuela's election fraudulent and a sham, it not only sounded hollow but also seemed almost ridiculous. Considering the Jan. 6 storming of Congress, can the United States really teach other countries what a well-functioning democracy should look like?

While Washington's closest allies condemned the rioters, countries such as China, Iran, Russia and Zimbabwe quickly used the situation to ridicule U.S. democracy and question the administration's criticism of other governments and the way they lead their countries.

Friends with Dictators

In light of Trump's dubious understanding of democracy, it is no wonder that he seems to be in better company with dictators than with elected leaders. While he has regularly humiliated or insulted close allies, he has expressed great respect for authoritarian figures, such as Duterte in the Philippines, el-Sisi in Egypt and Erdoğan in Turkey. This flattery for strongmen goes hand in hand with Trump's contempt for human rights and a free press.

The president has most often remained completely silent when violations have been committed by countries with which the United States has a strategically or economically good relationship. After the brutal assassination of dissident and journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, which was in all likelihood ordered by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump shrugged off all questions from the press.

In addition, after the assassination of Khashoggi sparked outrage among U.S. lawmakers from both parties, Trump bypassed Congress to push through a billion-dollar deal to sell precision-guided missiles and other high-tech weapons to the kingdom. Later on in an interview, the president boasted to journalist Bob Woodward about the crown prince: “I saved his ass,” and “I was able to get Congress to leave him alone. I was able to get them to stop.”

'Unfair' Agreements

A key point in Trump's 2016 campaign promises was that he would withdraw the United States from several "unfair" agreements and renegotiate the terms of the agreements to get better deals instead. He most definitely fulfilled the first part of the election promise and very quickly left the Paris climate agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the INF nuclear agreement with Russia, several major trade agreements and several U.N. agencies. Nevertheless, apart from some trade agreements, nothing else has replaced these agreements.

In fact, Washington remains isolated on a number of issues and is not even sitting at the negotiating table when the world discusses climate and health, among other topics. The United States is no longer a key player in Syria and other areas of conflict. Despite warnings from the NATO secretary general and senior Republican senators, in November Trump announced further troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan, whose numbers are indeed already modest. The president's decision does not seem founded on strategic considerations, but rather on the America First doctrine and a belief that you can run foreign policy like a business.

Efforts to normalize relations between Israel and a number of Arab countries have been one of the few foreign policy areas the Trump administration has actively pursued. One can hardly criticize that Israel, with its recent Bahrain, UAE and Morocco accords, is expanding its circle of neighbors who acknowledge that they no longer want Israel deleted from the world map. Nevertheless, it is difficult to ignore the fact that this has happened at the expense of the Palestinians, Western Sahara and several activists in the Arab world. The agreements were reached under pressure or with promises of military and financial support, which will strengthen authoritarian leaders and shut down the debate about basic civil rights in the region.

In Sudan, which is fighting a fierce battle to steer in the direction of democracy, the United States made it a requirement that the Sudanese government enter into an agreement with Israel before the U.S. would lift decades-old and economically catastrophic sanctions. The normalization agreement signed in October could make the new leadership unpopular, lead to instability and worst case scenario jeopardize the transition to a civilian government.

It is evident that Trump had no patience for the long haul, which is necessary to reach peace initiatives and conduct diplomacy. The efforts in North Korea never managed to be much more than a series of "historic" photos of Trump and Kim Jong Un, smiling as they cross the border between North and South Korea. When a final agreement could not be reached at the third summit — something that normally takes years of diplomatic negotiations — the American president lost interest and the dialogue stopped. Kim has since announced that he intends to expand the country's stockpile of nuclear weapons.

The Unilateralist

It is certainly not an exaggeration to state that Trump has been uninterested in multilateral cooperation; most clearly, he has strongly downgraded and at times actively opposed the U.N. It probably also did not help the relationship that Trump’s speech before the General Assembly in 2018 drew laughter, as he boastfully claimed that his government in less than two years had achieved more than any other government in U.S. history. Trump has withdrawn the United States from UNESCO, the UNHCR, the U.N. Human Rights Council and the World Health Organization. Domestically, he has also downgraded the position as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, which is no longer of cabinet status.

