The US Incited Panic in Europe on the Eve of a Retreat
Considering the current political climate, a full-fledged comparison of nuclear power potential is politically meaningless for countries with nuclear superpowers. There is no doubt that if the stockpiles of the most murderous weapons in history amassed by Russia, the United States, and, apparently, China, are used, all humankind will perish. It is no coincidence that the nuclear powers themselves often remind us of this in their statements.
Since there are no winners in such a war, the main function of diplomacy is to make the most of the situation when one has to concede under pressure to an aggressive opponent — especially since the disintegration of economic globalization makes it possible to then introduce unilateral economic sanctions against the other country under very plausible pretexts. There is no alternative to such actions — well, for the U.S. not to really fight Russia.
Let's say that this strategy does not exclude the fact that the lives of several hundreds or thousands of Ukrainians could easily be sacrificed by the United States simply to strengthen the case for additional sanctions against Russia. Or, for example, to really make it follow in the spirit of Hollywood tradition, a few heroes will die before the happy ending. Note that it would be great for Russia, of course, not to let this American scenario develop.
However, beyond private provocations, no one in the U.S. plans to go to war or seriously sever relations with Russia. In the face of growing pressure from China, President Joe Biden is guided by the understandable strategy of surviving by concentrating on the most important issues and saving limited resources where their use is not crucial. Except for the most ignorant or very daring members in Congress, it is obvious to all that Russia is not going to compete with the U.S. for world leadership. To minimize the damage from its actions, it is necessary to withdraw from obligations that divert resources away from more important matters, if not to make peace with it.
Therefore, the purpose of the colossal propaganda campaign waged by the U.S. and Britain on the allegedly probable Russian invasion of Ukraine is meant to prepare for meeting Russia's main demands in the sector of European and international security.
Washington should present its forthcoming concessions as an effort to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian people and state, as well as to avoid a major war in Europe. The U.S. does not intend to fight for Ukraine as it does for all other NATO countries.
But the horror from which the U.S. will save the world must be so universally feared that no one in the public consciousness has even a shadow of doubt about the decisions made. Therefore, the information released about the situation ends up painting a picture of two seemingly contradictory viewpoints.
First, there has been a clear resurgence of talk that Ukraine is, in fact, not a crucial worry for the United States and that NATO expansion has long since run out of steam. As to the reasons for such talk, they are based on the belief that Ukraine, although unfortunate, is not the most important issue for the U.S. and the West. Practically on a daily basis, we see extensive comments by fairly well-known experts and politicians pointing out that the post-Cold War expansion policy was not well thought out and the commitments made by Washington were too grand.
The mistakes made by each of the previous U.S. administrations are explained in detail, and their preoccupation with liberal ideas is pointed out as the main reason. The latter is quite amusing since it indicates a complete contempt for readers who, in principle, understand that the U.S. seizure of control over Eastern Europe was dictated by typical selfish interests.
Second, the strategic preparation for the retreat is accompanied by fears about the extent of the Russian threat. A recent striking statement on this subject was made by President Biden himself, who declared that the new war would be the largest since 1945 — as if there had been no NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, in which the Air Force deployed more than 1,000 units. Not to mention the attack by the U.S. and its allies on Iraq, in which their side involved a military group of more than half a million.
Additionally, the determination, yet weakness, of Ukraine itself and its army is pointed out; they clearly need to be saved, but in a way that does not risk anything. Western media and expert statements are overflowing with comparisons of Russian and Ukrainian military potentials as if they were two comparable adversaries preparing to engage in a battle for regional dominance. This is supplemented by pictures of Ukrainian military forces, even their appearance suggesting that they will become easy victims of Russian aggressors.
To be more convincing, the U.S. and its closest allies are evacuating the families of diplomats from Kyiv, preparing reserves of ridiculous proportions in terms of military planning for transfer to Europe, and organizing an incredible number of appearances on a variety of political platforms.
