Washington in the Eye of the Storm
Twelve days of revolt against the murderous Col. Moammar Gadhafi passed before U.S. President Barack Obama issued his reaction to the events. His reaction was not made as promptly as for similar events in Egypt.
Two weeks of resistance against the popular uprising of the Libyan people passed before Obama “advised” Gadhafi to step down. Conversely, Obama did not hesitate in his advice to Hosni Mubarak to step down from power “immediately,” only a few days after the outbreak of the Egyptian uprising.
Compared to his stance on the events in Egypt, it appears that President Obama’s reaction to the Libyan uprisings is both timid in its content and late: he criticized Gadhafi’s abuses of “international norms and the most basic moral code,” froze assets and property belonging to him and his sons in the United States, and advised him to step down from power.
It is notable that a result of the Libyan uprisings was the unification of tribal bodies with the Libyan people around a national goal to topple the authoritarian regime; this objective inspires the Libyan uprising more than the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. What the Arab world is experiencing today is not uprisings against dictators and despotism, but rather a situation of awakening similar to the awakening of independence that liberated the region from the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
What is happening today is an Arab phenomenon more closely resembling a nationalism that calls for a clear Western stance in support of the region’s people before their rulers. From here comes the most important question about the U.S. position on the Libyan uprising: Why did Obama’s advice to Gadhafi to step down despite the price Libyans paid and are still paying for their freedom come two weeks too late? Is Libyan political freedom more expensive than Egyptian? Why was Washington not as enthusiastic about the Libyan opposition’s request for a no fly zone as it was in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan during the era of former dictator Saddam Hussein?
It could be said that the reason goes back to the ineffectiveness of Washington’s pressure on Libya, unlike its influence in Egypt, especially on the military institution.
It can be said that endorsing the Egyptian leader after Mubarak is more important to American diplomacy. This is evident first, in light of the pivotal position of Egypt in the Arab world and second, in light of the importance of the extent of Israel’s continuing pressure on Washington to maintain the regional balance that laid the basis for the Camp David agreement. Libya was only important after Gadhafi straightened out his differences with Western Europe and the United States and joined the fight against “international terrorism.” Libya’s importance was confined to a role as a primary source of oil for its European allies.
Finally, perhaps the reason for Washington’s late response in taking a clear stance on the Libyan uprising is the continued anxiety about alternative Libyan rulers being Islamic extremists. This is a theory that dictators in the region spread and Moammar Gadhafi continues to circulate.
But is it logical to ignore the United States’ diplomatic and clandestine observations? It is necessary to note the absence of fundamentalists in the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan uprisings, despite Islamist groups’ attempts to join them.
The free Arab uprisings are right to consider it a matter of pride that the United States has had no hand in their movements and that no side has called for Washington’s military intervention to support them.
But Washington, with its strategic and economic interests in the region, is morally and politically responsible for justifying its fears for stability in the region (at least in the short term) in order to work with its European allies to help Egypt, Libya and Tunisia move forward in building modern political institutions, an independent judicial body, and opening up their Constitutions to increase public freedoms and human rights. Washington knows, ahead of all other capitals in the West, that this is the most effective way to ensure stability in the region in the long term.
Two weeks of resistance against the popular uprising of the Libyan people passed before Obama “advised” Gadhafi to step down. Conversely, Obama did not hesitate in his advice to Hosni Mubarak to step down from power “immediately,” only a few days after the outbreak of the Egyptian uprising.
Compared to his stance on the events in Egypt, it appears that President Obama’s reaction to the Libyan uprisings is both timid in its content and late: he criticized Gadhafi’s abuses of “international norms and the most basic moral code,” froze assets and property belonging to him and his sons in the United States, and advised him to step down from power.
It is notable that a result of the Libyan uprisings was the unification of tribal bodies with the Libyan people around a national goal to topple the authoritarian regime; this objective inspires the Libyan uprising more than the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. What the Arab world is experiencing today is not uprisings against dictators and despotism, but rather a situation of awakening similar to the awakening of independence that liberated the region from the Ottoman Empire after World War I.
What is happening today is an Arab phenomenon more closely resembling a nationalism that calls for a clear Western stance in support of the region’s people before their rulers. From here comes the most important question about the U.S. position on the Libyan uprising: Why did Obama’s advice to Gadhafi to step down despite the price Libyans paid and are still paying for their freedom come two weeks too late? Is Libyan political freedom more expensive than Egyptian? Why was Washington not as enthusiastic about the Libyan opposition’s request for a no fly zone as it was in the case of Iraqi Kurdistan during the era of former dictator Saddam Hussein?
It could be said that the reason goes back to the ineffectiveness of Washington’s pressure on Libya, unlike its influence in Egypt, especially on the military institution.
It can be said that endorsing the Egyptian leader after Mubarak is more important to American diplomacy. This is evident first, in light of the pivotal position of Egypt in the Arab world and second, in light of the importance of the extent of Israel’s continuing pressure on Washington to maintain the regional balance that laid the basis for the Camp David agreement. Libya was only important after Gadhafi straightened out his differences with Western Europe and the United States and joined the fight against “international terrorism.” Libya’s importance was confined to a role as a primary source of oil for its European allies.
Finally, perhaps the reason for Washington’s late response in taking a clear stance on the Libyan uprising is the continued anxiety about alternative Libyan rulers being Islamic extremists. This is a theory that dictators in the region spread and Moammar Gadhafi continues to circulate.
But is it logical to ignore the United States’ diplomatic and clandestine observations? It is necessary to note the absence of fundamentalists in the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan uprisings, despite Islamist groups’ attempts to join them.
The free Arab uprisings are right to consider it a matter of pride that the United States has had no hand in their movements and that no side has called for Washington’s military intervention to support them.
But Washington, with its strategic and economic interests in the region, is morally and politically responsible for justifying its fears for stability in the region (at least in the short term) in order to work with its European allies to help Egypt, Libya and Tunisia move forward in building modern political institutions, an independent judicial body, and opening up their Constitutions to increase public freedoms and human rights. Washington knows, ahead of all other capitals in the West, that this is the most effective way to ensure stability in the region in the long term.