What the Return of Muqtada Al-Sadr Means for Americans

The leader of the Sadrist movement, Mr. Muqtada al-Sadr, returned to Iraq last week. The Western press did not cease to talk about this important event, the implications of this return and what consequences it will have on the Iraqi political scene and on future projects for the U.S. administration in Iraq, especially when troops in Iraq will pull out at the end of this year as stipulated by the Iraqi-American agreement.

One of the important articles which talked about the return of Muqtada al-Sadr was by the British author Michael Boyle, who wrote in The Guardian on Jan. 11, 2011, an article in which he talked about what this means from the standpoint of the U.S. administration, how it sees the return and its impact on its future in Iraq. Below is the article followed by some related observations. The writer says:

“When Moqtada al-Sadr left Iraq in 2007, many U.S. officials hoped that his Sadrist movement — which had waged a bitter insurgency against American forces there since 2004 — would fade from prominence once the Iraqi government retook control of much of the country from the insurgency. His hurried departure from Iraq was prompted by a joint U.S.-Iraq effort to confront his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), and to restore parts of Baghdad that they ran to Iraqi government control. Without even a formal announcement, Sadr fled to Iran to escape the crackdown, infuriating those among his supporters who wanted him to continue the resistance against U.S. forces and the Iraqi government.

“His return to Iraqi politics last week has proved that his decision to go to Iran at the height of the U.S. offensive was a tactical retreat but a strategic victory. Sadr used his time to bolster his religious credentials by studying in Iran, while his political movement gradually rejoined Iraqi politics and won 39 seats in the elections last March. The result is that Sadr and his allies look as powerful as ever. Once considered an irredeemable enemy of the Iraqi government, Sadr recently found himself playing the role of kingmaker in ensuring its survival. In October, he helped to forge the political compromise that restored Nouri al-Maliki to power by throwing his support by the Maliki’s State of Law party to form a governing coalition.

“The rapturous crowds that greeted Sadr upon his return indicate that this calculation paid off: His backing of the government is crucial; yet, as an outsider to the government, he can use the bully pulpit to pressure the prime minister and, if needed, change the trajectory of Iraqi politics. In a bitter irony, given his role in forcing the departure of Sadr, Maliki is now dependent on the cleric for his political survival, while Sadr’s supporters have made it clear that their support is conditional on whether Maliki continues to do things that they approve of.

“The return of Sadr to prominence in Iraqi politics is not a result that the U.S. or UK should welcome, despite the measured support that Sadr offered for the government in his major address. To start with, there is a standing arrest warrant out for Sadr for his involvement in the murder of the respected Shia cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei. That the current Iraqi government appears to be willing to permit his return without pursuing this matter does not increase one’s faith in their respect for the rule of law. His continuing political influence in Iraq, despite these charges, is a visible symbol of the government’s weakness and its dependence on those who nearly pushed Iraq into civil war not so long ago.

“Then, while he has cautiously embraced the Iraqi government, Sadr remains deeply hostile to the U.S. and UK, reminding his followers yesterday that the U.S., Britain and Israel are the ‘common enemies’ of the Iraqi people. He has called on his followers to continue the ‘resistance’ against the U.S., though, of course, he has remained vague about what exactly that means. That is precisely the point: ‘resistance’ is whatever he wants it mean at that moment, which will almost by definition be opposite to what the U.S. would like to see happen in Iraq. His return as the vanguard of the resistance may destroy American hopes to remain in Iraq in a support capacity, after their withdrawal at the end of the year.

“Sadr may sometimes play the part of a pragmatic politician, but he is not a natural democrat and would be willing to play any card — including violence — to maintain his influence. Despite his careful tone in recent statements, it is unlikely that he has suddenly become a voice for tolerance and reasonable government. His prominence is likely to alarm moderate Sunnis and Kurds, and if he continues to agitate for sectarian causes, it is possible that he may undermine the fragile compromise that permitted the formation of an Iraqi government. Even worse, his instinct is for Hezbollah-style quasi-religious rule, and his movement’s control over a number of key ministries (including housing and labour) means that little stands in his way of achieving this. The real losers in his return will be those Iraqis who wish to see their government work on a non-sectarian basis, because his movement is likely to seek to transform their religious preferences into government policy.

“Finally, Sadr has only managed to achieve such level of influence because he is backed by Iran. Only under pressure from Iran did he compromise so far as to throw his weight behind Maliki, who once tried to destroy his movement, as the leader of the Iraqi government. The return of Sadr to Iraqi politics may have actually strengthened the hand of Iran, for now Tehran has a powerful ally who can ensure that events in Iraq occur to their liking.