China, on the other hand, has done its part to fill the void left by the United States, and has succeeded in getting several key posts occupied by Chinese officials and influencing the debate in the U.N. in its favor. Where China until recently focused on development and "soft" issues, it has now begun to interfere in security policy issues, such as Syria, and participate actively in U.N. peacekeeping operations. The United States has also lost its usual and almost natural leadership role in this area.

Expectations

While there will be natural limitations to Biden's foreign policy, there is no doubt that we will experience a more predictable policy. It is likely that Biden will reenter the U.S. into the Paris climate agreement and start renegotiations with Iran, more actively promote democracy and human rights, rebuild ties with the United States' traditional allies and try to take the lead on the international scene.

Through 36 years in the Senate and eight years as Obama's vice president, the newly elected president has knowledge of the inner workings of Washington and close contacts from Beijing to Berlin. He promotes classic American foreign policy based on national interests, which includes a world order governed by reasonably democratic principles and respect for human rights. He does this not only for ideological reasons but because it provides stability, which ultimately benefits U.S. economy and security policy.

There is no doubt that Biden's team can restore the U.S.’s international recognition very quickly. The same thing happened under Obama following the George W. Bush era, which had damaged America's reputation due to the unpopular Iraq war and the administration's arrogant approach to both its allies and enemies. Many world leaders, not least among America's closest partners in Europe, are probably looking forward to a more reliable president in Washington and a dialogue with substance and details following Trump's simple rhetoric. The Foreign Service will probably also be strengthened again. At a minimum, Biden will probably fill the many vacancies in the State Department and the empty ambassadorial posts around the world.

The newly elected president has already nominated his ‘national security team’ — a team of experienced and respected career diplomats and civil servants who know each other and have worked together for years. Trump's former national security adviser John Bolton told CNN after the nominations that it was a cohesive and competent team. This even comes from a notorious hawk and unilateralist who belongs on the very far right side of the Republican Party when it comes to foreign policy.

Pompeo, on the other hand, has not surprisingly mocked his successors, stating that they live in a "fantasy world" and engage in “multilateralism for the sake of hanging out with their buddies at a cool cocktail party.” This comment actually says more about Pompeo than about the new team.

How far can Biden take his progressive climate policy, and how far is he going to make it on the global stage? The Constitution grants the U.S. president many foreign policy powers and the ability to set the general tone and choose his allies and enemies. However, Congress must approve foreign policy appointments, ratify international agreements and approve the sizable budget for foreign commitments. With the continuing, if not increasing, polarization in the country, it is possible that Republican members of Congress will do what they can to weaken Biden's foreign policy.

In addition, there is no denying that the world is changing continuously and rapidly, and that it already looks different from when Biden was last in the White House under Obama just four years ago. The United States has already lost both influence and recognition. Currently, the country is trying to get a grip on the COVID-19 crisis, which fatally exposes the country's weaknesses, as well as an ideological struggle that has divided the population on issues like race, inequality, migration, public health and much more.

When the United States constituted upward of 30% of the world economy and enjoyed respect for its competence and diplomatic capabilities, the world was more unipolar. Recently, in an article in Foreign Policy, Harvard professor Stephen M. Walt pointed out that the world is no longer as unipolar. He therefore thought that Biden and his team might have bitten off more than they can chew when they said that the United States should once again "sit at the end of the table" in international contexts, save women and girls in all corners of the world, fight corruption and inspire people to live in freedom.

Russia and China have a different agenda, have already moved ahead and have filled the void left by Trump in respect to several conflicts and global issues. U.S. hegemony in the world is not just threatened by other governments. Tech companies and mega-companies not only have a huge impact on the course of the world, but have caused the concepts of power and control to become more diffuse than ever before. If we were not already aware of it, Twitter's recent ban of Trump’s account showed for that reason alone that leaders of the largest social media possess a special kind of power that the leaders of the world's largest countries cannot even dream of.