The Americans' probable retreat from their strategic positions in Eastern Europe cannot look like a mere exercise in common sense; politicians in the West have long ago become accustomed to and conditioned their voters to believe in these actions. It must appear as a decisive retreat that should bring peace to Europe and further strengthen the United States itself.
The U.S. allies in Europe are more restrained — with the exception, of course, of the United Kingdom, whose authorities are dealing with domestic issues in which Boris Johnson's government is again on the verge of a crisis because of the violation of quarantine restrictions. Therefore, London urgently needs to entertain its citizens with any vivid performances outside the kingdom. France, usually very vocal on European security and defense issues, has gone quiet. The Élysée Palace understands that it has no stakes in this game and that the Fifth Republic is in too dire an economic and political situation.
Germany is stubbornly pushing its viewpoint, the essence of which is the inviolability of economic relations with Russia: new gas pipelines bypassing Eastern Europe will bring the Federal Republic decades of control over the European energy market and a comfortable existence. The countries of southern Europe do not care at all, although they are forced to send several troops, ships or planes to participate in playing pretend on the Russian border.
Poland and the Baltic states are the most nervous. There they have no idea how far the U.S. will be willing to go in shedding its excessive commitments in Europe. The actual return of NATO military capabilities to the 1997 borders means that Warsaw and the Baltic capitals will have to seek common ground with Russia. Moscow, of course, is not going to put the Baltics under its control, although it is ready for such a development there as well. Russia itself does not need it now, thank God. However, if Moscow and Washington do reach an agreement, these four states will lose their main foreign policy function, formed over the past 30 years, to act as an instigator in relations between the nuclear superpowers.
Those in power in Kyiv are well aware of the motives and intentions of the United States, and so they keep repeating that there is no real threat of an attack by Russia. The Ukrainian leaders are daring, but not fools. They have enough common sense to understand that the U.S. will not risk its own survival to preserve the existing regime in Ukraine, even if hordes of bloodthirsty cannibals do stand on the borders of this country, which, among other things, is not the case right now. And there is no way to force Americans to stay in Ukraine when Russia plays its role quite convincingly.
Since there are no winners in such a war, the main function of diplomacy is to make the most of the situation when one has to concede under pressure to an aggressive opponent — especially since the disintegration of economic globalization makes it possible to then introduce unilateral economic sanctions against the other country under very plausible pretexts. There is no alternative to such actions — well, for the U.S. not to really fight Russia.
Let's say that this strategy does not exclude the fact that the lives of several hundreds or thousands of Ukrainians could easily be sacrificed by the United States simply to strengthen the case for additional sanctions against Russia. Or, for example, to really make it follow in the spirit of Hollywood tradition, a few heroes will die before the happy ending. Note that it would be great for Russia, of course, not to let this American scenario develop.
However, beyond private provocations, no one in the U.S. plans to go to war or seriously sever relations with Russia. In the face of growing pressure from China, President Joe Biden is guided by the understandable strategy of surviving by concentrating on the most important issues and saving limited resources where their use is not crucial. Except for the most ignorant or very daring members in Congress, it is obvious to all that Russia is not going to compete with the U.S. for world leadership. To minimize the damage from its actions, it is necessary to withdraw from obligations that divert resources away from more important matters, if not to make peace with it.
Therefore, the purpose of the colossal propaganda campaign waged by the U.S. and Britain on the allegedly probable Russian invasion of Ukraine is meant to prepare for meeting Russia's main demands in the sector of European and international security.
Washington should present its forthcoming concessions as an effort to ensure the survival of the Ukrainian people and state, as well as to avoid a major war in Europe. The U.S. does not intend to fight for Ukraine as it does for all other NATO countries.
But the horror from which the U.S. will save the world must be so universally feared that no one in the public consciousness has even a shadow of doubt about the decisions made. Therefore, the information released about the situation ends up painting a picture of two seemingly contradictory viewpoints.
