A Test of the U.S. with Civilian Turkey

Friday, July 29 is a historic date, marking the official end of the military-dominated political system in Turkey and the strengthening of democratic civilian authority.

The government asks for the retirement of the top echelon of the military, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) agrees; this tests the sincerity of attitudes about democracy for both insiders and outsiders. At this point, attention naturally turns to the U.S., which is closely interested in the internal politics of Turkey and has had very special connections with the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) since the Cold War.

The U.S., whose official discourse emphasizes democracy, was expected to applaud Turkey for becoming civilian-controlled. Unfortunately, that is not what Washington is thinking. Since the AKP became Turkey’s ruling party, unconventional moves from the AKP have been nervously welcomed as suspect by the U.S.; perhaps these habits originated during the Cold War, and the pragmatic approach of the U.S. has not changed. A large number of critical cases, such as that of Ergenekon and Sledgehammer, for which TAF members will go to trial, are among these practices. The militaristic Kemalist elite has been taking defeat after defeat as they lose their strategic positions in Washington. The U.S. cannot understand July 29 without greater context.

The military attempts to claim that the liquidation of some anti-participatory democratic groups forms part of a big outsiders’ plan that involves the U.S. as well. In this way, the nationalist side wants to decrease social support for recent developments and progress, while, in my opinion, no progressive development in Turkey’s recent political circumstances will exclude the U.S. Washington has wanted the AKP and their supporters weakened since the memorandum of the March 1, 2003, crisis. Although they do not like the U.S., some other groups in power, including the general staff of the TAF, have become de facto allies since they expect the same result that the U.S. expects. The red line in these relations would be an actual physical coup. Besides that, we have neither seen nor heard any serious objection from Washington about the military’s recent attempts in political engineering.

Many factors concerning the balance and control of democracy affect the U.S. attitude toward assisting the weakening of the AKP and its supporters. The American foreign policy elite belittles conservative religious groups and overlooks their worldview and lifestyle in Turkey. Independent foreign policy practices followed by Ankara, which have been supported by these kinds of groups, are increasing the inconvenience level of Washington. Do not be misled by the U.S. wish to maintain close relations with the present government of Turkey because of Turkey’s geopolitical importance.

In contrast to the Brussels reforms, which are active and courageous in the general sense, Washington has become the main base abroad for Turkey’s pro-status quo elite who gain support and receive positive reactions for their practices. The number of military staff who have tried to adapt to Washington’s plan is no fewer. Washington has welcomed the people working to increase the legitimacy of trials, such as that of Ergenekon, and to change some habits of the TAF staff, such as rebellious gangs and coups. Although the U.S. administration is not directly involved in these practices, many officials, think tank organizations and other contractors intercede in these issues and work with the Turkish administration.

Many times, since the beginning of the Ergenekon trial and the taking into custody of some military staff, we have heard reproaches from Washington, such as, “Turkey needs a military as well.” Washington also worries that the military cannot function if it keeps dealing with trials. It is understandable why the U.S. would worry about the Turkish military, as it plays a crucial role for NATO and the U.S. as well. However, it is neither useful nor ethical to back up some illegal organized practices in the military just for the sake of other functions of the Turkish military and NATO. It is more useful for NATO and the U.S. to work with a military that is free of democratic problems and focused on its actual job. Restriction of its ability to intervene in politics in this manner would also enhance the reputation of the TAF and the U.S. as well. A close relationship between a powerful Turkish and U.S. military would be win-win situation for both sides unless the U.S. were to cover up the Turkish military’s undemocratic practices.

It is challenging that Washington is one of the capitals that seems to adequately understand and accept the situation that is the multi-armed process of abolishing the military’s role in Turkish politics. I think the main engine to the social and political movements of this transformation, which is the religious dimension, is turning heads. I hope the American foreign policy elite will not waste any more of their nation’s time by anticipating a Turkey made up of Kemalists and white Turks. It will be profitable for both sides, particularly Washington, when both begin working together with the new Turkish system that interacts with civilians and the military as if they were two separate states. Our expectations for new Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces Necdet Özel and his new team are that, by contributing to this process, they will accelerate U.S. understanding toward Turkey’s new system.