Another question is whether the world can still trust and count on the United States. Is the world’s trust in the United States broken? Although we are now guaranteed four years under Biden and a presumably reliable foreign policy and willingness to cooperate and act on common values and principles, Washington's allies cannot know for sure what will happen in four years. With over 74 million voters voting for Trump, it is inevitable that Trumpism will live on. It is impossible to rule out the possibility that either the outgoing president's son, Donald Jr., or a similar populist will take power in four or eight years and once again will prioritize America First and withdraw the U.S. from some of the agreements that Biden will join or rejoin.

In conclusion, we should probably not expect world stability promoted by the United States. Nonetheless, one can hope for a significant change in America’s engagement in the world. Biden's candidate to become the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., Linda Thomas-Greenfield, is a highly respected career diplomat and one of those who left the State Department under Trump. She believed the world’s diplomats had been marginalized and dishonored in recent years. A few weeks ago, she spoke volume telling them this: “America is back. Multilateralism is back. Diplomacy is back.”

*Editor's Note: The original language publication of this article is accessible with a paid subscription.


Kan USA igen sætte sig for bordenden i international politik?

Efter fire år med Trump ved verden som minimum én ting: USA har – i hvert fald midlertidigt – mistet sin moralske stemme og status som foregangsland. Washington står i øjeblikket alene på en række spørgsmål og er ikke engang med ved bordet, når verden taler om fx klima og sundhed. Biden lover en ny linje for USA’s status og rolle i verden, men det står endnu ikke klart, om tiden er løbet fra idéen om USA som klodens førende magt.

Fire år til med Donald Trump kunne for alvor have ændret verdens geopolitiske struktur – eller i hvert fald have svækket USA internationalt yderligere endnu. Selv om titlen som verdens vigtigste magt var udfordret allerede inden, Trump trådte til i 2017, har han med sin ’America First’-doktrin for alvor mindsket landets rolle i verden. Allerede som kandidat til embedet, gjorde Trump det klart, at hans præsidentskab skulle dreje sig om USA og amerikanerne, og at landets samspil med resten af verden skulle ses gennem prismen what’s in it for us. At det så også på længere sigt betød, at USA ville miste indflydelse, syntes den kortsigtede, aftrædende præsident at være ligeglad med.

Washington havde ifølge Trump i for lang tid brugt for mange penge og for meget energi på uduelige alliancer og organisationer, som ikke gav nok igen. Det skulle være slut med at spille verdens politimand og forsvarer af fjerne befolkningers rettigheder. Dette grundlæggende skift i opfattelsen og prioriteringen af amerikansk udenrigspolitik har i de sidste fire år blot udmøntet sig i en tilbagetrækning fra den diplomatiske scene, en udmeldelse af diverse samarbejder og nedskalering af ressourcer brugt på internationalt arbejde. Denne indstilling vil med sikkerhed ændre sig under Bidens administration. Ved udvælgelsen af sit sikkerheds- og udenrigspolitiske team sagde den nyvalgte præsident således også i en tale, at USA var ”klar til at lede verden – ikke trække sig tilbage fra den”.

Demoraliseret foreign service
Siden Anden Verdenskrig har USA siddet hårdt på verdens diplomatiske trone – måske kun udfordret af Sovjetunionen under den kolde krig. Denne dominans bunder frem for alt i landets økonomiske, militære og politiske magt. At opretholde denne status kræver derudover en indsats og et globalt apparat med fangarme ud i alle afkroge af verden. USA’s udenrigstjeneste har i årtier været verdens absolut største, kun i de sidste par år overgået af Kinas. Udenrigsministeriet i Washington D.C. er et enormt kompleks med omkring 5.000 ansatte, der fører tilsyn med over 270 repræsentationer i hele verden (Danmark har til sammenligning 103). Fra Freetown til Jakarta er USA’s ambassade ofte den med de bedste efterretninger og den skarpeste analyse af situationen, samt direkte linje til de lokale ledere.

Men dette enorme apparat – den tidligere stolte foreign service – er blevet reduceret og demoraliseret under Trump. Mens han med fuldt overlæg har ladet mange ambassadørstillinger og nøgleposter i Washington stå tomme, har der været en decideret udvandring af rangerende diplomater, som ikke kunne se sig selv som repræsentanter for administrationen, der forlod i frustration eller blev presset til at sige op.

