The “Betrayal” of Obama

Not surprisingly, Barack Obama sent a letter to his Brazilian counterpart, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in which he approved the plan proposed by Brazil and Turkey at the G-20 meeting. In clear terms, the letter supports a new attempt at diplomatic conciliation by two players hitherto not directly involved in the existing conflict. This tactic is not new in diplomacy. In 1983 — correct me if the date is wrong — the Vatican obtained a favorable solution to the crisis between Chile and Argentina involving the dispute of the Beagle Channel. The possibility of useful discussion increases when the mediators are not associated with either side of the matter in question.

In light of the facts, how can we interpret the “betrayal” of the American president? After all, Lula is “my man,” as Obama himself said in the days after his election. Well, look at what will be in play if Brazil and Turkey manage to convince Iran to accept a proposal that permits the continuation of a nuclear program with minimal monitoring. In the first place, the internal political sphere of the United States has changed and the president does not have the House majority that he had possessed — a Democrat died and was replaced with a Republican. This means that there is greater vulnerability to internal pressures and criticism at a time when the government is announcing and negotiating important economic and social programs.

In the second place, derivative of the first, is the fact that global American leadership, stemming from a political belief in American society from the time of its founders, does not comprehend any international political process in which they are not setting the agenda. Such a perception crystallized after World War II, in which the American military and industrial forces effectively represented the turning point in the war. Obama certainly knew that Lula could advance dialogue with his innate Brazilian charisma, but he may have been surprised by the substantive efficiency that resulted from the negotiations.

Thirdly, and I think this is a relevant point, there is the possibility that with an agreement in which the United States is not directly involved, the question of petroleum and gas becomes strategic. We ran a story in Jornal do Brasil showing that Iran, possessing the second largest oil reserves on the planet, is in urgent need of external refineries for export of its energy resources. Iran is also a manufacturer of oil probes that Brazil ends up renting or buying from other partners.

Furthermore, Iranian society has a positive view of Brazil. A former Brazilian ambassador in Tehran said to me once that Iran is a great potential market, despite being aware that Brazil has strong relations with America. Iran’s perception of Brazilians is that we are people who esteem our independence above all else.

Last is the Israeli lobby in the United States. The Iran crisis is a complicated chess game on a board occupied by the states of the Middle East. If we were to look in terms of regional alliances, Iran becomes the only piece capable of representing some kind of equilibrating force in the Arab world in the face of the powerful and immutable alliance between the U.S. and Israel. An accord obtained in defiance of American negotiators and independent of the powerful Jewish lobby in the United States could be threatening to the authorities in Tel Aviv, given the belligerent speech by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Nothing against the Brazilian action, this is already clear: Israel’s position is that it is impossible to accept an Iran that denies the Holocaust and does not recognize Israel. Despite knowing this speech is a political tool used to affirm Tehran to the rest of the Muslim world — itself with deep internal divisions — it is understandable that the Israelis do not want to wait and see.

This episode reveals the subtlety of the Brazilian government. Despite the open and clear betrayal of Obama — who remained silent in the face of the truculence Secretary of State Hillary Clinton exhibited toward Iran — Lula did not expose the aces up his sleeve in order to demoralize the American attitude. He preferred instead to capitalize on the apparent loss from assuming a position of independence in the face of American decisions and the powers of the U.N. Security Council.

The Brazilian self-affirmation in this episode is the greatest moment of national diplomacy in recent decades — the only other similar case I can think of was when General Ernest Geisel broke from Washington to sign a nuclear accord with Germany in 1975. Apart from the success or failure of the deal, Brazil has entered the story, this time as a protagonist capable of delivering what has been promised. The fact that Brazil is sufficiently strong economically to challenge American leadership today is more symbolic to the United States than it is substantial to the rest of the world.