First, there has been a clear resurgence of talk that Ukraine is, in fact, not a crucial worry for the United States and that NATO expansion has long since run out of steam. As to the reasons for such talk, they are based on the belief that Ukraine, although unfortunate, is not the most important issue for the U.S. and the West. Practically on a daily basis, we see extensive comments by fairly well-known experts and politicians pointing out that the post-Cold War expansion policy was not well thought out and the commitments made by Washington were too grand.
The mistakes made by each of the previous U.S. administrations are explained in detail, and their preoccupation with liberal ideas is pointed out as the main reason. The latter is quite amusing since it indicates a complete contempt for readers who, in principle, understand that the U.S. seizure of control over Eastern Europe was dictated by typical selfish interests.
Second, the strategic preparation for the retreat is accompanied by fears about the extent of the Russian threat. A recent striking statement on this subject was made by President Biden himself, who declared that the new war would be the largest since 1945 — as if there had been no NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, in which the Air Force deployed more than 1,000 units. Not to mention the attack by the U.S. and its allies on Iraq, in which their side involved a military group of more than half a million.
Additionally, the determination, yet weakness, of Ukraine itself and its army is pointed out; they clearly need to be saved, but in a way that does not risk anything. Western media and expert statements are overflowing with comparisons of Russian and Ukrainian military potentials as if they were two comparable adversaries preparing to engage in a battle for regional dominance. This is supplemented by pictures of Ukrainian military forces, even their appearance suggesting that they will become easy victims of Russian aggressors.
To be more convincing, the U.S. and its closest allies are evacuating the families of diplomats from Kyiv, preparing reserves of ridiculous proportions in terms of military planning for transfer to Europe, and organizing an incredible number of appearances on a variety of political platforms.
The Americans' probable retreat from their strategic positions in Eastern Europe cannot look like a mere exercise in common sense; politicians in the West have long ago become accustomed to and conditioned their voters to believe in these actions. It must appear as a decisive retreat that should bring peace to Europe and further strengthen the United States itself.
The U.S. allies in Europe are more restrained — with the exception, of course, of the United Kingdom, whose authorities are dealing with domestic issues in which Boris Johnson's government is again on the verge of a crisis because of the violation of quarantine restrictions. Therefore, London urgently needs to entertain its citizens with any vivid performances outside the kingdom. France, usually very vocal on European security and defense issues, has gone quiet. The Élysée Palace understands that it has no stakes in this game and that the Fifth Republic is in too dire an economic and political situation.
Germany is stubbornly pushing its viewpoint, the essence of which is the inviolability of economic relations with Russia: new gas pipelines bypassing Eastern Europe will bring the Federal Republic decades of control over the European energy market and a comfortable existence. The countries of southern Europe do not care at all, although they are forced to send several troops, ships or planes to participate in playing pretend on the Russian border.
Poland and the Baltic states are the most nervous. There they have no idea how far the U.S. will be willing to go in shedding its excessive commitments in Europe. The actual return of NATO military capabilities to the 1997 borders means that Warsaw and the Baltic capitals will have to seek common ground with Russia. Moscow, of course, is not going to put the Baltics under its control, although it is ready for such a development there as well. Russia itself does not need it now, thank God. However, if Moscow and Washington do reach an agreement, these four states will lose their main foreign policy function, formed over the past 30 years, to act as an instigator in relations between the nuclear superpowers.
Those in power in Kyiv are well aware of the motives and intentions of the United States, and so they keep repeating that there is no real threat of an attack by Russia. The Ukrainian leaders are daring, but not fools. They have enough common sense to understand that the U.S. will not risk its own survival to preserve the existing regime in Ukraine, even if hordes of bloodthirsty cannibals do stand on the borders of this country, which, among other things, is not the case right now. And there is no way to force Americans to stay in Ukraine when Russia plays its role quite convincingly.
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