Det har været tydeligt fra starten, at Trump heller ikke har haft det store til overs for diplomater eller diplomatiets rolle. Hans første udenrigsminister, Rex Tillerson, kom fra en lederpost i olieindustrien og fik primært til opgave at barbere en stor del af udenrigstjenestens budget ned. Han blev aldrig populær blandt de ansatte og blev fyret relativt hurtigt, da han heller ikke formåede at blive en del af Trumps inderkreds.

Hans efterfølger, Mike Pompeo, har haft mere held med at være i kridthuset hus den utilregnelige præsident og blev en af hans mest tro væbnere. Men Pompeo skuffede mange i Foggy Bottom – som Udenrigsministeriet også kaldes – da han godtog Trumps tilsvining af flere ansatte i Ukraine-sagen. I øvrigt har han stået i spidsen for en udenrigspolitik og en stil, som selv inkarnerede tjenestemænd har haft svært ved at fordøje. Den klassiske diplomat sætter nemlig pris på dyder som erfaring, pli, tålmodighed og forståelse for historie, kultur og geografi – ikke just karaktertræk, der har været kendetegnende for Trump og hans udenrigspolitiske team.

Foregangsland?
USA er ikke bare en supermagt i kraft af sit militær, sin økonomi og et enormt embedsapparat. Amerika repræsenterer fortsat noget helt særligt for mange mennesker i hele verden: et multikulturelt eksperiment og et sted hvor man kan udleve sine drømme og leve i frihed. I årtier har Washington fremstået som verdens moralske vogter. Selvom landets renommé er plettet ved krige, støtte til adskillige diktatorer og en hyklerisk rolle i Cuba, Mellemøsten og andre steder, har USA generelt været at finde på den rigtige side af historien og som foregangsland for demokratiske principper og det internationale system, vi kender i dag.

Uden USA havde vi ikke haft FN, NATO, afkolonisering, menneskerettighedserklæringen og utallige fredsaftaler. Ronald Reagan talte om ”den skinnende by på bakketoppen” og George Bush senior om ”tusind lysende punkter” i deres beskrivelser af deres elskede fædreland. Et land, der stod som et lysende eksempel for resten af verden. I en tale til et vælgermøde for et par år siden, hånede Trump Bushs beskrivelse og sagde, at han aldrig rigtigt havde forstået det med de lysende punkter. Selvfølgelig havde han ikke det. ”Jeg ved én ting”, sagde han videre, ”Make America Great Again forstår vi. Sætte Amerika først forstår vi”.

Til gengæld ved verden én ting efter fire år med Trump: USA har – i hvert fald midlertidigt – mistet sin moralske stemme og status som foregangsland. Da Pompeo i december måned beskrev Venezuelas valg som svindel og bedrag, klingede det ikke bare hult, men forekom nærmest latterligt. Kan USA virkelig tillade sig – ikke mindst efter stormløbet på Kongressen d. 6. januar – at belære andre om, hvordan et velfungerende demokrati skal se ud?

Mens Washingtons nærmeste allierede fordømte stormløberne, så lande som Kina, Iran, Rusland og Zimbabwe da også hurtigt deres snit til at håne USA’s demokrati og sætte spørgsmålstegn ved administrationens kritik af andre regeringers måde at lede deres lande.

Venner med diktatorer
I lyset af Trumps tvivlsomme opfattelse af demokrati, kan det ikke undre, at han synes at være i bedre selskab med diktatorer end med folkevalgte ledere. Mens han jævnligt har nedgjort eller fornærmet nære allierede, har han udtrykt stor respekt for autoritære karakterer som Duterte i Filippinerne, al-Sisi i Egypten og Erdoğan i Tyrkiet. Denne leflen for stærke mænd går hånd i hånd med Trumps ringeagt for menneskerettigheder og en fri presse.

Præsidenten har oftest forholdt sig aldeles tavs, når krænkelser er blevet begået af lande, som USA har et strategisk eller økonomisk godt forhold til. Efter det bestialske mord på den regeringskritiske journalist Jamal Khashoggi på det saudiarabiske konsulat i Istanbul – som med al sandsynlighed var beordret af kronprins Mohammed bin Salman – gled Trump af på alle spørgsmål fra pressen.

