The Dangers of Extending the American Occupation on Iraq and Regional Security

In accordance with the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement, the total withdrawal of American forces from Iraq by the end of this year is quickly approaching. American officials are intensifying their pressure on Iraq to extend the efforts of these forces or to maintain their role after the end of the year in one of two ways: an official Iraqi agreement that extends the engagement on the grounds that America is responding to Iraqi desires or, if Iraq refuses, an extension decided by the American administration despite the desires of the Iraqis.

The strangest of the American efforts to extend their presence is the argument that American interests will put pressure on Iraqis and coerce them until they act under the guidance of the new U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to implement military operations unilaterally, in contrast to the provisions of the security agreement. These excuses, according to the former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, range from “reassuring American allies and showing Iran that they will not leave the region”* to “Iraq’s need of assistance in several military aspects including intelligence work and air defense.”* This effort was employed to serve the region and is not linked entirely to American interests or to the Israeli interest in maintaining the weakness of Arabs to mitigate the threat to its existence and regional security.

Apart from the political deception of the United States regarding its endeavors to extend its unjustified military efforts in Iraq, its arguments attempt to form a consensus among some countries in the region based on their assertion that they intend to reassure their allies and show Iran that they will remain in the region. Far from this blatant political hypocrisy and its use to justify American military efforts, the insistence of the United States on leaving a small, symbolic force stems broadly from its strategy. This reveals the truth that America is not a voluntary defensive force moving around the world to protect people and that the region itself takes a place in the strategic interests of the United States. The greatest among these is maintaining a field presence in the region and using pressure to continue its efforts, even under the conditions agreed to last year, the most important of which are below.

First is Iraq’s prevention of exacerbating of the outcomes of war and their destructive political effects on its geopolitical position. The end of the war and withdrawal of the occupation mean one thing: Iraq will enter a phase of historical advantages, including a different national strength and independence. Most importantly, it will start to return to its historical political and national unity and restore its role in the Arab world and the region, which is compatible with its geographical position and the substance and tendencies of its people toward independence and freedom.

The United States will recognize the risks of restoring Iraq’s unity and its historical role in its interests and Israeli interests, which drove the politics of the invasion. The idea of extension was to prevent Iraq from benefiting after the war, and ensuring its exit from the war results in no less than a continuation of Iraq’s divisions and taking advantage of domestic divisions regarding the from of government, the political system, identity and its role.

Second is Iraq’s building of a platform to threaten particular countries in the region from land, sea and air. Threatening countries that refuse all forms of foreign intervention in the region prevents progress and exploitation of its resources and creates divisions among its members.

What tempts America to pursue this aim is Iraq’s border with Iran, its geographic proximity to the center of the region, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is possible that its position is of strategic value to countries around Israel, especially Syria, in case it may reunify and restore its role. As American forces remain in Iraq, the United States will be able to issue a direct threat to the region and try to impose policies that serve Western interests and Israeli security.

Third, and more serious, is the probability that the extension is a means to keep American forces close to Iran to prepare and be able to fight any probable war against Iran, whether initiated by America or whether Israel is pressured to carry it out for the sake of curbing the worsening threat of Iran to American presence and Israeli aggression. The goal of Iran’s insistence on its peaceful nuclear efforts, its continued support for Palestinian issues, and its decision to resist is such that a possible war requires the implementation and realization of the best results of the geographic proximity currently provided by Iraq through direct U.S. military presence.

If that were all that it means to seize Iraq’s independence and change it to a bridgehead for military intervention of the widest perspective to threaten Arabs and the countries in the region, then it is necessary to ensure Iraq’s independence. National and regional security demands that all the countries of the region refuse the extension and permanent efforts and the end of any form of American military efforts in the Middle East.