We believe we may know what U.S. President Obama said to Traian Băsescu during the latter’s visit to Washington, from what we have heard and from the Romanian head of state’s accounts. But this is not all, because we are talking about diplomacy here — where things that are not said, but understood nonetheless, are at least as important as official statements.
However, Obama was extremely clear. Using diplomatic language, he did convey his message, although he may not have been clear enough for those who, without knowing a thing about international relations, are discussing Băsescu’s visit on TV. And we should bear in mind the things he said about our relationship with the U.S., about the way in which the U.S. sees Băsescu and about other things, like visas. So what did Obama actually say without talking?
“Dear Traian, Romania has been and will continue to be important for the U.S. — the thing is that we are certain it would have remained so anyway. We do not have to push the Romanians or do them special favors; as a matter of fact, we are delighted that they are the ones who want to do these things for us. We do not have to try too hard.”
In translation: It is not primarily about Băsescu; it is about Romania. Obama can throw lavish receptions for despicable dictators who violate the rights of their population and mismanage their countries, because they must be kept close or brought closer to the U.S. That is not the case for Romania. We are firmly anchored to the U.S., and we will remain so because our affinities go in this direction and our deepest interests demand it.
“We accepted this meeting because you, Traian Băsescu, wanted it and requested it. We did this for our important relationship and because it was ok for you, but it does not mean that we had to organize a state visit or receive you with special honors. It was not necessary, and we did not have reasons to do that.”
By now it should have been clear enough for everyone that the Romanian side was the one that insisted on a meeting with Obama and not the other way around, as everyone could see from the short meeting.
In fact, the meeting, whose main purpose was the signing of some agreements related to foreign affairs ministers, might as well not have existed. It was not necessary. But Băsescu knew that this was something that would help his image. And if somebody actually imagined that Băsescu went to the U.S. aimlessly, without knowing beforehand that he would see Obama, they do not know a thing about diplomacy.
The Romanian side must have pushed for a meeting until they got it, before the president crossed the ocean. And was it an image success? Probably not. It was, however, a success in that they managed to organize a meeting that had no reason to be held.
“The anti-missile shield does not mean that American politics is still focused on the Black Sea or on a confrontation with Russia in the Black Sea, as during the George W. Bush administration in 2005-2006, when Romania was the regional spearhead of anti-Russian rhetoric and action.”
The explanation? We must understand one thing. Things have changed in our region. It is not only that Obama’s policy is no longer following Bush’s projects, which were aimed at attracting the Ukraine and Georgia to NATO and which placed him in an antagonistic relationship with Russia; on the contrary. American foreign policy is no longer centered on the Black Sea and Eastern European region, but on South Asia, the Arab world and Iran, or the Pacific region. In Europe, the relationship with Russia has not been better since 2002.
There are two things that prove this. The first is the shield itself. What we can see is not the shield designed by Bush Jr. No. It is a compromise shield. Obama gave the Russians a less threatening shield, capable of intercepting only medium-range missiles. Not long-range missiles, such as the first, which would have bothered Russia more than the current one.
The second — let us think about Libya. If the Russians had not consented to it, the NATO intervention run there under the auspices of the U.N. could not have taken place. The intervention would not have been authorized by the Security Council, in which Russia has the power of veto, and would have been accused of violating international law, similar to the intervention in Iraq.
This helps us understand the importance of America’s relationship with Russia and why Romania is playing another role in the Black Sea.
“The talk on visas and taking action to waive them is a result of your insistence, but it means almost nothing. Visas will stay in place. That ’we will work on it, make efforts, do something’ does not mean we will remove the visas; we are just stalling to get you off our backs. This is what George W. Bush did as well — ‘work’ together with the representatives of Congress for this purpose. You can see the result — nothing has changed. And nothing will change too soon.”
Visas will stay in place.
“America is very cool, and we know it.”
Indeed it is.
Ce i-a spus Obama lui Basescu fara sa vorbeasca
Credem ca stim ca i-a spus presedintele american Obama lui Traian Basescu, in timpul vizitei acestuia din urma la Washington. Din ce-am auzit si ce a povestit seful statului roman. Dar asta nu e nici pe departe tot. Pentru ca vorbim de diplomatie aici, in care ce se nu se spune, dar se intelege, e cel putin la fel de important ca declaratiile oficiale.
Dar Obama a vorbit extrem de clar. In limbaj diplomatic. Sigur, nu suficient de clar pentru toti cei care n-au habar de relatii internationale, dar care comenteaza pe la televizor vizita lui Basescu, dar a vorbit. Si a spus lucruri pe care trebuie sa le retinem. Despre relatia noastra cu Statele Unite, despre cum il vad pe Traian Basescu si despre alte lucruri, precum vizele. Deci, ce-a spus Obama, fara sa vorbeasca, pana la urma?