Og efter drabet på Khashoggi udløste raseri blandt amerikanske lovgivere fra begge partier, omgik Trump Kongressen for at gennemføre en milliardhandel af præcisionsstyrede missiler og andre højteknologiske våben til kongedømmet. I et senere interview med journalisten Bob Woodward pralede præsidenten: ”Det lykkedes mig at få Kongressen til at lade kronprinsen være i fred. Jeg fik dem til at stoppe. Jeg reddede hans røv”.

”Unfair” aftaler
Et nøglepunkt i Trumps kampagne i 2016 var, at han ville trække USA ud af adskillige ”unfair” aftaler og forhandle sig frem til noget meget bedre i stedet. Han levede i den grad op til den første del af valgløftet og forlod meget hurtigt Paris-aftalen, Iran-aftalen, INF-atomaftalen med Rusland, adskillige store handelsaftaler og flere FN-agenturer. Men bortset fra nogle handelsaftaler er der ikke kommet noget andet i stedet.

Washington står derimod alene på en række spørgsmål og er ikke engang med ved bordet, når verden taler klima og sundhed mv. USA er ikke længere en afgørende aktør i Syrien og andre konfliktområder, og i november annoncerede Trump en yderligere reduktion af det efterhånden beskedne antal styrker i Irak og Afghanistan trods advarsler fra NATO’s generalsekretær og ledende Republikanske senatorer. Præsidentens beslutninger synes ikke at have være baseret på strategiske overvejelser men rettere idéen om America First, og at udenrigpolitik kan gøres op i hård valuta.

Et af Trump-administrationens få aktive områder udenrigspolitisk har været indsatsen for at normalisere forholdet mellem Israel og en række arabiske lande. Det er svært at kritisere, at Israel med de seneste aftaler med bl.a. Bahrain, Emiraterne og Marokko udvider kredsen af naboer, der er villige til at skrive under på, at de ikke længere ønsker Israel slettet af landkortet. Men det er ligeledes svært at se bort fra, at det er sket på bekostning af palæstinenserne, Vestsahara og flere aktivister i den arabiske verden. Aftalerne er dels kommet på plads under pres eller med løfter om militær og økonomisk støtte, som vil styrke autoritære ledere og lukke ned for debatten om gængse frihedsrettigheder i regionen.

I Sudan, hvor de kæmper en brav kamp for at styre i retningen af demokrati, gjorde USA det til et krav, at regeringen indgik en aftale med Israel, hvis den ønskede at frigøre sig fra årtier gamle og økonomisk katastrofale sanktioner. Normaliseringsaftalen, der blev underskrevet i oktober, kan gøre den nye ledelse upopulær, føre til ustabilitet og i værste fald være med til at sætte overgangen til en civil regering over styr.

Det er tydeligt, at Trump ikke har haft tålmodigheden til det lange seje træk som fredsinitiativer og diplomati kræver. Indsatsen i Nordkorea nåede aldrig at blive meget andet end en række ”historiske” fotos af Trump og Kim Jong-un, der smilende krydser grænsen mellem nord og syd. Da man ved det tredje topmøde ikke kunne komme til en fuld aftale – noget der gerne tager års diplomatisk arbejde – mistede den amerikanske præsident interessen, og dialogen stoppede. Kim har siden bekendtgjort, at han agter at udvide landets beholdning af atomvåben.

Unilateralisten
Det er vist ikke en overdrivelse at sige, at Trump heller ikke har været interesseret i multilateralt samarbejde; tydeligst har han stærkt nedprioriteret og til tider aktivt modarbejdet FN. Det hjalp nok heller ikke på forholdet, at Trump under sin tale til generalforsamlingen i 2018 blev modtaget med latter, da han pralende påstod, at hans regering på under to år havde opnået mere end nogen anden i USA’s historie. Trump har meldt USA ud af UNESCO, UNHCR, FN’s menneskerettighedsråd, samt WHO. Internt har han derudover degraderet posten som FN-ambassadør, som ikke længere er en del af kabinettet.

