There’s No Such Thing as the Obama Doctrine

Every few months, commentators find a new grand strategy that regenerates Barack Obama. First he was an anti-war candidate; the beginning of the Democratic primary election had a lot to do with his early and shrewd opposition to the Iraq War. Even some right-wingers, including Robert Kagan, pointed out that he was an interventionist regarding Afghanistan and certain other issues. Some criticized his multi-faceted approach, which offered dialogues with Iran, Russia and China, as a being biased. More recently, Daniel Drezner claimed that the new strategy was a “counter attack” by analyzing the determined negotiation attempts with countries under the threat of China.

So what is the Obama Doctrine? In fact, the question itself is confusing. Doctrinal approach to foreign policy is no longer very plausible. All but one of America’s foreign policy “doctrines” were formulated when the United States’ policy toward a single nation, the Soviet Union, dominated the entire U.S. strategy. This policy became the defining feature of global relations due to the bipolar world formulated during the Cold War. (The Monroe Doctrine is an exception.) In today’s multi-polar, multi-layered world, none of America’s foreign policy is based on a central foundation. While other regions need to implement unique approaches, the policy seems to be getting more variable and inconsistent.

However, Obama had a different worldview and a thoughtful attitude about international relations. His opinions seemed to be direct and consistent. Since the beginning of the presidential campaign, he said that he thinks that the main argument of American foreign politics lies “between ideology and realism” and positioned himself accordingly. When he gave an interview with David Brooks in May 2008 he said, “I have enormous sympathy for the foreign policy of George H. W. Bush.” He repeated his admiration once again when he gave an interview on CNN in 2008. However, he also praised Harry Truman, Dean Acheson and George Kennan for being masters of foreign politics. Rahm Emanuel when he was chief of staff in the White House, told The New York Times in April of 2010, “if you had to put him in a category, he’s probably more realpolitik, like Bush 41.”

Commentators said many things about his reaction to the Arab Spring, especially his May 19 speech, in which he pointed out why American support is necessary for the development of democracy in the region. All former U.S. presidents have supported democracy and they should continue to do so. The real question is: Should this support consist of active enforcement, particularly by the military, to bring down the undemocratic regimes? At this point, you can see that pragmatism is behind rhetoric. When members of the Obama administration were caught off guard by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, which had surprised their leaders and people as well, they saw that the protests in Egypt would be successful and they chose not to oppose what was inevitable. Ronald Reagan took two years to oppose Ferdinand Marcos. It took just two weeks for Obama to call for Hosni Mubarak to resign.

The fashionable criticism now is that Obama doesn’t have a coherent policy on the Arab Spring. But should he have one? America’s ability to affect and change the situations in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia contain multiple variables. Let’s talk about Saudi Arabia, a country where the United States’ interests and values clash most severely. If the U.S. began to pressure the Riyadh regime to change and supported the major protests, it would mean supporting instability in the Saudi Kingdom, and oil prices would rise. The U.S. and most other developed countries would be weakened. In the mean time, legitimate power and the rich Saudi regime could probably afford it, but they would have the hatred of all of Washington. So what exactly does more a “stable” Middle East policy achieve?

The Libyan administration encountered a humanitarian crisis and Moammar Gadhafi’s opposition called for the Arab Union, the United Nations and certain European allies to call for an international intervention. The opposition in Libya found a way to get their multinational intervention; however, they were limited to disciplinary intervention. Syria is different because the regime is under the control of a stricter and more powerful administration. It is useful to mention that some commentators wanted Obama to spell out a resignation option for Bashar al-Assad, and also criticized him for his call to encourage Gadhafi to step down in Libya. Perhaps they want us to go war with Syria as well, which would put us in a war with four countries.

In all of these situations, what determines the policy of the administration is the intense balancing of cost and benefits. Ever since Versailles, Vietnam and Iraq, declaring single doctrine policies has called for great commitment, great financial cost and enormous expenses in modern American politics. We have just ended a decade in which rhetoric and numerous interventions took place, and we are still paying for it. So far, Congress has spent more than $1.3 trillion, not to mention the incredible value of lost human life. In this case, a foreign policy that is strategic and self-sufficient, when necessary, is proper and reasonable.