China Doesn't Have Nuclear Weapons? An American Candidate's Ignorant Warning

Surprisingly, American Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain did not know that China was a country in possession of nuclear weapons, and American public opinion ridiculed his ignorance. Cain argued that China’s nuclear capability could not be compared with America’s; this is probably his reason for overlooking and disregarding China’s nuclear capability.

This greatly shocked American public opinion, but the Chinese should be the ones who are truly startled. Cain is pretty clueless, and ignorant yet again. He was once the CEO of a large American company, a television anchor and a columnist. He belongs to an elite group of Americans. He is not a satirical street corner bum going into the election. The structure of his knowledge and the extent of his ignorance toward China are definitely not unique among the American elite. There is no question that his attitude is, to a certain extent, representative.

This is an era when American political circles are intensively discussing China: Various adjustments to China policy are in the pipeline, the scope of American politicians participating in the discussions is increasing and their positions are becoming increasingly pointed. However, Cain’s ignorance is telling us just how weak and distorted the general cognitive underpinnings of this great debate on China are. Some claim that the “punish China” people very possibly have no idea at all what they themselves are saying: What their mouths are saying is China and what their hearts are aiming at is China, but that China and the real China are simply not the same country.

What Chinese people should be shocked about is that we, ourselves, believe that it is enough to use Chinese nuclear strength as an effective strategic deterrent, but perhaps it does not really achieve this. Yes, the American military may not suspect that China possesses nuclear retaliatory capability, and this is probably also the case for American China-policy decision makers. As a basis for drafting their China strategy, they will not question China’s capability.

However, American societal attitudes and foreign politicians’ opinions toward China will, to a great extent, influence the central themes of American officials’ China policies. When Cain did not know that China possesses nuclear weapons, it implied that Chinese nuclear power has left behind too shallow of an impression on American society. China is a nuclear weapons country; this reality, in many instances, does not enter into the portrayal of American society’s feelings and attitudes toward China.

This is dangerous: When China-United States friction gradually increases, the variables in U.S. China policy will also increase and American society’s understanding of the quality and nature of China’s national strength will be obscured, which could possibly result in a directional misunderstanding that harms bilateral relations.

This again reminds us that China must take some action toward modernizing and strengthening its strategic nuclear forces. These actions should be carried out within the scope of relevant international conventions and the commitments that China has made, but China should not be too concerned about the idle chatter of international public opinion. Given that China’s future international status will become more and more sensitive, the fundamental role of nuclear forces in Chinese national security cannot be compared with any other strategic weapon.

Believing that so long as you possess nuclear weapons it is all right, that their quantity and quality does not matter and that just possessing them is enough to support China’s strategic deterrent — this kind of viewpoint is shallow. In 2006, two American scholars wrote an article in Foreign Affairs magazine saying that America could, in one instant, destroy the strategic arsenal of Russia or China. Even though this viewpoint is widely called into question, it clearly increased American society’s contempt for China’s nuclear force.

The deterrent strength of China’s nuclear force should be enough to eliminate Cain’s “blind spot of understanding,” and should be enough to check some Americans from using military methods to influence the intentions of Chinese-United States’ competition. China strengthening its strategic forces is not for the sake of changing from a defensive to an offensive posture in mutual deterrence against the United States; China has never had the need to do as much. But we need to act. China’s defensive stance has the strength of cool-headed power, and will bring about a corresponding change in the offensive connotation, thereby increasing peaceful rationality while also increasing forcefulness.