Kina har derimod gjort sit for at udfylde tomrummet fra USA og er lykkedes med at få adskillige nøgleposter besat af kinesere og påvirke debatten i FN i sin retning. Hvor Kina indtil for nylig fokuserede på udvikling og ”bløde” emner, er man nu begyndt at blande sig i sikkerhedspolitiske spørgsmål, såsom Syrien, og deltage aktivt i FN’s fredsbevarende operationer. Også her har USA altså mistet sin sædvanlige og nærmest naturlige lederrolle.

Forventninger
Selv om der kommer til at være naturlige begrænsninger for præsident Bidens udenrigspolitik, er der ingen tvivl om, at vi kommer til at opleve en mere forudsigelig linje. Man kan formentligt regne med, at Biden vil vende tilbage til Paris-aftalen og forhandlinger med Iran, mere aktivt vil promovere demokrati og menneskerettigheder, genopbygge bånd til USA’s traditionelle allierede, samt forsøge at tage teten i det multilaterale system.

Den nyvalgte præsident er – qua 36 år i senatet og otte år som Obamas stedfortræder – en gammel ørn i faget og har nære kontakter fra Beijing til Berlin. Han står for en klassisk amerikansk udenrigspolitik baseret på nationale interesser, som inkluderer en verdensorden med nogenlunde demokratiske principper og respekt for menneskerettigheder. Ikke kun af ideologiske årsager men fordi det giver stabilitet, hvilket i sidste ende også er til USA’s økonomiske og sikkerhedspolitiske fordel.

Der er vist ingen tvivl om, at Bidens hold hurtigt kan gøre meget for at genoprette USA’s anerkendelse internationalt. Det samme skete under Obama efter årene med Bush, der havde skadet USA’s omdømme efter den upopulære Irak-krig og administrationens arrogante tilgang til både allierede og fjender. Der er sikkert mange verdensledere – ikke mindst blandt USA’s nærmeste partnere i Europa – som glæder sig til en mere pålidelig præsident i Washington og en dialog med tyngde og nuancer efter Trumps simple retorik. Udenrigstjenesten vil formentlig også blive styrket igen, i hvert fald vil Biden nok besætte de mange ledige stillinger i Udenrigsministeriet og de tomme ambassadørposter ude i verden.

Den nyvalgte præsident har allerede nomineret sit ’national security team’: et hold af erfarne og respekterede karrierediplomater og tjenestemænd, der kender hinanden og har arbejdet sammen i årevis. Et sammenhængende og kompetent team, sagde Trumps tidligere nationale sikkerhedrådgiver John Bolton til CNN efter nomineringerne. Og dette kommer fra en berygtet høg og unilateralist, der er at finde på den yderste højrefløj af Repuplikansk udenrigspolitik.

Udenrigsminister Pompeo har derimod – ikke overraskende – hånet sine efterfølgere og sagt, at de lever i en ”fantasi-verden” og engagerer sig i ”multilateralisme for at kunne hænge ud med deres venner til en cool cocktailfest”. Kommentaren siger i virkeligheden nok mere om Pompeo selv end om det kommende team.

Men hvor langt kan Biden gå i sin progressive klimapolitik og ude i verden mere generelt? Ifølge forfatningen har den amerikanske præsident temmeligt mange beføjelser inden for udenrigspolitik og kan sætte den generelle tone og vælge sine allierede og sine fjender. Men det er Kongressen, der godkender de udenrigspolitiske udnævnelser, ratificerer internationale aftaler og godkender det anseelige budget for indsatser uden for USA’s grænser. Og med den vedblivende – hvis ikke tiltagende – polarisering i landet er det muligt, at Republikanske medlemmer af Kongressen vil gøre, hvad de kan for at sætte en kæp i hjulet på Bidens udenrigspolitik.

Derudover kan det heller ikke fornægtes, at verden ændrer sig kontinuerligt og hurtigt, og at den allerede ser anderledes ud, end da Biden sidst sad i Det Hvide Hus under Obama for bare fire år siden. USA har allerede mistet både indflydelse og anerkendelse, og er i øjeblikket opslugt af en COVID-19 krise, som i den grad udstiller landets svagheder, samt en ideologisk kamp som har splittet befolkningen i forhold til spørgsmål om race, ulighed, migration, folkesundhed og meget mere.

