Does the U.S. Need Turkey?
The most exciting “military-diplomatic” news from last week was U.S. Chief of Staff Mike Mullen’s official visit to Ankara. Once we heard Mullen was coming to Ankara, we all wrote in our columns that “Mullen is coming to ask for Turkey’s support during the U.S.’ s withdrawal from Iraq.” Yet, Mullen proved us wrong when he said, “we do not transport weapons through Turkey, nor do we plan to in the future” in his address to the media in front of the American embassy.
Radikal had published a report on the day of Mullen’s address to the media saying “Mullen will not communicate details of the withdrawal from Iraq, but Ankara is expecting a group of diplomats from the U.S. about this issue.” Although we guessed right that Mullen came to meet his newly appointed Turkish counterpart Isik Kosaner, Turkish Chief of Staff, we were wrong that the U.S. wanted to withdraw its armed equipment through Turkish territory.
When Mullen disproved my guess about the reasons for his visit — although I had talked in privately in advance to senior officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom I trusted and knew were involved during the visit — I asked two questions to myself:
1) Mullen might be telling the truth. It is reasonable for the United States, who could not open the northern front in the run-up to the Iraqi invasion because Turkey did not give consent for its territory to be used, to not need Turkey for such an operation as withdrawal from Iraq. However, if this really is the case, why did Turkey say that “they are expecting a group from the U.S. and that if the U.S. demands it they are ready to assess the situation”?
2) Perhaps Mullen is not telling the truth. Yet, if the U.S. needs the Incirlik base to transport its heavy armed equipment back from Iraq, why did Mullen say they “will not have any demands for Turkey in the withdrawal process”?
While looking for answers to these questions, it is possible to conceptualize the following scenarios, considering the clues and information Turkish and American diplomats have given:
* Turkey might be intentionally painting a picture of the U.S. as negotiating the “withdrawal from Iraq” with Turkey in order to breed a further discourse that “the U.S. needs Turkey as it does in many other areas.” Thus, Turkey is drawing a counter discourse: “The U.S. will cross Turkey off its friendly countries list because of Turkey’s uncompromising attitude on Iran and Israel.” Turkey hopes to give the message that no matter who dwells in Washington, “the U.S. cannot cross off Turkey when it is in exigent need of Turkey.” This can be called the “use of fruitful discourse for domestic political purposes.” Yet, the validity of this argument vanishes as Mullen addresses the media.
* Alternatively, perhaps Ankara also anticipated that Mullen was paying a visit because the U.S. wanted to withdraw its armed equipment and heavy war vehicles through Turkey. In other words, Ankara, like Turkish journalists, also might have come to know the U.S.’ s intentions after Mullen’s visit. When we asked Turkish Foreign Ministry officials about when the group from the U.S. would come, they said that the U.S. will make that decision. This showed that the expectation of a group from the U.S. exists in Ankara but is not solidified in Washington yet.
* Or, Mullen might have not conveyed the intentions clearly, such that the U.S. would have a stronger hand negotiating with Turkey after giving an initial message that “the U.S. does not need Turkey during the withdrawal from Iraq.” This way, the U.S. might be reasoning, it will be possible to give the Turkish opposition the chance to say “the U.S. does not urgently need Turkey” against the Turkish government, which looks favorably on many of the U.S. demands, because “the invasion is coming to an end."
* At the same time, a confounding cycle of negotiations about the “missile shield project” is expected to begin in October within NATO and between the U.S. and Turkey. The establishment of a deterrent air defense system against threats such as Iran, Russia and hostile forces to the south of Turkey will begin. If agreed, radar and defense missiles, which could make Turkey a target of attacks, will be located on Turkish soil. The U.S. administration, which repeatedly manifested the wisdom of the Turkish saying “giving up the chicken for the sake of a dangling goose,” might have wanted to avoid squandering its limited extant credibility in Turkey on the heavy military equipment that it intends to withdraw from the Persian Gulf.
Radikal had published a report on the day of Mullen’s address to the media saying “Mullen will not communicate details of the withdrawal from Iraq, but Ankara is expecting a group of diplomats from the U.S. about this issue.” Although we guessed right that Mullen came to meet his newly appointed Turkish counterpart Isik Kosaner, Turkish Chief of Staff, we were wrong that the U.S. wanted to withdraw its armed equipment through Turkish territory.
When Mullen disproved my guess about the reasons for his visit — although I had talked in privately in advance to senior officials from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whom I trusted and knew were involved during the visit — I asked two questions to myself:
1) Mullen might be telling the truth. It is reasonable for the United States, who could not open the northern front in the run-up to the Iraqi invasion because Turkey did not give consent for its territory to be used, to not need Turkey for such an operation as withdrawal from Iraq. However, if this really is the case, why did Turkey say that “they are expecting a group from the U.S. and that if the U.S. demands it they are ready to assess the situation”?
2) Perhaps Mullen is not telling the truth. Yet, if the U.S. needs the Incirlik base to transport its heavy armed equipment back from Iraq, why did Mullen say they “will not have any demands for Turkey in the withdrawal process”?
While looking for answers to these questions, it is possible to conceptualize the following scenarios, considering the clues and information Turkish and American diplomats have given:
* Turkey might be intentionally painting a picture of the U.S. as negotiating the “withdrawal from Iraq” with Turkey in order to breed a further discourse that “the U.S. needs Turkey as it does in many other areas.” Thus, Turkey is drawing a counter discourse: “The U.S. will cross Turkey off its friendly countries list because of Turkey’s uncompromising attitude on Iran and Israel.” Turkey hopes to give the message that no matter who dwells in Washington, “the U.S. cannot cross off Turkey when it is in exigent need of Turkey.” This can be called the “use of fruitful discourse for domestic political purposes.” Yet, the validity of this argument vanishes as Mullen addresses the media.
* Alternatively, perhaps Ankara also anticipated that Mullen was paying a visit because the U.S. wanted to withdraw its armed equipment and heavy war vehicles through Turkey. In other words, Ankara, like Turkish journalists, also might have come to know the U.S.’ s intentions after Mullen’s visit. When we asked Turkish Foreign Ministry officials about when the group from the U.S. would come, they said that the U.S. will make that decision. This showed that the expectation of a group from the U.S. exists in Ankara but is not solidified in Washington yet.
* Or, Mullen might have not conveyed the intentions clearly, such that the U.S. would have a stronger hand negotiating with Turkey after giving an initial message that “the U.S. does not need Turkey during the withdrawal from Iraq.” This way, the U.S. might be reasoning, it will be possible to give the Turkish opposition the chance to say “the U.S. does not urgently need Turkey” against the Turkish government, which looks favorably on many of the U.S. demands, because “the invasion is coming to an end."
* At the same time, a confounding cycle of negotiations about the “missile shield project” is expected to begin in October within NATO and between the U.S. and Turkey. The establishment of a deterrent air defense system against threats such as Iran, Russia and hostile forces to the south of Turkey will begin. If agreed, radar and defense missiles, which could make Turkey a target of attacks, will be located on Turkish soil. The U.S. administration, which repeatedly manifested the wisdom of the Turkish saying “giving up the chicken for the sake of a dangling goose,” might have wanted to avoid squandering its limited extant credibility in Turkey on the heavy military equipment that it intends to withdraw from the Persian Gulf.