China and the US: Between Interdependence and Realpolitik
Since the beginning of 2010, we have seen a marked interest on behalf of political analysts and journalists regarding the bilateral “China-USA” relationship. The latter has recently experienced increasing tension in the form of Chinese anger against the American sale of arms to Taiwan or the Dalai-Lama’s visit to Washington. But now is the time for appeasement, and after American Secretary of the Treasury Tim Geithner’s surprise visit to Beijing, it is Chinese President Hu Jintao himself who will travel to Washington, to the great satisfaction of Barack Obama.
Officially, the purpose of the Chinese chief of state’s visit is to attend a summit on nuclear disarmament which finished this Tuesday in Washington.
Unofficially, the trip serves to seal the “reconciliation” between the two great powers in the wake of recent tension, particularly regarding the question of the appreciation of the Yuan, as noted by Eric Le Boucher in Les Echos. The trip also serves to present the U.S. with the opportunity to coax China into giving its support, or at least to declare itself benevolently neutral, regarding an investigation into the Iranian nuclear project, which the United States and other countries like France want to expedite.
The majority of analyses on the “China-USA” relationship are happy to emphasize the commercial and financial interdependence that exists between the two countries. To clarify, the United States buys goods manufactured by the Chinese, which the Chinese then sell on credit by purchasing American Treasury Bonds. The financial crisis has not changed this reality.
But the debate could soon move from a purely economic sphere into a sphere of “haute politique.” Considering this, Wen Liao, chairwoman of a political, economic, and business consultancy, has written an interesting op-ed for the Financial Times which elevates the debate. The article, entitled “Bismarck’s Lessons for Beijing,” forges an audacious and pertinent connection between the situation in China today and that of the German Empire following the German unification of 1870, orchestrated by the masterful Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.
China’s rise as a great power of the 21st century strangely echoes that of Bismarckian Germany at the end of the 19th century. They have the same interior authoritative system, legitimized by an unprecedented economic boom. They have the same exterior desire for conciliation — with ideals of balanced world powers and good neighbor policies — and they have the same obsession with the achievement of territorial and spiritual unity of the nation. The credo of China’s peaceful rise proclaimed by Chinese leaders indubitably recalls the “defensive” politics of Prussia during Bismarck’s era.
If history repeats itself, this phase of a peaceful rise could end just like Bismarck’s Prussia did by transforming itself into a German Empire that became expansionist and warlike. American international relations theorists from the late Samuel Huntington to John Mearscheimer* are not wrong. According to the latter, the rise of China threatens to be anything but peaceful. He emphasizes that the Middle Kingdom will naturally seek a role allowing for regional hegemony in Asia — a role that it incidentally played for almost two thousand years — and will seek to develop an equivalent to America’s Monroe Doctrine. But the United States will not be able to sit around with their arms folded when confronted with China’s desire for hegemony in Asia. Their current strategic doctrine established under George W. Bush’s administration proclaims that they cannot tolerate a “peer competitor” anywhere in the world.
And even if China and the United States have a short-term reconciliation, it is obvious that their long-term interests diverge. When China is able to economically pass over the American consumer, it can reaffirm its sovereignty in other domains. Will it be able to convince other states in the region to follow suit and thus succeed in weaving alliances around itself? Such is the great issue of Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century: exerting a strong enough attraction for its neighbors and increasing its soft power, which relies more on persuasion than compulsion. Should this not be the case, the wake-up call could be painful for the entire world.
* See John Mearscheimer China’s Unpeaceful Rise, Current History, April 2006
Officially, the purpose of the Chinese chief of state’s visit is to attend a summit on nuclear disarmament which finished this Tuesday in Washington.
Unofficially, the trip serves to seal the “reconciliation” between the two great powers in the wake of recent tension, particularly regarding the question of the appreciation of the Yuan, as noted by Eric Le Boucher in Les Echos. The trip also serves to present the U.S. with the opportunity to coax China into giving its support, or at least to declare itself benevolently neutral, regarding an investigation into the Iranian nuclear project, which the United States and other countries like France want to expedite.
The majority of analyses on the “China-USA” relationship are happy to emphasize the commercial and financial interdependence that exists between the two countries. To clarify, the United States buys goods manufactured by the Chinese, which the Chinese then sell on credit by purchasing American Treasury Bonds. The financial crisis has not changed this reality.
But the debate could soon move from a purely economic sphere into a sphere of “haute politique.” Considering this, Wen Liao, chairwoman of a political, economic, and business consultancy, has written an interesting op-ed for the Financial Times which elevates the debate. The article, entitled “Bismarck’s Lessons for Beijing,” forges an audacious and pertinent connection between the situation in China today and that of the German Empire following the German unification of 1870, orchestrated by the masterful Chancellor Otto von Bismarck.
China’s rise as a great power of the 21st century strangely echoes that of Bismarckian Germany at the end of the 19th century. They have the same interior authoritative system, legitimized by an unprecedented economic boom. They have the same exterior desire for conciliation — with ideals of balanced world powers and good neighbor policies — and they have the same obsession with the achievement of territorial and spiritual unity of the nation. The credo of China’s peaceful rise proclaimed by Chinese leaders indubitably recalls the “defensive” politics of Prussia during Bismarck’s era.
If history repeats itself, this phase of a peaceful rise could end just like Bismarck’s Prussia did by transforming itself into a German Empire that became expansionist and warlike. American international relations theorists from the late Samuel Huntington to John Mearscheimer* are not wrong. According to the latter, the rise of China threatens to be anything but peaceful. He emphasizes that the Middle Kingdom will naturally seek a role allowing for regional hegemony in Asia — a role that it incidentally played for almost two thousand years — and will seek to develop an equivalent to America’s Monroe Doctrine. But the United States will not be able to sit around with their arms folded when confronted with China’s desire for hegemony in Asia. Their current strategic doctrine established under George W. Bush’s administration proclaims that they cannot tolerate a “peer competitor” anywhere in the world.
And even if China and the United States have a short-term reconciliation, it is obvious that their long-term interests diverge. When China is able to economically pass over the American consumer, it can reaffirm its sovereignty in other domains. Will it be able to convince other states in the region to follow suit and thus succeed in weaving alliances around itself? Such is the great issue of Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century: exerting a strong enough attraction for its neighbors and increasing its soft power, which relies more on persuasion than compulsion. Should this not be the case, the wake-up call could be painful for the entire world.
* See John Mearscheimer China’s Unpeaceful Rise, Current History, April 2006
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