Harvard-professoren Stephen M. Walt påpegede for nylig i en artikel i Foreign Policy, at verden ikke længere er så unipolar som dengang USA sad på 30 pct. af verdensøkonomien og var respekteret for dets kompetence og diplomatiske evner. Han mente derfor, at Biden og hans team måske tog munden for fuld, når de sagde, at USA atter skulle ”sidde for enden af bordet” i internationale sammenhænge, redde kvinder og piger i verdens afkroge, bekæmpe korruption og inspirere befolkninger til at ville leve i frihed.

Rusland og Kina har en anden dagsorden og er allerede rykket ind og har udfyldt tomrummet efterladt af Trump i en række konflikter og globale spørgsmål. Og det er ikke bare andre regeringer, der truer USA’s hegemoni i verden – tech- og andre mega-firmaer har ikke bare enorm indflydelse på verdens gang, men har gjort begreberne magt og kontrol mere diffuse end nogensinde før. Twitters nylige blokering af Trump viste i den grad – hvis vi ikke allerede var klar over det – at lederne af de største sociale medier har adgang til en særlig form for magt, som lederne af verdens største lande ikke engang kan drømme om.

Et andet spørgsmål handler om, hvorvidt verden stadig kan stole på og regne med USA. Er tilliden brudt? Selv om man nu er sikret fire år med Biden og en formodentlig pålidelig udenrigspolitik og vilje til at samarbejde og handle ud fra fælles værdier og principper, kan Washingtons allierede ikke vide sig sikre på, hvad der sker om endnu fire år. Med over 74 millioner vælgere, der stemte på Trump, kommer man ikke uden om, at trumpismen lever videre. Det kan derfor ikke udelukkes, at enten den afgående præsidents søn, Donald Jr., eller en lignende populist overtager magten om fire eller otte år og igen vil prioritere America First og droppe nogle af de aftaler, som Biden vil indgå i eller vende tilbage til.

Alt i alt skal vi derfor nok ikke forvente, at alt vender tilbage til en stabil verdensorden med USA ved roret. Men ikke desto mindre kan man håbe på en betydelig ændring i USA’s engagement i verden. Bidens kandidat til posten som FN-ambassadør, Linda Thomas-Greenfield – en højt respekteret karrierediplomat og en af dem, der forlod Udenrigsministeriet under Trump – sendte for nogle uger siden i en tale en sigende besked til verdens diplomater, som hun mente var blevet marginaliseret og skændet i de seneste år: ”Amerika er tilbage. Multilateralisme er tilbage. Diplomatiet er tilbage”.


This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Ireland: We Must Stand Up to Trump on Climate. The Alternative Is Too Bleak To Contemplate

Israel: From the Cities of America to John Bolton: Trump’s Vendetta Campaign against Opponents Reaches New Heights

Australia: Donald Trump Is Taking Over the US Federal Reserve and Financial Markets Have Missed the Point

Australia: Australia Boosts Corporate Law Enforcement as America Goes Soft

Ireland: Irish Examiner View: Would We Miss Donald Trump and Would a Successor Be Worse?

Topics

Peru: Blockade ‘For Now’

Japan: US President and the Federal Reserve Board: Harmonious Dialogue To Support the Dollar

Austria: The EU Must Recognize That a Tariff Deal with Trump Is Hardly Worth Anything

Mexico: The Network of Intellectuals and Artists in Defense of Venezuela and President Nicholás Maduro

Hong Kong: Cordial Cross-Strait Relations Will Spare Taiwan Trump’s Demands, Says Paul Kuoboug Chang

Germany: The Tariffs Have Side Effects — For the US Too*

Ireland: We Must Stand Up to Trump on Climate. The Alternative Is Too Bleak To Contemplate

Canada: Carney Takes Us Backward with Americans on Trade

Related Articles

Peru: Blockade ‘For Now’

Japan: US President and the Federal Reserve Board: Harmonious Dialogue To Support the Dollar

Germany: The Tariffs Have Side Effects — For the US Too*

Ireland: We Must Stand Up to Trump on Climate. The Alternative Is Too Bleak To Contemplate

Canada: Carney Takes Us Backward with Americans on Trade