A Dangerous Report on Obama’s Desk
Published in Al Quds
(Palestine) on 23 December 2008
by Sa'd Mahiou (link to original)
(Palestine) on 23 December 2008
by Sa'd Mahiou (link to original)
Translated from
by Robert Gonzales.
Edited by Jessica Tesoriero.
Whoever reads the text of the report that the “American Council of Foreign Relations” (the “secret” real maker of presidents and policies in the United States) prepared in cooperation with the Brookings Institute, titled “Restoring the Balance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President,” will be astonished at the extent to which American policies have changed in the Middle East.
It is true that this report, which comes after 18 months of work by 15 American experts in Middle Eastern matters, strongly maintains the principle of greater American strategic interests in the Middle East, but also leaves seemingly endless room for maneuvering of American diplomacy. This doesn’t just include direct talks with Iran and Syria, but even includes recognizing Hamas, if the latter accepts it, with “reduced” provisos of recognizing Israel.
The most prominent recommendations of the report:
Obama will face a series of dangerous and complicated challenges that will require his close attention: the challenge of Iran, a brittle situation in Iraq, weak governments in Lebanon and Palestine, the broken Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and American influence marred by a disfigured reputation.
The president will need to concentrate on Iran, because the clock has begun to tick in its nuclear program. He should deal directly with the Iranian government without preconditions, alongside incentives to prevent it from developing nuclear military capability. At the same time, he should garner international support to impose harsh sanctions if Iran rejects an agreed-upon solution.
He should work to achieve peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially Syria. The Syrian government is now in a position to complete a peace agreement, and differences between Syria and Israel can be bridged.
In addition, the possibility of regaining a strategic position will strengthen efforts to weaken Iranian influence in this sensitive corner of the region, reduce foreign support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and improve the chances for stability in Lebanon.
As for the Palestinian cause, it requires the United States to work, first of all, to support a government of national unity, before it continues with the peace process, and it should deal with Hamas on the condition that it recognize the Arab peace initiative.
These are the main points of the report that now rests on the desk of Obama and his advisors, which for the most part forms (in addition to the Baker-Hamilton report) the core of a new American policy. If it points to anything, it is to the extent and depth of the adjustments to American diplomacy, and its guidelines: from Bush's diplomacy of force to the Obama diplomacy of “soft force.”
However, will a change in form also mean a change in content?
Not at all, especially when we look at the report’s paragraph that emphasizes that the Greater Middle East, “will remain vital to the United States for decades to come, given its geostrategic location, its energy and financial resources, the U.S. commitment to Israel, and the possibility both for terrorism to emanate from the region, and for nuclear materials and weapons to spread there.
Reduced American involvement would jeopardize all these interests.”
Clear?
So they assume!
It is true that this report, which comes after 18 months of work by 15 American experts in Middle Eastern matters, strongly maintains the principle of greater American strategic interests in the Middle East, but also leaves seemingly endless room for maneuvering of American diplomacy. This doesn’t just include direct talks with Iran and Syria, but even includes recognizing Hamas, if the latter accepts it, with “reduced” provisos of recognizing Israel.
The most prominent recommendations of the report:
Obama will face a series of dangerous and complicated challenges that will require his close attention: the challenge of Iran, a brittle situation in Iraq, weak governments in Lebanon and Palestine, the broken Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and American influence marred by a disfigured reputation.
The president will need to concentrate on Iran, because the clock has begun to tick in its nuclear program. He should deal directly with the Iranian government without preconditions, alongside incentives to prevent it from developing nuclear military capability. At the same time, he should garner international support to impose harsh sanctions if Iran rejects an agreed-upon solution.
He should work to achieve peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, especially Syria. The Syrian government is now in a position to complete a peace agreement, and differences between Syria and Israel can be bridged.
In addition, the possibility of regaining a strategic position will strengthen efforts to weaken Iranian influence in this sensitive corner of the region, reduce foreign support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and improve the chances for stability in Lebanon.
As for the Palestinian cause, it requires the United States to work, first of all, to support a government of national unity, before it continues with the peace process, and it should deal with Hamas on the condition that it recognize the Arab peace initiative.
These are the main points of the report that now rests on the desk of Obama and his advisors, which for the most part forms (in addition to the Baker-Hamilton report) the core of a new American policy. If it points to anything, it is to the extent and depth of the adjustments to American diplomacy, and its guidelines: from Bush's diplomacy of force to the Obama diplomacy of “soft force.”
However, will a change in form also mean a change in content?
Not at all, especially when we look at the report’s paragraph that emphasizes that the Greater Middle East, “will remain vital to the United States for decades to come, given its geostrategic location, its energy and financial resources, the U.S. commitment to Israel, and the possibility both for terrorism to emanate from the region, and for nuclear materials and weapons to spread there.
Reduced American involvement would jeopardize all these interests.”
Clear?
So they assume!