Draga Traian, Romania e importanta pentru SUA si asa va fi si de acum incolo - ideea e ca oricum suntem siguri ca asa ar fi ramas, oricum. Nu trebuie sa tragem de romani, nu avem nevoie sa le facem servicii speciale, ba chiar suntem incantati de faptul ca ei sunt cei care vor. Nu ne straduim peste puteri.
In traducere - nu e vorba de Basescu in primul rand, e vorba de Romania. Obama e capabil sa faca adevarate primiri de gala pentru dictatori odiosi, care incalca drepturile oamenilor pe care-i stapanesc si isi conduc rau tara, dar care trebuie mentinuti sau atrasi aproape de SUA. La Romania, nu e cazul. Suntem ferm ancorati de SUA si asa vom ramane. Pentru ca afinitatile noastre merg in directia asta si pentru ca interesele noastre cele mai profunde cer asta.
Am acceptat intalnirea asta pentru ca tu, Traian Basescu, ai vrut-o si ai cerut-o. Am facut asta pentru relatia importanta si pentru ca era ok pentru tine, dar asta nu inseamna ca trebuia sa facem vizita de stat sau sa-ti dam onoruri deosebite. Nu e necesar si nu avem motive.
Pana la ora asta, ar trebui sa fie destul de clar pentru toata lumea ca partea romana a fost cea care a insistat pentru o intalnire cu Obama, nu invers. Dupa cum s-a si vazut din scurta intalnire.
Ba din contra, intalnirea, care era destinata in primul rand semnarii unor acorduri care tineau de ministrii de Externe, ar fi putut sa nu existe. Nu era necesara. Dar Traian Basescu stia ca poate fi ceva ce ajuta la imagine. Si, daca cineva isi inchipuia ca Basescu s-ar fi dus in SUA haihui, fara sa stie dinainte ca se vede cu Obama, inseamna ca nu stie exact ce inseamna diplomatia.
Partea romana trebuie sa fi presat pentru o intalnire si a obtinut-o. Dinainte sa treaca Oceanul. Ca n-a fost un succes de imagine? Posibil. A fost un succes prin faptul ca a reusit o intalnire care n-avea de ce sa aiba loc.
Scutul antiracheta nu inseamna ca politica americana mai e concentrata pe Marea Neagra sau pe o confruntare cu Rusia la Marea Neagra, precum se intampla pe vremea lui George W. Bush, in 2005-2006, cand Romania era varful de lance regional al retoricii si actiunii antirusesti.
Explicatia? Trebuie sa intelegem un lucru. In regiunea noastra, lucrurile s-au schimbat. Nu doar ca politica lui Obama nu mai urmareste proiectele lui Bush, de atragere a Ucrainei si Georgiei in NATO si, implicit, de antagonism cu Rusia, ba din contra. Politica externa americana nu se mai concentreaza pe regiunea Marii Negre si Europa de Est, ci pe Asia de Sud, lumea araba si Iranul sau regiunea PAcifica. In Europa, relatiile cu Rusia sunt mai bune decat au fost vreodata, din 2002 incoace.
Ca lucrurile stau asa ne-o dovedesc doua lucruri. Primul e chiar scutul. Ceea ce se vede nu e scutul ala proiectat de Bush jr. Nu. E un scut-compromis. In care Obama le-a dat rusilor un scut mai putin amenintator, capabil sa intercepteze doar rachete cu raza media de actiune. Nu cu raza lunga, precum primul, care i-ar fi deranjat pe rusi mai mult decat acesta.
Al doilea - sa ne gandim la Libia. Daca rusii n-ar fi vrut, interventia NATO sub egida ONU de acolo n-ar fi avut loc. Ar fi fost una fara mandatul Consiliului de Securitate, unde rusii au drept de veto, deci una care ar fi fost acuzata ca incalca, precum cea din Irak, legea internationala.
Asta ca, sa intelegem cat de importanta e relatia Americii cu Rusia si de ce rolul Romaniei la Marea Neagra e altul.
Discutia despre vize si asumarea unei actiuni de inlaturare a lor vine tot in urma insistentelor voastre, dar nu inseamna mai nimic. Vizele vor ramane. Ca "vom lucra, vom depune eforturi, vom face ceva" nu inseamna ca le vom scoate - doar ca tragem de timp, ca sa nu ne mai bateti la cap. Asa a facut, de altfel, si George W. Bush, ca "va lucra" si el impreuna cu reprezentantii Congresului pentru asta. Rezultatul il vedeti - nimic nu s-a schimbat. Si nu se va schimba foarte curand.
Vizele vor ramane.
America e foarte tare si e constienta de asta.
Este.
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