“One of the bitter ironies of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq is that its attempt to create a liberal democracy in the region wound up leaving its longtime enemy as a key power broker in the region.

“Despite all of these reasons to be worried about Sadr, it is not clear what the U.S. can do to influence events in Iraq, now that he has returned. Prime Minister Maliki is determined that the U.S. follow through on the Status of Forces Agreement, which would see all U.S. forces depart the country by December 2011. Even now, the U.S. has withdrawn most of its active combat forces from Iraq and is playing a much less central role in Iraqi politics. Now that they have been shown the door by the Maliki government, the U.S. will lose much of its remaining leverage in Iraq, and local political actors like Sadr will find it less costly to grandstand against whatever the U.S. recommends, no matter how sensible.

“That Sadr’s return holds out the prospect of a return to violence or increasingly illiberal government in Iraq is clear. But it is also now clear that events in Iraq have slipped out of the hands of the U.S., turning America into a bystander in the aftermath of a war of its own making. Whether Iraq will continue to consolidate its fragile gains, or slip back into violence or authoritarian government, is a matter that the Obama administration may find very hard to influence.”

Now I’ll comment on some of the article’s observations and provisions. I will put down the author’s words followed by my comment.

“Sadr once considered an irredeemable enemy of the Iraqi government.” The Iraqi government does not consider al-Sadr an enemy, in spite of the battles that occurred between his movement and the government. The disagreement is relative, not absolute, and now he is part of the government even though he differs with them regarding how to deal with foreign troops on Iraqi soil.

“Maliki is now dependent on the cleric for his political survival.” Maliki did not depend on the cleric but relied on his ability to use political tactics on maneuvers to negotiate and win parties inside and out, which made him eligible for the post of prime minister.

“His continuing political influence in Iraq, despite these charges, is a visible symbol of the government’s weakness and its dependence on those who nearly pushed Iraq into civil war not so long ago.” Sadr’s increased popularity has a number of factors, some related to being the heir to his father, who had overwhelming popularity among young Shiites, some related to the presence of Sadr and his movement near the areas where the poorer classes live. These groups constitute the majority of his movement.

“…pushed Iraq into civil war.” To be objective and historically fair, it was not the Sadrist movement who pushed Iraq to a civil war. Al-Qaida is the main reason for the events that took place in Iraq in 2006 and 2007, when they carried out terrorist operations against Shiite shrines and residential areas.

“…Would be willing to play any card — including violence — to maintain his influence.” It’s not that way. Violence is an inferior approach; when it is used by a politician, he won’t be a politician any more but the leader of gangs and a terrorist. Sadr is far from that; he does not need violence to strengthen his position, and the recent elections have proved that. They got, using politics, the largest number of parliamentary seats that any party can obtain.

“His prominence is likely to alarm moderate Sunnis and Kurds.” This is not valid. Sadr did not terrify the Kurds, let alone the moderate Sunnis. Maybe he scares the terrorist organization al-Qaida and like-minded organizations of armed Shiites who disagree with him, especially Asaeb Ahel Al Haq.

“Finally, Sadr has only managed to achieve such level of influence because he is backed by Iran.” Sadr is supported by his popularity among the poor and has nothing to do with Iran, and the current results of the elections are a clear example of this.

“Maliki, who once tried to destroy his movement…” I do not think that Maliki wants to do that at this time, especially after the support he had from Sadr.

“The return of Sadr to Iraqi politics may have actually strengthened the hand of Iran.” The link between Sadr and Iran is not absolutely always as such; even though he had settled in Iran for several years, there are differences between him and them. Some believe that “in spite of his rousing speech to problems it is better to have Sadr in Iraq than in Iran because if he was in Iran he could be managed by them,”* as a U.S. military commander said to Fox News on Wednesday, Jan. 12, 2011.

Sadr’s return has enhanced the scene of violence or the emergence of a non-liberal government, which is a view embraced by some analysts who see his return as a potential return of violence to Iraqi streets. But we must not forget that there is another view which foresees the opposite of that — for example by Nizar Latif, who wrote in The National newspaper on Saturday, Jan. 9, 2011, an article titled “Al Sadr Adopts More Moderate Stance.” The title is clear on content and significance. This view carries a lot of truth as Sadr and his movement, through the new policy they followed, has obtained important positions in the government and 39 members in the Iraqi parliament. If the Sadrist movement continues to walk this line, and continues to review its policies and remove any bad elements that would harm them, this might not be their last major post in the Iraqi government. Next session they might be the party of the prime minister.

*Editor’s note: This quotation, accurately translated, could not be verified.

The link to the Guardian article is here